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To my parents

But if anyone persists in investigating the reason for that [hidden] will, refusing to
pay heed to our warning, we let him go on and fight with God like the Giants, while
we wait to see what triumphs he will bring back, certain that he will do no harm to
our cause and no good to his own.
Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will
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ABSTRACT

Meyer, Joel P. "Christian Justification after Nihilism." Ph.D. diss., Concordia Seminary,
2012. [235] pp.
This dissertation addresses the problem that nihilism presents to Christian faith and life.
North Atlantic Christians live in an age when nihilism is a normal condition. The world does not
appear to have one clear and unquestionable meaning. Instead, each of us has convictions about
the world that we hold dear. But we realize that other people hold drastically different
convictions than our own, and we have no absolute way of determining the validity of one set
over another. So they appear to us as values, rather than the way things are, grounded in nothing
more than our own will and desire to hold them. In such an age Christians are confronted with
the question of justification in its broadest sense: what reasons do we have for living as we do
rather than some other way?
This dissertation asks whether Christians have reasons for their faith and life beyond their
own will and desire to hold them. Christians are tempted, in this age, to trade on the value of
Christianity, justifying it on the basis of its practical or aesthetic appeal. But this only reinforces
the notion that Christianity is grounded in nothing more than our own will and desire. Instead,
this dissertation argues that Christianity can only move beyond our nihilism by appealing to the
authority of God's act through the man Jesus of Nazareth. In order to maintain the authority of
God's act in Jesus, however, Christians will have to give up the Platonic assumption that God is
the principled and rational ground of our existence, which is intelligible to any reasonable, goodwilled person. This Platonic assumption leads Christians to construe God as a conjecture of
human reason. Instead Christians will have to embrace an understanding of God as the personal,
willful, and inscrutable creator, who speaks and acts intelligibly only through the man Jesus of
Nazareth.

viii

INTRODUCTION
This dissertation will address the problem that many Christians in the North Atlantic West
no longer have a good reason to go to church beyond the value they find in it. I There are, of
course, different qualities of value. We can place a high value on Christianity by describing how
it helps us make our way through life, providing therapeutic comfort or useful moral direction.
Or we can place a low value on Christianity by having nothing more to say about it besides the
observation that this is what we have always done. In either case, though, Christian faith and life
today often appear as values; convictions we hold dear and nothing more. Traditionally,
Christianity provided compelling claims about the way things are and a path of discipleship that
would lead us to live a more righteous and holy life. Christianity was not valuable; it was true.
But now it appears to be another option for us to appropriate among a variety of others, and we
tend to practice Christianity insofar as it has some practical or aesthetic benefit.
One way to describe this problem is to say that nihilism is a normal condition. For
Christians and non-Christians alike, the world does not appear to have one clear and
unquestionable meaning. Instead, each of us has convictions about the world that we hold dear.
But we realize that other people hold drastically different convictions than our own, and we have
no absolute way of determining the validity of one set over another. So they appear to us as
values, rather than the way things are, grounded in nothing more than our own will and desire to
hold them.
In such an age Christians are confronted with the question of justification in its broadest

I will defend this bold assertion in the first three chapters.
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sense: what reasons do we have for living as we do rather than some other way? Christians are
tempted, in this age, to trade on the value of Christianity, justifying it on the basis of its practical
or aesthetic appeal. But this only reinforces the notion that Christianity is grounded in nothing
more than our own will and desire. Instead, this dissertation argues that Christianity can only
move beyond our nihilism by appealing to the authority of God's act through the man Jesus of
Nazareth. In order to maintain the authority of God's act in Jesus, however, Christians will have
to give up the Platonic assumption that God is the principled and rational ground of our
existence, which is intelligible to any reasonable, good-willed person. This Platonic assumption
leads Christians to construe God as a conjecture of human reason. Instead Christians will have to
embrace an understanding of God as the personal, willful, and inscrutable creator, who speaks
and acts intelligibly only through the man Jesus of Nazareth.
The dissertation is an essay in postmodern theology. By using the term postmodern,
however, I do not mean to invest much in any definition of what counts as either modern or
postmodern. I only want to describe, in an idiosyncratic way, a style of argumentation.
Postmodern arguments, as I am defining them, assume that something has gone wrong; there is a
problem that needs attention. For instance, the basic problem that I address is that many
Christians in America have a hard time giving an answer to the question "Why go to church?"
that does not appeal to the personal value of Christianity. If this is right, I cannot help but
conclude that something has gone wrong. Modern arguments, as I am defining them, do not start
with a problem. They tend to assume that there are perennial subjects, which each have their own
set of categories that give rise to propositions. They aim to evaluate propositions on the basis of
the traditional categories. Postmodern arguments recognize that all categories and topics function
within a web of assumptions that are dependent on a social and historical context. Therefore, a
postmodern argument can recognize that when basic problems arise, they stem systematically
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from a complex group of assumptions. Once it has identified a problem, the postmodern
argument will give an account of the assumptions that have given rise to the current difficulty.
Then, in order to fix the problem, it will suggest that we have overlooked something within our
own tradition that is important or would make a difference if we took it more seriously. So it
goes on to propose an alternative paradigm or trajectory that will help us understand ourselves
and get along better in our current context.
However, the trouble with postmodern arguments is that there are so many of them. They
do not all identify exactly the same problem, and they give their own nuanced story about when
and where things went wrong. Each account is coherent and consistent, which makes it hard to
discern why one is better than another. Before I go on to add another to the list, it will be helpful
to situate this dissertation within the context of several other postmodern arguments, and begin to
suggest what advantages my argument has. I can already begin to argue for my own account by
casting the others as attempts to answer the same sort of problem. Although they might not use
Nietzsche's vocabulary of nihilism, nor has this always been their principle focus, several
movements in contemporary Christian theology address this problem, or a variation of it, in
postmodern fashion: by giving an account of its origins and proposing a way past it. The main
differences between them depend on where they locate the origin of the problem.
The movement called Postliberal theology points to the Enlightenment as the time when
Christian theology took a turn for the worse. During the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, the Christian west found itself in a state of crisis over the issue of authority.
Traditional religious authorities that had long been taken for granted were now in competition
with one another, a rising secular political sphere, and modern science. So in order to gain a
public hearing, Christians felt compelled to show how their particular beliefs about God and their
interpretations of the Bible were grounded in and could be correlated with more general and
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universally accessible truths. For instance, in The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics,' Hans Frei demonstrates that during this
period a shift took place in the direction of Biblical interpretation. Whereas a Christian in the
west once understood his existence within the frame of reference provided by the biblical
narratives, now the biblical narratives had to be shown to fit more universal descriptions of
reality that were constructed apart from the biblical narrative. Rather than allowing the realistic
Biblical stories to determine their own meaning, both liberals and conservatives tried to locate
the meaning of the text in an historical or ideal referent. Frei made a similar argument about
theological method in his book, Types of Christian Theology,' and George Lindbeck formalized a
Postliberal theory of religion and doctrine in The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a
Postliberal Age.'
Postliberal theology recognizes that the quest to ground Christian beliefs in universal
reason, or universally accepted notions of what counts for reason, only had the effect of stripping
Christian beliefs of their core content and eliminating the rational context in which Christian
beliefs made any sense in the first place. In response, Postliberal theology argues that particular
Christian beliefs are not dependent on other frameworks for meaning, but sustain their own
interpretive idiom, which works as a schema for depicting and understanding the world as a
whole. This sort of schematic idiom is what Frei refers to as the literal sense of the text, or what
he aims to say when he describes Christian theology as critical self-description, or what
Lindbeck calls a cultural linguistic theory of doctrine. By recasting Christian theology in this
2 Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974).
3 Hans W. Frei, Types of Christian Theology, ed. George Hunsiger and William C. Placher (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1992).
4 George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Lousiville:
Westminster John Knox, 1984).
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way, Postliberal theology represents a gain in Christian self-understanding and practice because
it identifies the externality of Christian faith. In its obsession to find indubitable grounds for
Christian belief, 'liberal' theology sought to ground beliefs about God in universal standards of
knowledge by which anyone reasonable person could judge their truth. Thus, questions as to
what sorts of knowledge are possible gain precedence over what can or cannot be said. And
since the epistemological question must be asked first, liberal theology represents a turn in the
subject of theology from God to the perceiving and thinking individual, similar to what William
Placher terms the domestication of transcendence.5 Postliberal theology encourages us to reverse
this trend.
While Postliberal theology focuses mainly on issues of knowledge and epistemology,
Radical Orthodoxy focuses on being and ontology.' According to the Radical Orthodox account,
Christian theology took a turn for the worse with Dims Scotus, who used being as a univocal
concept. In Thomas Aquinas, for instance, being was thought of as an analogous term. This
means simply that the language we use to talk about God was thought to be inadequate to the
task of actually describing God. For as infinite, God transcends the possibilities of our finite
language. Aquinas makes this point by saying that God is simple. He is not composed of parts
that can be discerned and described. In fact, as the source and goal of all things created he is not
composed at all. God is wholly other than the things our language is adept at naming. Thus, all
the language we can use to speak of God falls short of actually describing him. For when we
speak about God, we use words that apply to creatures. But this does not mean that when we

5 William C. Placher, The Domestication of Transcendence: How Modern Thinking about God Went Wrong
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1996).
6

The most accessible account of the Radical Orthodox project is Simon Oliver, "Introducing Radical
Orthodoxy: from Participation to Late Modernity," in The Radical Orthodoxy Reader, ed. John Milbank and Simon
Oliver (London: Routledge, 2009), 3-27.
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speak about God, we do so equivocally, as if our words we use have nothing to do with God.
Rather, we speak analogously. Since God is the source and goal of all created things he contains
within himself the perfections we encounter in creation in diverse ways. This means that the term
good, for instance, refers primarily to God who is himself goodness and secondarily to creatures
that are good only insofar as they participate in and reflect God's goodness in their own distinct
manner. But we can speak about God only as we can speak about creatures. So to say that God is
good, then, is to speak analogously since a creature is good by virtue of its relation to God who is
goodness. Simon Oliver, in his lucid introduction to an often opaque movement puts it this way:
"we might say that the question is not 'Is God good?', but rather, 'In what sense, if at all, can I
be called good."' For, we cannot have a prior notion of what is good apart from God who is our
source and goal.
Therefore, when being is used as an analogous term, God is being itself; and all things have
their existence, their being, only insofar as they participate in God. So knowledge of any created
thing requires knowledge of the God who transcends all created things. But when being is used
as a univocal term, as Radical Orthodoxy claims for Scotus and much of theology and
philosophy after him, several things happen simultaneously. First, philosophy becomes the study
of being as such without reference to God, and theology turns into the isolated study of revealed
facts. Second, everything can now be known apart from its origin and goal in God. Created
things become static and isolated, purely different and autonomous, i.e. conceptual space is made
for "the secular." Third, God becomes an object of human perception. God's being can be
mapped precisely as a distinct kind: infinite rather than finite. Thus, God who was the

7

Simon Oliver, "Introducing Radical Orthodoxy," 16.
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transcendent and ineffable source and goal of all things becomes grounded in human perception
as an object of the thinking subject.
A significant part of the Radical Orthodox project consists of convincing its readers that
this transformation did not have to happen, that univocity and its social and political
consequences has no more justification than the analogy of being. And in this way, they hope to
relativize the story that the contemporary secular world is one of emancipation from outworn
religious superstition. The movement combines this with an effort to re-describe the world in a
way that privileges a revised neo-platonic notion of the participation of all things in the Triune
God, in order to suggest that the secular is regress rather than progress.s
Finally, Postconstantinianism locates the problem even further back in Christian history.
Rather than focusing on epistemological or ontological issues, this movement, which has been
spearheaded by the work of John Howard Yoder, identifies the political transformation of
Christianity that began with the Constantinian era as fundamentally problematic.' The problem
occurred when Christianity went from a minority religion to the accepted, and later designated,
religion of the Roman Empire. During the former period, it took great conviction to be a
Christian since it often meant one was persecuted and ostracized. But when it became the
religion of the Empire, being a Christian was the social norm. Therefore Christianity
accommodated itself to the aims and goals of the state, and Christian beliefs and practices
underwent a transformation. The transformation can be described as a confusion of the church
and the world. Since the church now has a vested interest in the present order of things, Christian
ethics has to be workable for all in society. The Christian life then becomes defined not by the
8 See, for example, the collection of essays in Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology, ed. John Milbank,
Catherine Pickstock and Graham Ward (London: Routledge, 1999).
9 See especially, John Howard Yoder, "The Constantinian Sources of Western Social Ethics," in The Priestly
Kingdom: Social Ethics as Gospel (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 135-47.
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teachings and lordship of Jesus, but by the duties necessary for maintaining the present social
order. Consequently, Christian eschatological convictions about God's work through Jesus were
eclipsed altogether or spiritualized into matters of inner renewal. Therefore, during the
Constantinian synthesis, substantial Christian convictions appeared more timeless and ideal, less
embodied in everyday practices, and more detached from the church's central narrative. Hence,
Christianity underwent a transformation of authority structures. The authenticity of Christian
belief in God became underwritten not by the authority of God's action in Jesus, continued and
sustained through the mission of the church, but by the state's official and sometimes tacit
sanction.
Postconstantinian theology seeks to reverse this trend by recapturing the distinction
between the church and world through a renewed appreciation of the political character of Jesus'
identity and mission. For instance, in Yoder's landmark work The Politics ofJesus,'° he
effectively questions depictions of Jesus that excuse Christians from listening to Jesus. Then
Yoder proposes ways that Jesus can and should be considered a political figure, later drawing out
the consequences for Christian faith and life.
Each of these accounts is descriptively powerful. And my recognition of the problem
depends in part on the invaluable and faithful work done by these Christian theologians. But
rather than adopting any of these, I will account for our nihilism by following the story Friedrich
Nietzsche," Martin Heidegger' and James Edwards" tell. According to their accounts, a

I° John Howard Yoder, The Politics ofJesus: Vicit Agnus Noster, 2" ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994).

" Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols in The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, ed. Aaron
Ridley and Judith Norman and trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 171.
12 Martin Heidegger, "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God Is Dead,'" in The Question Concerning Technology and
Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper, 1977), 53-114.
13 James C. Edwards, The Plain Sense of Things: The Fate of Religion in an Age of Normal Nihilism
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).
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significant transition took place when Plato subjected the gods to the Good. Formally, the gods
were understood as the willful, passionate and unprincipled forces determining our existence.
But a moral uneasiness about the arbitrariness of the gods (or God) led to us to rethink the sacred
ground of our existence as a principled and rational standard to which even the gods must
adhere. In this account, Socrates poses the key question when he asks Euthyphro whether the
holy is approved by the gods because it is holy, or whether it is holy because it is approved by
the gods." Socrates and the western tradition after him side with the former position. And
precisely at this stage, the question of authority and right (the question of justification) posed by
human beings extends up to the sacred ground of existence, and God has to be justified by the
bar of human reason. Human beings therefore stand as judge and arbiter of God, so that the
groundwork is set for the death of God." Christian theologians adopted and even advanced this
conception of the sacred ground.'6 And it worked well within Christendom, when everyone
assumed the same God. But when competing visions of the Good present themselves, this
conception of the sacred has trouble answering why one is more right than another. So the
human subject becomes exposed as the ground of the sacred, and nihilism ensues.

14
Plato, Euthyphro in The Last Days of Socrates, trans. Hugh Tredennick and Harold Tarrant (London:
Penguin Books, 1954), 17.
15 Cf. Simon Blackburn, Being Good: A Short Introduction to Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001),
1-18, for his discussion of the comprehensive scope of the problem of justification, Euthyphro, and the death of
God.
16 Given my account of Aquinas above, one might get the impression that my depiction of Plato is a straw man
since I suggest that Aquinas thinks that we cannot have a prior notion of the good apart from God. While this is a
commendable aspect of Aquinas' thought, he still maintains the principled relationship between the sacred and the
profane that is characteristic of this age and assumes Plato's argument against Homer. This does not become a
problem until after Christendom. One way to test the cogency of my account is to ask whether Aquinas can be
recovered in an age of normal nihilism. Radical Orthodoxy certainly thinks he can, but my argument suggests he
cannot, at least not insofar as Radical Orthodoxy seeks to recover this aspect in particular. While I do not make this
explicit, it is an important aspect of my argument and I track it in the footnotes of the second chapter. For now, Cf.
Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, 171, .-The true world, unattainable for now, but promised to the man who is wise.
pious, virtuous ('to the sinner who repents'). (Progress of the idea: it gets trickier, more subtle, less
comprehensible...it becomes Christian...)."
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In light of this account, I will recommend Luther's treatment of God in The Bondage of the
Will." This famous work of Luther's was his side of an argument with Erasmus of Rotterdam.
The dispute between the two takes place in the time of renaissance and reformation, when the
age of Idealism has broken down and the sacred ground of existence needs to be redefined.
While on the surface the argument is about human and divine freedom, the deeper argument is
about the sacred ground. Erasmus' argument tends toward modern liberalism: since all we have
to go on are human opinions, it is better to take refuge in the skeptics and the authority of the
church. No other way can keep people from killing one another. Luther, on the other hand,
argues that the only hope for Christian faith lies in the fact that God has made himself known
God has spoken a word for himself—in and through Jesus Christ, and continues to speak through
the apostolic proclamation of Christ (the ministry of the word), which is contained in the Holy
Scriptures. Furthermore, Luther argues that only when Christians resist the temptation of filling
in the gaps to make God's action consistent with human reasoning will their theological speech
let God be God. And he appropriates the theological distinction between God preached and God
not preached to help us maintain God's priority. The force of Luther's final conclusion is that
speculation about God directs one away from God's actual promises in Jesus to something more
universal and appealing to human reasoning. An appeal to something more universal and
principled than God's spoken word only has the effect of making Christianity into a conjecture
about the way things really are that cannot stand the test of faith because it grounds our
convictions not in the certainty of God but in the reasoning of the thinking subject. The theology
of glory leads to nihilism.

17 Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, vol. 33 of Luther's Works, ed. Philip S. Watson and trans. Philip S.
Watson and Benjamin Drewery (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972).
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Presuming that my argument is coherent and logically consistent, this makes it, at best,
equal to the other postmodern arguments; and by adding another to the bunch I only seem to be
devaluing them all. So what exactly recommends this account? First, by highlighting the
devaluation of our highest values, I have identified a more comprehensive issue than any of the
other accounts. This does not mean that the others are wrong. I think they have each identified a
real problem. But, as I have just now sketched, they each can be described, without too much
exaggeration, as groping after the problem of authority, right, and justification; the problem of
nihilism. So in order to elicit some common assent to the priority of this problem, I use the first
chapter to describe nihilism as a normal condition. If the story Nietzsche, Heidegger, and
Edwards tell is at all helpful, we should be able to recognize nihilism as an everyday feature of
western life. So in the first chapter, I highlight the phenomenon of the devaluation of our highest
values. I then lay out the story Edwards tells about how this came to be our condition, focusing
specifically on the question of justification. To conclude the chapter, I begin to suggest some
ways to assess this account.
In the second and third chapters I show how helpful this account of the matter is by
addressing the work of John Milbank and Stanley Hauerwas. Both theologians engage the
problem of Christian justification. Both understand that Christianity is no longer the
unquestioned assumption of western life, and both seek to give reasons why Christianity is
something more than another personal opinion, but actually the way things really are. In his
masterful Theology and Social Them)," Milbank even identifies nihilism as the central problem
facing Christian faith and life. And Hauerwas takes up the problem of devaluation directly in The

18

John Milbank,

Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).
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Peaceable Kingdom:9 However, over the course of these two chapters, I find that neither
adequately articulates the problem, nor gives reasons for Christian faith and life that transcend its
status as a value.
For one, Milbank can speak about nihilism without recognizing the aspect of devaluation.
He construes nihilism as a position or an ontology than competes with other positions. This
allows him to suggest that we can overcome nihilism by having a better (more attractive) account
of things. But this strategy of Christian justification intensifies the commoditization of
Christianity by making it highly valuable. In identifying the problem, Hauerwas is quite
different. He understands the significance of devaluation, but does not sufficiently articulate its
root cause. Hauerwas works against the liberal assumption that we have no story except the one
we choose when we have no story. This, he thinks, not only devalues the Christian faith but is
also dishonest to our existence as contingent creatures. Christianity, on the other hand, allows us
to accept our contingency and act as creatures, joyfully dispossessed of our need to control our
own destiny. As Christians, in other words, we are not consumers of values but faithful followers
of Jesus, through which we receive our lives as an unexpected gift from the Creator. I do not
want to argue that this is a bad account of the Christian life, but I do question whether this
actually overcomes the problem of devaluation. In the face of coherent lives lived according to a
different final vocabulary, to steal a term from Richard Rorty, what makes Christianity more
than just another personal preference? Hauerwas tends to answer this question by appealing to
the attractiveness of the Christian witness, which only reduplicates the problem.
The arguments I make in these two chapters help recommend my account of the problem.
Milbank represents the most powerful and influential thinker to appropriate the Radical
19 Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of
Noire Dame Press, 1983).
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Orthodox story of how things went wrong. And Hauerwas borrows from Postliberalism to make
a Postconstantinian argument. I do not argue that they are wrong as much as I suggest that their
account of the matter is not fully adequate to answer the problem. Put another way, in light of
Edwards' account, Hauerwas and Milbank run into difficulties; and that recommends Edwards as
a more comprehensive account of our common problem.
Luther, on the other hand, does not run into these difficulties. And in the fourth chapter I
describe the core of Luther's argument with Erasmus and conclude with some summary
reflections about doing theology after nihilism. In the final two chapters I fill out my argument
and put my summary reflections to work by addressing two core issues related to my thesis. Put
succinctly, my thesis is that Christianity can only overcome nihilism by appealing in a nonspeculative way to the divine authority of Jesus. This means that Christians have an investment
in a particular identity and mission of the man Jesus of Nazareth, and that they have reasons for
believing this. The fifth chapter discusses the issues surrounding the person Jesus of Nazareth.
The sixth chapter is about the scriptures. I ask whether the Christian scriptures can be holy in our
age. When the authority of the Bible was assumed, interpretation happened rather unproblematically. But now that the church's interpretation of the Bible lacks the cultural backing
it once had, Christians must be able to say why we think that God speaks through this book?
Saying that the Bible is a book of the church only intensifies the problem. What reasons do we
have for believing that the church's use of these texts is really God's use? This issue relates to
my thesis because we come to know the identity of Jesus primarily through the scriptures.
Finally, let me speak a brief word about my intended audience. I will frequently refer to
those affected by nihilism as westerners. Nihilism is a predominately western phenomenon, and
a particular problem for the practice of Christianity in the west. It does not apply to global
Christianity. But even this statement does not say enough. For recent immigration trends suggest
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that many in "the west" are not afflicted by the problem simply because they do not share
something as basic as a sense of disenchantment.' So who exactly do I mean to address when I
say "westerners." To answer this question, let me refer to James Edwards who defines "the west"
as,
those who grew up by avidly reading Homer, the Bible, Plato, Cervantes,
Shakespeare, Descartes, Kant, George Elliot, Nietzsche, Whitman, and Freud, and
whose political consciousness was shaped by the European wars of religion and by
the French, American, Russian, and Eastern European revolutions, and whose present
circumstance is one of relative peace, plenty, and leisure in some one of the North
Atlantic democracies 21
While I hope that my constructive chapters present a faithful and catholic account of the
Christian faith, I will be writing primarily to those who have been formed by what Edwards
describes as the west.

20 Leopoldo A. Sanchez M., "The Global South Meets North America: Confessional Lutheran Identity in Light
of Changing Christian Demographics," Concordia Journal 37 (2011), 39-56.
21 Edwards,

Plain Sense, 4.
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CHAPTER ONE
NORMAL NIHILISM AND THE QUESTION OF JUSTIFICATION
This chapter will introduce the normal condition of nihilism as a problem for Christian life
and witness. Since the term nihilism has been used in many different ways over the past several
centuries, its meaning is anything but clear and unambiguous. My use of the term will follow
Nietzsche's description when he writes, "What does Nihilism mean? That the highest values
devaluate themselves. The aim is lacking; 'why?' finds no answer."' Of course, by itself, this
statement does not clear up the ambiguity of the term. It too needs some explanation, and I will
provide a fuller description throughout this chapter. For now, though, it is enough to know that
nihilism means that our highest values devaluate themselves. In the face of convictions radically
different than our own, we lack any reason for holding our beliefs and living as we do.
Therefore, our convictions seem to be merely our values, grounded in nothing more than our
personal will to hold them. But insofar as we understand our convictions to be values, they
devalue themselves. If our will to hold them is the final measure of their significance and
meaning, then they lose their authoritative and formative status. They appear as merely personal
preferences rather than the way things really are.
Throughout this chapter, I will argue that nihilism is a normal condition. And my account
of nihilism as a normal condition will draw primarily upon James Edwards' book The Plain
Sense of Things: The Fate of Religion in an Age of Normal Nihilism. While the story Edwards

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. R. J. Hollingdale and Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random
House, 1967), 9. Italics are original.
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tells about how nihilism has come to be our normal condition will be the center piece of this
chapter, and the starting point for the dissertation's greater argument, much of this chapter will
try to recommend normal nihilism as an apt description of the North Atlantic context in which
Christianity is practiced. I find that the story Edwards tells has great explanatory power.
However, the explanatory power of any narrative can only be caught, in a sense, over the course
of contemplating a wide range of topics. Therefore, this chapter will be divided into three
sections. The first section will introduce the problem of nihilism by identifying the cultural
phenomenon it aims to describe. In this section, I hope to produce some common assent and
recognition of the condition I want to describe as nihilism. The second section will focus more
specifically on the causes of our nihilism and how the central challenge to Christian faith and life
is the question of justification. When our highest values devalue themselves, the central question
facing Christianity becomes that of justification in its broadest sense. Is Christianity merely
another set of personal values? Do Christians have reasons for their beliefs and lives beyond the
value we find in them? Edwards' description of our nihilism will be the central feature of this
section. But Edwards' account of our nihilism is not the only one available. So the third section
will begin to show how Edwards marks a significant gain in understanding the problem.
Finally, before moving on, let me say something briefly about the term justification. In the
most obvious sense, the "question of justification" that 1 am referring to is not the way many
Lutherans have normally talked about justification. Lutherans have ordinarily used the term in a
narrower and technical sense to refer to an individual's standing before God. But it will become
clear, I hope, that the "question of justification" that nihilism poses to Christianity is the broadest
possible sense of the term. In an age of normal nihilism we are forced to give reasons for doing
what we do, for living one way rather than another. We must claim some sense of authority and
right for being Christian. We must give some justification. That being the case, however, the two
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different uses of the term should not mislead the reader into thinking that the forensic
justification of the sinner before God has nothing to do with the broader "question of
justification." For the more narrow sense is only a concentrated instance of the broader sense.
Introducing Nihilism as a Problem
All Things Shining,' a recent book about how westerners might recover some sense of
meaning in their lives, concludes with an unusual acknowledgement. After giving credit to all the
people who helped with the book along the way, the authors write this final paragraph: "And
thanks, finally, to the gods, who show themselves little by little or sometimes all at once and for
whom we hope this book provides an appropriate landing place to welcome you back home."3
The book, it turns out, is a recommendation of Homeric polytheism. Of course, the book's
authors are not suggesting that there are beings named Athena or Zeus that have made
convincing appearances after millennia of obscurity. But they do want us to recognize that
diverse forces exist in this world, and that we might gain something by letting ourselves be
caught up in them when they occasionally appear. This, at least, might allow us to recover a
sense that the world is made up of shining things (things that transcend the value we assign
them), which have been hidden by our contemporary world of control, manipulation and
aimlessness.
For anyone raised in the traditions of the modem European and American west, whose
ancestors took part not only in Christendom but also the Enlightenment, and who were taught to
value not only the cultural achievement of monotheism but also rational inquiry, this
recommendation should raise an important question. What has happened to our world that
2 Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Dorrance Kelly, All Things Shining: Reading the Western Classics to Find Meaning
in a Secular Age (New York: Free Press, 2011).
3

Ibid., 226.
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polytheism has become a viable option today? One might answer that question in the way of G.
K. Chesterton's fictional Rev. Father Brown; a staunch defender of both rationality and
Christendom. "It's the first effect of not believing in God that you lose your common sense and
can't see things as they are. Anything that anybody talks about, and says there's a good deal in it,
extends itself indefinitely like a vista in a nightmare. And a dog is an omen, and a cat is a
mystery, and a pig is a mascot and a beetle is a scarab, calling up all the menagerie of
polytheism."4 For Father Brown, the gospel and common sense go together. The history of the
modem west is a story of progress and advancement in both religion and knowledge. Polytheism
occurs only when that great tradition has been abandoned for superstition.
But that kind of answer does little to account for the problem which philosophers Hubert
Dreyfus and Sean Dorrance Kelly aim to address in their book. The problem is what they call
"our contemporary nihilism," and it is a common feature of everyday North Atlantic life.
Dreyfus and Kelley notice that our lives are constituted by the burden of choice. Not only do we
have to make choices about the everyday trivial things, like what to have for breakfast or what
car to drive; but even more significantly we are forced to make choices about the kinds of things
that make up our identity and person. What is our political affiliation? What job will I pursue?
Who should I marry? Where should I live? The heart of the problem, though, is not merely that
we have too many choices, but that "when we find ourselves confronted by these kinds of
existential choices, we feel a lack of any genuine motivation to choose one over the others."5 We
lack such motivation because we have no unassailable reasons for choosing one way over
4 G. K. Chesterton, The Incredulity of Father Brown, in The Father Brown Stories: Part II, vol. 12 of The
Collected Works of G. K. Chesterton (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005), 93. Robert W. Jenson, "What is a PostChristian?" in The Strange New Word of the Gospel: Re-Evangelizing in the Postmodern World, ed. Carl E. Braaten
and Robert W. Jenson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 21, first drew my attention to this quotation. Although
Chesterton is sometimes thought to be a passé modernist, the collected essays in this important volume tend to take
Chesterton's account of the situation as their starting point for reflection.
5
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another. Burdened by the sheer proliferation of options, none presents itself to us as the obvious
right choice. So our lives appear arbitrary and meaningless because, despite all the options, we
have no ultimate reasons for discerning the important differences between them. The question
"why?" finds no good answer.
Dreyfus and Kelly account for our contemporary nihilism by telling the story of the west as
a history of decline. Nihilism, they think, is uniquely our problem. Not long ago, the world
appeared to have a discernable structure that shined forth with an unmistakable clarity. Rarely
did anyone have to make a significant choice about the course of their lives. But when choices
did have to be made, the structure of the world seemed to provide a clear answer to which one
was right and wrong, better or worse, good and evil. In the middle ages, for example, the
unquestioned assumption about the world was that the God of the Bible created it. Everything
that happened could be explained in reference to his will and purposes, which seemed to
permeate all of existence. But that clear and shining structure has dimmed over the course of
western history. Dreyfus and Kelly explore the classics of western literature in order to trace the
diminishment of the shining things in our world, and they notice that with the rise of a unified
and comprehensive explanation for everything—monotheism—the inner self also gradually rose
as the ultimate arbiter of the world's order. This effectively killed God, as Nietzsche once put it,
leaving us with no good reasons for judging from among a world of choices.
The story that Dreyfus and Kelley tell about how nihilism came to be our problem has
many affinities with the story James Edwards tells. And later in this chapter I will endorse his
explanation of why nihilism has come to be a normal condition. For now, though, it is enough to
notice that nihilism names a common phenomenon—the burden of choice. In the modem west,
we seem to be forced to determine the meaning and value of our lives. Dreyfus and Kelley are
not the only ones to make this observation. This phenomenon has been recognized by a wide
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array of cultural observers, and it will be helpful to deepen this description of "our contemporary
nihilism" by briefly surveying a few of the more influential voices.
First, no account of our contemporary nihilism can ignore the work Alasdair Maclntyre has
done in the area of moral theory. In his seminal book, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory,6
Maclntyre observes that contemporary moral debate seems interminable. In any given subject,
like the debate over abortion for example, each side has a coherent argument based on its own
starting premises. But there seems to be no way of discerning between the assumed starting
premises. So while each of us who engage in moral discourse appear to be giving a rational and
impersonal argument for our position, we lack any justification for why we have chosen to begin
with those premises in the first place. Therefore, our arguments begin to look like the bald
assertion of arbitrary and personal preferences despite their outward appearance as rational and
impersonal. The moral theory that expresses this dilemma is called emotivism, which holds that
"all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of personal preference, expressions of attitude
or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character."' Emotivism, in other words, is
the moral theory that assumes this is the inescapable fate of moral discourse as such.
Maclntyre wants to argue that emotivism does not capture the essence of moral discourse.
Emotivism, he argues, results from the loss of sustained practices that lead toward the
achievement of an objective good. And without those practices, our moral judgments lack a
suitable context. That argument does not need to concern us here.8 More importantly for our
6

Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1981).
7 Ibid., 12.
s Alasdair Mac1ntyre's work, especially

After Virtue and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry:
Encyclopedia, Genealogy, and Tradition (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1990) sounds a sense of
panic at the approaching collapse of western civilization at the advent of nihilism. Maclntyre reduces our options to
Nietzsche or Aristotle and later, Nietzsche or Aquinas. As will become clear later in my argument, I find this to be
an inadequate parsing of the situation; one that tries unsuccessfully to tell a different story about the west than the
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present purposes, Maclntyre finds that emotivism is more than a theory. Emotivism is deeply
embedded in contemporary western culture, especially in its inability to distinguish between
manipulative and non-manipulative social relationships.
If every evaluative utterance is thought to be the expression of personal desires and
preferences, every expression treats the other as a means to achieve one's own personal will. To
illustrate the grip emotivism has on our culture, Maclntyre depicts three types of persons, three
stock characters, which determine the course of everyday life. They are the manager, the
therapist and the rich aesthete. Each character approaches everything it encounters as a means
toward a personally determined end. For instance, the manager uses whatever means are at his
disposal to achieve maximum efficiency for his institution. Even humans are treated as any other
resource for the maintenance and growth of an organization. Likewise, the therapist transforms
"neurotic symptoms into directed energy, maladjusted individuals into well-adjusted ones.""
Since it is assumed that no moral judgment can be publically justified, the only criterion
available to these characters is efficiency and effectiveness. Moreover, on the opposite side of
managerial effectiveness stands a unique brand of moral individualism. Since it is assumed that
there are no universally binding criteria of judgment, the individual self stands apart from any
external moral commitments. It is free to make and remake any series of moral judgments on the
basis of its own determination of what is good. Therefore, Maclntyre argues, our contemporary
lives are structured by the ongoing conflict between the aims of bureaucrats to increase their own
effectiveness and power by using whatever means are available to them and the aims of
one Nietzsche told. I will be recommending that a better way to understand the problem is "Nietzsche or Luther." I
briefly note this difference here because the focus of this dissertation is the Christian church rather than the
predicament of the west. But I find it important to note because while Maclntyre will not appear in the body of my
text, his central account of the matter has been taken up in different ways by both Stanley Hauerwas and John
Milbank. Thus, Maclntyre will always be in the background of this argument.
Maclntyre, After Virtue, 30.
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individuals to live according to their own chosen morality, free of the illegitimate authority of the
moral convictions (preferences) of others.
By observing how emotivism imbues our culture, Maclntyre is stating nothing profound.
The give and take we experience between the managerial and individual poles of western life is
as ordinary as the pursuit of a job that will pay enough to enjoy life apart from work. But this
only displays the way our contemporary nihilism is an enshrined part of everyday life.
Everything, it seems, stands before us as a means to whatever end we find important. Nothing
stands out as sacred and beyond the reach of our manipulation.
Maclntyre's observations about moral discourse fit nicely with Martin Heidegger's
observations about modem technology and what he calls Bestand, or standing reserve. In a
profound and important essay entitled, "The Question Concerning Technology,"'° Heidegger
suggests that contemporary westerners live in a technological age. This is more than the simple
observation that contemporary life is filled with technology (even more so now than when
Heidegger originally wrote the essay in the 1950's). More significantly, Heidegger argues that
the character of modern technology has come to shape the way the world presents itself to us—it
shapes our very self-understanding. According to Heidegger, technology has always served the
purposes of bringing forth into light what is possible; for instance, in the way a silversmith
brings forth a chalice from silver. But modern technology has the characteristic of bringing forth
or revealing the world in a certain and distinctive way. Heidegger calls that way standing
reserve, or that which is the storehouse for energy to be organized and used according to our
desiring. He writes that, "the revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging

to Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in The Question Concerning Technology and
Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper, 1977), 3-35.

22

[Herausforden], which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be
extracted and stored as such.""
To illustrate his point about modern technology, Heidegger asks us to observe the
difference between the old windmill and the modern hydro-electric plant. While the windmill
uses the wind to create energy, it nevertheless depends on the wind's blowing. The hydro-electric
plant, on the other hand, is not placed into the current of the river. Rather, by damming the river,
it changes the river's structure to fit the demands of the hydroelectric plant. "What the river is
now, namely a water power supplier, derives from out of the essence of the power station."'
Therefore, even the river now appears to us as an object that can be manipulated for the purposes
of storing its latent energy for human use. This, Heidegger thinks, is in stark contrast to a
previous time when the world appeared to stand over-against us. At one time, in other words, the
river was something we could not control. It was a force external to us, one which we had to
respect as it shaped our lives according to its power. But now, the power latent in the river is
merely another resource at our disposal for whatever appropriation and use we desire.
Heidegger hopes that by reflecting on the essence of technology, we can get a sense of how
our lives are nevertheless called forth by the world around us. For our present purposes, though,
it should be enough to notice how modern technology is another aspect of our contemporary
nihilism. Rather than standing over-against us, determining the limitations and meaning of our
existence, the world itself now appears as a resource, as raw material to be used for whatever we
determine.
The sort of transition in human self-understanding that Heidegger describes also finds
expression in the work of Philip Rieff, who writes about the relationship between religion and
II Ibid., 14.
12
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culture in his now prophetic book The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith after Freud."'
Written in the midst of the secularization debate in the mid-twentieth century, Rieff argues that
in the coming age the practice of religion in our culture will not decrease but increase. However,
that increase will come only after a dramatic transformation has taken place in the function of
culture and the character of religion. He describes this transformation of culture as moving from
a therapy of commitment to a therapy of release. Rieff notices that the artifacts of our culture
such as art, religion and the like, once served to give us meaning and purpose and assuage our
displacement by situating us within structured and purposeful communities. Now, however, these
cultural artifacts serve as tools of release from the outward communal purposes normally
associated with religion. Thanks to Freud among others, we now recognize in ways that we
previously did not that all moral demand systems are groundless. This recognition has lead to
what Rieff calls the triumph of the therapeutic, in which we understand meaning and
determination for life as unhealthy commitments of our imagination. A triumphantly therapeutic
culture will seek to release us from the bondage of commitment to the external authority
normally provided by culture. Rieff foresaw that the future therapeutic culture would not do
away with religion, but embrace it in a new way. Since religions no longer stand as arch rivals
against one another, faith can be used positively in the effort to constantly remake oneself free of
any authoritative commitment. Faith will be transformed into "one entertainable and passing
personal experience among others, to enhance the interest of living freed from communal
purpose."I4

13 Philip Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith after Freud (1966; repr., Wilmington, DE: ISI
Books, 2006), 16.
14
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Rieff s thesis finds backing in at least one recent and influential study on religion in
America. That book is called Soul Searching: The Religious and Spiritual Lives of American
Teenagers.15 Its authors, Christian Smith and Melinda Lundquist Denton, share the results of an
extensive survey of American youth about their religious lives. Surprisingly, they find that
American teenagers are remarkably conventional in their religious practices. They follow closely
the habits of their parents, they have a generally positive attitude toward religion, and they
participate in formal religious practices quite regularly on average. At the same time, however,
these same teenagers are extremely inarticulate about what they believe, they have great
difficulty noticing what difference their beliefs make in their own lives, they have a negative
attitude to those who would pattern their life according to a set standard of beliefs, and they
assume an individualism that precludes them from saying that one religion is more right than any
other. The problem is that, overall, traditional religion (one that has compelling claims about the
way the world really is and expectations to follow a path of discipleship that will lead its
practitioners to a more righteous and holy life) has lost its persuasive power.
This does not mean religion is unimportant. But the importance has changed drastically.
Religion still draws American teens insofar as it makes them happy and helps them get what they
want out of life. "What legitimates the religion of most youth today is not that it is the lifetransformative, transcendent truth, but that it instrumentally provides mental, psychological,
emotional, and social benefits that teens find useful and valuable."16 This attitude is so pervasive
among American teenagers and the greater American public that Smith and Denton summarize
their findings by calling the dominant religion among them Moralistic Therapeutic Deism. This

15 Christian Smith and Melinda Lundquist Denton, Soul Searching: The Religious and Spiritual Lives of
American Teenagers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
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"religion" holds that God created and ordered the world and wants people to be good, that the
goal of life is to be happy and to feel good about oneself, and that God is not directly involved in
anyone's life except to resolve a problem.'? Rather than providing the categories and concepts
that make the world shine forth with God's order, Moralistic Therapeutic Deism operates as a
salve for teenage life. In other words, Christianity is merely another, even if sometimes
effective,I8 way of human coping.
Examples of "our contemporary nihilism" can be unending. But these few should help us
understand that the term nihilism is a description of a phenomenon; a phenomenon recognized by
a diverse group of observers. We live in an age when the world no longer presents itself as
having a recognizable order. Or, put another way, "God" no longer has constructive force and
authority in our lives. So we human beings carry the burden of determining the meaning of our
own lives. Some might triumph this as the human coming of age. Dreyfus and Kelley,
Maclntyre, Heidegger, and Rieff, however, rightly worry that our nihilism can only be selfdestructive. While I am sympathetic to their concern, I am more worried about the fate of
Christian life and witness in such an age. Given our nihilism, can the God Christians worship be
anything more than another personal value, anything more than a decomposing corpse of the one
who supposedly works all in all?' In order to begin answering this question, we need to have a
more focused description of the problem. And no one account of our nihilism is more persuasive
and helpful than the one James Edwards provides in The Plain Sense of Things.

17
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18 By the end of the book, Smith and Denton, Soul Searching, 218-58, demonstrate that religion does make a
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Normal Nihilism and the Question of Justification
Edwards too writes his book with a sense of worry about our contemporary nihilism. And
Edwards also recognizes that Nihilism is a common feature of western life. We take for granted
now in ways that we previously did not that the convictions we hold most dear, the convictions
that are supposed to be ordering our existence, and that includes our Christian beliefs and
practices, have no ground beyond our own will to hold them. And so, they appear as merely
useful ways that we make sense of our lives. Thus, we choose to adopt and hold our convictions,
not because they correspond to reality (whatever that might mean), but only in so far as we find
some practical or aesthetic value in them.
It is no accident that the term value, and the economic connotations associated with it,
becomes an apt way of describing ourselves in an age of normal nihilism. Edwards finds that the
American shopping mall serves as the perfect example of our nihilism.
Here one sees alternative values jostling one another in tenuous détente; more
important, here one sees oneself operating as the consumer (and, indirectly, as the
creator) of those values. In my community's largest mall, for example, a Christian
bookstore sits right alongside a store selling reproductions of Early American
knickknacks; just beside the shop for consumer software there is a clothing store that
traffics in outfits apparently designed to be worn in the Maine woods....In airconditioned comfort one can stroll from life to life, from world to world, complete
with appropriate sounds effects...Laid out before one are whole lives that one can, if
one has the necessary credit line, freely choose to inhabit: devout Christian;
Williamsburg grandee; high-tech yuppie; Down East guide; great white hunter. This
striking transformation of life into lifestyle, the way in which tools, garments and
attitudes specific to particular times and places become commodities to be marketed
to anonymous and rootless consumers: these are the natural (if also banal)
expressions of our normal nihilism 20
Especially devastating for Christian life and witness is how nihilism has changed the way
we relate to religious beliefs and practices. Whereas Christianity, along with other religions, used
to structure the world for us, providing the concepts and categories necessary for us to have
20
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meaningful lives, now Christianity has become just another economic commodity competing for
our attention and devotion. Edwards writes,
Organized religion has certainly not disappeared in this shadow-time of values, but it
has changed its character in fundamental ways. There are still devout Jews and
Muslims and Christians around, of course, but to us they begin to look like the folks
who need to wear nothing but Polo head to foot, or those who spend all their free time
arguing the advantages of IBMs over Macs. The Christian book store is just another
shop in the mall.21
While the shopping mall is a fine illustration of the way nihilism is our normal condition,
the strength of Edwards' account lies in the way he tells the story of how we got here. For
Edwards, the shopping mall is not an accident. It is only a late form of a long history of western
religious sensibilities. Following Nietzsche, Edwards calls this the age of transvalued values.
And the story Edwards tells draws much from both Nietzsche and Heidegger. In the next section
of this chapter, I will assess Edwards' account in relationship to those two great figures. I will
argue that Edwards' account understands and reads the tradition of western thought in a more
helpful manner than either Nietzsche or Heidegger. The difference between Edwards and
Heidegger especially brings clarity to the problem facing the Christian church. That clarity
provides insight that some contemporary theologians today miss when they try to make sense of
the western tradition. But first, let me lay out the basic contours of Edwards' description of how
nihilism has become our normal condition.
By his own admission, Edwards's narrative is simple and "deliberately schematic."22 My
rendition will not try to give Edwards any more depth or argue more persuasively for his
interpretation of key figures and movements. In fact, the simplicity of his account contributes to
its clarity and usefulness. So, while I do find it to be an accurate description, I will not argue for

21 Ibid.,
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its accuracy by writing my own history of western life and thought. Rather I will recommend
Edwards, in the next section and throughout the next two chapters, by showing how the narrative
rightly calls into question some important but finally inadequate attempts to overcome the
problem of normal nihilism.
According to Edwards, there are three features that make up western religiousness. They
are not necessary to religion anywhere and everywhere. But they have endured in one form or
another throughout the history of the west. The first feature, which lies at the heart and center of
western religiousness, is a binary division of all things. Throughout its history westerners have
typically understood reality as being divided into two different worlds. Edwards calls this the
division between the sacred and the profane. This division is an ontological one, meaning that all
things we account for are one kind of thing or another; they are either sacred or profane. The
sacred world is made up of those things that are perfect in and of themselves. They do not rely on
something else for their being or existence. They are "fully real and lack nothing in order to be
what they are, things that are resplendent in their completeness, self-sameness, independence,
and perfection." The profane world, on the other hand, is made up of those things "that are in
some way imperfect and needy, needy in their very being (or Being), in comparison to the
first."23 In the book of Genesis, for example, God is the sacred, standing alone and independent
of all things. The creation, on the other hand, comes to exist only because God calls it into being.
This division is so basic that it might seem trite to bring it to our attention. But its influence
over our thinking and practices cannot be over-stated. Not only does it form our basic
cosmology, but the structure is responsible for the most basic features of our common life: our
notion of truth, and practices of truthfulness such as philosophy, theology, and morality. For
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instance, Edwards goes on to describe the second and third features of western religiousness in
relation to the first. The second feature is that the sacred serves as the ground of the profane. This
can be stated both ontologically and epistemologically. Ontologically, the profane depends on
the sacred for its very existence, and the sacred determines the shape and order of the profane.
Epistemologically, the order and shape of the profane is only intelligible in light of the sacred.
The sacred, "is that which clarifies and makes intelligible, that which justifies and rationally
explains."24 The Old Testament can serve again as a useful example. The creation comes into
existence only because God wills it to exist. God's words cause it to come into being. And if Job,
for instance, wants to know the logic or reasons behind the world's movement, he cannot find a
right and satisfactory answer apart from the explanation God himself would provide.
The third feature also follows from the binary division. The two worlds are in an unstable
relationship that must be maintained through sacramental practices, or practices that reestablish a
proper order between the sacred and profane. The fall of creation occurs when Adam and Eve
disobey the will of God. And restoration can only take place when people come to acknowledge
Yahweh as the one true God. For example, when Abraham is willing to sacrifice his only son for
no other reason than the one true God told him to, he is counted righteous, despite the apparent
absurdity of the action.
Edwards tells of four stages, or ages, that progress towards the flowering of nihilism as a
normal condition. His account begins with what he calls the age of the gods, which I have
already highlighted in the examples from the Old Testament.' In this age, the sacred is the divine
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presence and force of God, or the gods in the case of polytheism, who orders the world by the
sheer power of his will. "Crucial to our understanding of this epoch is its portrayal of the gods as
centers of transcendent and terrible will. The gods are compelling super-human presences,
instances of uncontrollable and (sometimes) incomprehensible force."26 The creation story is an
obvious example of such force, but more subtle examples exist throughout the Christian
scriptures. For instance, Paul characterizes God's relationship to the creation in his letter to the
church in Rome as one of force and power, enacting the terrible will of the creator on creation:
"For the creation was subjected to futility, not of its own will but by the will of the one who
subjected it in order that the creation itself will be set free from its bondage to decay and will
obtain the freedom of the glory of the children of God" (Rom. 8:20-21).27
An important feature of Paul's letter to the Romans is that the will behind God's power
often lacks intelligibility. Paul fmds it especially troubling that God seems to have abandoned his
promises to the Jews since they were rejecting the gospel about Jesus. Paul concludes with
astonishment. "For God has imprisoned all to disobedience so that he might be merciful to all. 0
the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments
and how inscrutable his ways" (Rom. 11:32-33).
The sense of mystery Paul expresses behind the ways and will of God demonstrates an
important aspect of this age. The sacred grounds the profane merely by the sheer will of God or
the gods. There exists no standard of what is right beyond the will of the gods or the one God.
The gods do not operate according to any prior reasoning; they do not follow anyone's rules.
Therefore, "As we understand the term, the gods are not moral beings at all, since for us the
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notion of the moral largely derives from the epic of Idealism...and is intrinsically connected to
the notions of human happiness and of formal rationality. Morality is not just power and the will
to use it."28 That the sacred is personal and willful, under no compulsion to follow any principled
standard, sets the age of the gods apart from the next epoch. "In this first form of western
religiousness, then., the gods want what they want just because they want it; they do what they do
subject only to their own desires and to whatever external limitations on their power there may
be. (In the case of strict monotheism, of course, there are no such limitations, so the god's will is
boundless and unchallengeable...)."29 The personal, dynamic and sometimes inscrutable will of
the gods is the only standard and ground, and this distinguishes it from the age of the forms.
The age of the forms follows the age of the gods, and the key texts that mark the transition
from one age to the other demonstrate uneasiness about understanding the sacred ground as sheer
and inscrutable personal will. In its place, the age of the forms substitutes impersonal rational
stability. It is worth taking a moment to notice the transition, because this one, more than any
other, sets the trajectory of western religiousness toward the age of transvalued values. My
argument will be that Christianity can only overcome nihilism by following Luther's lead to
recover a sense that God rules by his personal, dynamic and inscrutable will. At the end of his
first chapter, Edwards flirts with the option of going back to the age of the gods. But for him,
unlike Dreyfus and Kelly, the brutality of the gods is not an option.3° It is untenable, for
Edwards, not so much because of its logical inconsistency as much as it is the cruel and harsh
picture of a world ordered by the sheer and seemingly arbitrary will of a God or several gods. Put
another way, the deficiency of the age of the gods is moral rather than ontological or
28
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epistemological. In the Euthyphro, Plato leads the reader to feel the same sort of uneasiness
about the age of the gods.
Plato's Euthyphro is one of those key transitional texts between the ages.31 In this early
dialogue, we find Socrates questioning the supposedly stable relationship between the authority
of the gods and holiness and piety. Socrates' dialogue partner Euthyphro meets Socrates outside
court. Euthyphro is there to prosecute his father for the murder of one of his servants. And the
reader immediately recognizes that the circumstances that led to the death of his father's servant
are at best ambiguous. At worst the charge Euthyprho levels against his father seems outrageous,
considering the man is being prosecuted by his own son for the death of a family slave. Or at
least this seems to be the way we, who have been brought up in the tradition of idealism with all
of its "powerful intellectual and ethical advantages,' should react. But when Socrates brings
this to Euthyphro's attention, Euthyphro justifies the holiness of his action by citing the will of
the gods, specifically the way Zeus punished his own father Cronos. Socrates asks how
Euthyphro can be so sure that what he is doing is holy since the gods will many different things
that cannot all be made consistent with one another. Surely there is some standard that will allow
one to recognize not just what is holy in one situation but holy in every situation. Given the
inadequacy of appealing to the gods in tough cases like this particular one, there must be some
special feature, some form that makes all things that are holy what they are. Socrates goes on to
show Euthyphro that holiness cannot be merely what the gods love. But no matter the specifics
of that argument, the movement from the age of the gods to the age of the forms had already

31
Plato, Euthyphro in The Last Days of Socrates, trans. Hugh Tredennick and Harold Tarrant (London:
Penguin Books, 1954), 1-27.
32

Edwards, Plain Sense, 20.

33

taken place when the plurality of the gods was rejected in favor of one ruling principle that could
decide in all cases.
Rather than the pure power of the gods, used according to the sheer arbitrariness of their
personal will, the age of the forms understands the sacred to be impersonal, rationally intelligible
form, "an a priori cosmic order that confers intelligible substance on things. The sacred thus
becomes understood as the ideal."33 The classic expression of this impersonal order is Plato's
allegory of the cave, found in the Republic.34 Inside the cave we find men chained in place, only
able to look upon the shadows projected on a wall by the light outside the cave. The world of the
shadows is the only one they know. But outside of that world, if one is fortunate enough to find
one's way out of the cave, one sees not just the shadows but the objects themselves, the ideal
forms lying behind the shadows. These forms are the sacred ground, the special feature that
stands behind every diverse experience. The Euthyphro is typical of Plato's dialogues. Socrates
encounters someone who thinks he knows about holiness, justice, or some other concept on the
basis of one example. Through dialectic conversation, Socrates quickly leads that person to
realize that while there is a sense of the concept in the person's example, there must be
something more formal and universal standing behind every particular case. Despite the
contingencies of everyday life, there stands something enduring and fixed that gives necessary
shape to the particulars we experience. These universals are the forms. The Form "is an ideal
condition of intelligibility; it is the fully real, perfect and immutable archetype that gives
intelligible substance (a determinate, enduring identity) to the things we normally encounter."35
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Thus, the sacred grounds the profane in a rational way. The reason we can distinguish
between kinds of things, according to the age of the forms, is that we can recognize within the
things we encounter in the sensory world a more pure and enduring Form that gives them order,
shape, and intelligibility. "The realm of the Forms is thus rational in our typical sense of the
term: it exhibits (as do the earthly seasons) an impersonal, abstract, eternal, immutable,
consistent pattem."36 In direct contrast to the age of the gods, the profane does not come into
existence by the pure will and force of the sacred, but rather emanates from and reflects the
sacred. "The guiding image here is one of mirroring, the granting of an intelligible identity,
rather than creation or control."37 Since the profane is not contingent upon the will and power of
the gods alone, but participates in something necessary and fixed, the sacred is patterned and
intelligible rather than arbitrary and inscrutable.
In the age of the gods, the sacramental practices that restore order between the sacred and
the profane were those that recognized the authority of the gods. Edwards cites the prominence
of sacrifice in both the early Greek religions as well as in the Old Testament to this effect. But in
the age of the forms, the sacramental practices aim to repair one's vision. "So long as we gaze at
the shifting shadows of shadows and take them for reality, we cannot help living badly... We
must first see (understand and know) what endures always as the same; then we can (and we
will) act as is proper in its light."38 Hence, sacramental practices are those that enable one to see
the forms, to adjust one's sight in order to recognize the rational order behind all things. Rather
than sacrificial, these practices are intellectual. In the Republic, for instance, Plato considers a
number of intellectual exercises, such as mathematics, geometry, astronomy, and chief among
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them philosophy, to be particularly fit to train the eye to see the enduring. And it is these
intellectual exercises which ought to teach the republic's leading citizens to see the world rightly,
and so make them fit to govern according to the Forms.39
The age of the forms lasted for many centuries. But the primary assumption that finally
unraveled this age was that an immediate and comprehensive vision of the Ideal or the Forms
was both a necessary and possible condition for comprehending a rational order within the
world. In the later Christianized version of this age, the Forms gave way to God as the ground of
all being, and the incarnation became a privileged locus for seeing the order behind this world.
During this time, the doctrine of God as the ground of all Being, sometimes even the ontological
necessity of the doctrine of the Trinity and the incarnation, were assumed in a rational discourse.
And in times and places in which they were not assumed, they were argued either on rational
basis that took for granted a general doctrine of God as the ground of all Beine or were
considered more particular manifestations of a self-evident and general doctrine of God, which
must be held by faith.41 In either case, the full and complete vision of the rational order of the
world was generally agreed upon. But when this comprehensive vision is questioned by equally
plausible alternatives, so that no single vision of the Truth stands out to us as pure and
unquestionable, the Platonic metaphysics of presence begins to collapse.
This sort of questioning occurred in many different ways over an extended period of time.
Edwards directs our attention to the rise of empirical sciences that placed doubt upon the basic
cosmology of the Christian scriptures, as well as the exploration of foreign lands with alternative
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political and economic structures. These discoveries made the notion that the Truth presents
itself to us in an unmediated way problematic. And without the certainty found in an immediate
vision, the binary distinction began to wane and there arose an epistemological crisis. If there are
many claims to immediate visions of the Truth, how do we know which one is right? The idea
that Truth can merely present itself to us loses it descriptive power. We lose the certainty of an
objective and immediate ground and must find a new ground upon which we can discern
between competing visions.
This crisis of certainty gave rise to what Edwards calls the age of Cartesian EgoSubjectivity. Rene Descartes' two major writings, Discourse on Method42 and Meditations on
First Philosophy,43 begin with the challenge presented by the collapse of an uncontested vision
of Truth. Through autobiographical reflection, Descartes recounts the diversity of opinions he
has encountered throughout the world, and recalls how little help they provided him for judging
between them. Thus, rather than searching the world for answers, he decides to make himself an
object of study. Doubting tradition and the bodily senses, which were prone to deceive,
Descartes came to the conclusion that the only certainty available to him was his own thinking
consciousness. "The ego thus becomes the subject, the hypokeimenon, the fixed and identitygranting ground of all other reality....Everything else takes is determinative reality, its true
Being, in relation to this ego-subject, as one of its 'objects."'"
However, the Cartesian solution to the problem of certainty already betrays the
precarious status of the sacred. The ground of Truth is no longer the world as it presents itself to

42 Rene Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, in vol. 1 of The Philosophical
Works of Descartes,trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. 12._ T. Ross (Dover Publications, 1955), 79-130.
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44

Edwards, Plain Sense, 29.

37

us; but now the human consciousness is the ground. The sacred is no longer the self-sustaining
source of light, but is itself grounded in the subject. "Metaphysical entities and hierarchies (gods,
Forms) necessarily become objects of the ego's belief, and this is a fundamental loss of status for
those entities. They are no longer the sacred ground, no longer the full presence of Being itself.
Rather, they are representations displayed as figures upon the ego-ground."45
Here we can begin to trace the decay and loss of the stability and certainty of the sacred. As
we saw in the Euthyphro, the age of the forms appeared to be an advance on the age of the gods
because the sacred ground became more fixed and certain. Since the sacred was that which gave
shape to, made sense of, and justified the profane, the age of the forms made the relationship
between the two more stable by making the sacred more fixed, enduring, and intelligible. But
that supposed gain only had the effect of making the sacred more tenuous in the end, since it
provided few resources for judging with any certainty between competing visions. Descartes'
"solution" to the instability of the sacred in the age of the forms only made matters worse. The
only stability remaining for Descartes was the thinking subject, and the subject itself became the
sacred grounding of the sacred ground. Descartes, of course, saw some of the danger, and tried to
argue for the necessity of God from the basis of the thinking subject. Whether that argument is
convincing or not—and the history of philosophy seems to have decided against it—the fatal
blow was already struck. The sacred ground now required an argument. The transition from the
age of ego-subjectivity to the age of what Edwards calls transvalued values is a short step away,
and the transition from Kant to Nietzsche serves as an apt illustration.
Kant thought he had secured the ground and objectivity of the thinking subject by
recognizing that our perceptions were predetermined by the apparatus that enables us to have
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experience of the world in the first place. Our concepts are formed from a priori categories of
human perception, which, Kant thought, determined our experiences in a fixed manner. While
we do not have access to the things in themselves which give rise to our perceptions, the subject
of perception is nevertheless fixed, providing some stability between the thinking subject and the
world. But Nietzsche was quick to point out that Kant's discovery did not entail the objectivity
Kant desired. For Kant's discovery simultaneously cut off any access we have to a real world
beyond our perceptions of it. Thus, the notion that the subject has, to some degree of accuracy, a
representation of the real world no longer holds water when we lack the ability to check our
representations over-against the original thing-in-itself. As Edwards suggests, "objective
reality—that opaque and resistant stuff assumed to stand over against the receptive ego and to be
spontaneously reflected in its consciousness—has become a will-o'-the wisp:46
Nietzsche exposed Kant's faulty attempt to ground the subject in something more secure
and real than its own perceptions. And despite Kant's optimism that he had saved metaphysics,
he actually brought an end to any possibility of conceiving the world as something more than our
interpretation of it. For Nietzsche, then, interpretation becomes the key to understanding the
human quest for knowledge, truth, and stability. Edwards writes, "the basic activity of
consciousness is not spontaneous representation but interpretation, the willful imposition of
structure and meaning on something—a text, a set of events, a sequence of sense experiences—
that demand it:47 Far from corresponding to or participating in a fixed and enduring realm of the
sacred, our knowledge depends merely on the human will to have some sense of stability in the
first place. Given this recognition, the truth becomes merely another name for the necessary
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activity of structuring and ordering our world for the enhancement of our own life. Truths are
revalued as values: fixed patterns of interpretation that we use to cope.
Thus, for the first time in the history of the west, Nietzsche sees the whole project in scope.
And what he saw was its necessary self-defeat. Our belief in a sacred world (what Nietzsche
calls the true world), which would arbitrate any and all claims, had collapsed under the weight of
its own determinacy to find truth, certainty, and stability. In a way that previously had not
appeared to anyone, our belief in the sacred now appeared to Nietzsche as merely a belief. For
the sacred had lost its justification. Nietzsche writes that, "the reasons people give for calling
`this' world an illusion argue much more convincingly in favour of its reality,—no other reality
could ever be proven."48 For millennia we thought the sacred world (and the constellation of
values associated with it such as God, morality, religion and even philosophy) was part and
parcel of our existence. But now it appears to be a human enterprise contingent on the human
desire for truth and stability.
Thus, the sacred lost its persuasive power over our lives. Nietzsche's famous tale of the
madman who accuses those standing on the street that they had killed God is a helpful
illustration. With amazement that we human beings could do such a thing, the madman asks,
"How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire
horizon? What did we do when we unchained the earth from its sun?"49 This last question, of
course, is a reference to Plato's allegory of the sun giving light to those stuck in the shadowy
world of the cave. Edwards neatly summarizes the consequences. "After Nietzsche there is
nothing left that possesses the full and final presence of pure Being; there is nothing that compels
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our unremitting assent, nothing that stuns into a blessed silence our capacity for ironic
redescription."5° Western religiousness has exhausted its own best resources under the pressure
to find truth, certainty, and stability in the world. And the end of the western project means the
advent of nihilism.
Nietzsche neatly summarizes what he means by nihilism with the following aphorism.
"What does nihilism mean? That the highest values have devalued themselves. The aim is
lacking: 'why?' finds no answer."5I The heart of this description is the rise and prominence of
values in our own self-understanding. We used to hold to our beliefs and convictions because we
thought they were true. We judged them by the standards of a real world—Nietzsche calls this
the true world—that existed beyond our individual perceptions of it. But after ages, even
millennia of unsuccessful attempts to prove the truth of our convictions we came to realize that
the whole process was self-defeating. The notion that we have access to the truth or that a True
world exists beyond our perceptions lost its descriptive power for us. And since we lacked any
persuasive means of justifying our most basic convictions, it seemed more accurate to call them
values. We value our convictions as ways of making sense of and ordering our lives and not
because they correspond to the way the world really is. The devaluation of our highest values
follows. Once we understand that the only ground for our convictions is the will to hold them,
the power and authority they had over our lives erodes. Edwards summarizes the problem well
when he writes that,
What appears to our sight as truth is not truth but the value of truth; that is, various
social practices for constructing and enforcing stable and public agreements about
`the facts,' agreements that always and only serve some particular instance of will to
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power. And this sort of 'posited' and contingent truth, like any other posited value,
can claim only our pragmatic allegiance, not our worship.52
Edwards calls nihilism a normal condition in order to convey how nihilism is now an
everyday phenomenon, as common as the air we breathe. Borrowing from Heidegger, Edwards
describes nihilism as a mood. A mood is not a set of philosophical theses or doctrines that can be
compared with another set. Rather a mood "is the way one receives whatever particular beliefs,
philosophical or otherwise, then come to one. A mood shows itself in the way those beliefs are
framed into one's life....A mood, then, is a way of acting, a style of response, a specific sense of
inhabiting one's life."53 Nihilism is a disposition and comportment we assume when we regard
the world and others. In as much as we live at the time when Truth and practices of truthfulness
have lost their hold over us, we are all normal nihilists. Nihilism is the way we now experience
the world.
Usually the term nihilism carries with it the connotation that one is a psychopath, that one
has given himself over to dark pessimism and apathy about the world. But this stereotype misses
the simpler and more fundamental way that nihilism shapes our everyday lives. "To say that we
are normal nihilists is just to say that our lives are constituted by self-devaluating values....As
normal nihilists we are aware of both the existence of radically alternative structures of
interpretation and the fact that we ourselves lack any knockdown, noncircular way to
demonstrate the self-sufficiency, solidarity, or originality of our own."54 Normal nihilism does
not mean that everyone today is an immoral atheist, or that no one any longer practices religion.
People still have moral convictions and regularly practice religion. But they also realize, in ways
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they previously did not, that they have no persuasive way of defending or justifying their own
convictions or the uniqueness of their religious practices in the face of those radically different
than their own. "To be a normal nihilist is to acknowledge that, however fervent and essential
one's commitment to a particular set of values, that's all one ever has: a commitment to a
particular set of values."55
The vast and penetrating effects normal nihilism has on our culture bring us full circle
back to the regional shopping mall, which can now be seen not as a strange phenomenon, but the
end of the long history of western religiousness that began with the desire to fmd truth, stability
and certainty—the desire for justification. Although Edwards does not highlight the issue of
justification in the same way I would like to, it is not hard to understand the history he writes in
terms of "the dispute for justification."
While he does not intend to write a comprehensive history of the west in the manner of
Edwards, Oswald Bayer's depiction of "the dispute for justification" tracks nicely with Edwards.
In his book Living by Faith: Justification and Sanctification, Bayer observes that the legal
terminology of justification is part and parcel of our everyday existence as social beings. We are
under constraint to prove our right before the judgment of others. Why is this the case? Bayer
only conjectures that it is our fate as social beings, who require recognition from one another in
order to exist. However we construe the cause, we are constantly under pressure to give reasons
for living as we do and not some other way. And we achieve that goal by claiming to be in the
right before the judgment of others. Therefore, "the world of the court is not a special world of
its own, but just a particular instance—a very striking one—of what is being done always and
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everywhere."56 This battle for justification forms not only our individual lives, but even world
histories, as social groups struggle with one another to claim right, to assign guilt, and to
vindicate themselves. The whole western project that Edwards narrates can be seen in precisely
these terms. The invocation of the sacred, and the search for a workable, stable, and rationally
intelligible ground has been part and parcel of the human attempt to assign meaning to our lives,
to claim that there is some right and authority to which we must assent and obey, and which
justifies our living one way rather than another. In an age of self-devaluating values, we realize
that our sacred grounds do not provide the stability and authority they once did. As values, we
have no justification for them beyond our own personal desire to hold them.
Thus, the question of justification stands at the heart of the devaluation of our highest
values. Given that we lack any persuasive means of giving reasons for our convictions, we have
been left with no other justification than our own commitment to them. The problem is not that
our central convictions appear to be wrong or false. Rather, the problem is that we westerners
have lost the ability to say why one viewpoint is more right than another. Our most ardent
attempts at justification have come up short. And we as a western people are cognizant of this
problem. More to the point then, the problem is that everyone's central convictions appear to be
merely subjective and preferential, no more true or persuasive than our own ability to find value
in them, which has significantly devalued them.
Christians have always been charged with the task of justification. The central claim
Christians have made throughout the centuries is that the creator has acted in a decisive way
through a particular person, and to know the truth about the world requires knowledge of this
person in particular. This claim is not readily apparent to every living person as the truth; nor
56 Oswald Bayer, Living by Faith: Justification and Sanctification, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 1.
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should it, given its particularity and exclusivity. So Christians have always been forced to justify
themselves as people who follow the way, the truth, and the life. But in an age of normal
nihilism the problem of justification arises in a more sweeping manner. Since no single set of
beliefs or way of life stands out above the rest as unmistakably the way things are, Christians are
forced to give reasons for living as we do. In our recent past, western culture assumed that the
Triune God was the creator of all things and the incarnation of God's Son was the pinnacle event
in the history of the world. But now, "no form of life is unquestioned by us; none is proof to our
capacity and need for irony," as Edwards warns."
Christians must be able to give reasons for their faith and life that appeal to more than what
Christians find personally valuable. The most nihilistic character of our convictions is that they
provide us with no resources to recommend them to other people beyond the usefulness we have
found in them for ordering our own lives. Of course, we have found ways to describe how
Christianity is important to us, how we've decided to follow it, been bequeathed it by our
ancestors, or what value we have found in it as we make our way through life. But nihilism is a
normal condition when we have lost the ability to say why Christianity is more than personally
useful, to say that we are compelled by its claims to believe it and have a right to hold others to
the standards of these beliefs. This is not to say that our appeals to the value of Christianity are
not valid attempts at justification. But it is to say that these are especially nihilistic means of
justification.
Martin Heidegger begins to capture the disaster facing Christianity when it makes an
appeal to values when he writes, "The heaviest blow against God is not that God is held to be
unknowable, not that God's existence is demonstrated to be un-provable, but rather that the god
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held to be real is elevated to the highest value."58 As a value, even the highest value, God loses
his authority, his right, his persuasive and commanding power over us because God's
significance to us is not that he is the ground of our existence—a powerful personal being and
force that we must understand and obey if we are to have life. Rather, God appears significant
only insofar as we have placed value on him. Heidegger appropriately uses the diminished god to
signify the loss of authority God has as the highest value. For, "That which is, as the objective, is
swallowed up into the immanence of subjectivity. The horizon no longer emits light of itself. It is
now nothing but the point-of-view posited in the value-positing of the will to power."59
Therefore, if Christianity in the west wants to avoid the fate of being another shop in the mall,
Christians will have to have reasons for their beliefs that extend beyond the personal value of
Christianity.
When I say, "give reasons," I do not mean this in an Apologetic sense. I do not intend to
show how Christians should persuade others into the faith by providing convincing reasons that
any good or rational person would have to accept. This would only reduplicate our nihilism by
underwriting the authority of human reason. Rather, I intend to answer these questions: What
reasons do Christians have for their faith and life? Are those reasons anything more than our
personal attraction to Christianity? Can we intelligibly say that our faith and life stem not from
our will and desire, but from God? And what will Christian faith and life look like when it is
formed by those reasons? Answering these questions will be the task of this dissertation. Before
moving on, though, it will be important to say something more about my choice of Edwards'
narrative.
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Assessing Edwards
Having canvassed the western tradition since the Homeric period, one cannot help but
wonder how exactly to assess Edwards' claims. How does one judge such a broad and sweeping
characterization of western life and thought? What resources are possibly available? One answer
to that question might be to check the accuracy of Edwards' account over against the original
sources, and see whether or not he gets one thinker or another right. Given the scope of his
narrative, that kind of assessment is unrealistic, not to mention the fact that it begs the question
of what the standards are by which anyone might consider a reading of Nietzsche or Plato right
in the first place. But more so, it tends to misunderstand what Edwards aims to accomplish with
his story.
Edwards himself admits that he is not trying to provide anything more than a
characterization of these influential thinkers, to track a popular and influential way we have
understood ourselves in light of their work. "The point here, as I say, is self-recognition, not the
advancement of philosophical scholarship. The point is that we come to accept my narrative, and
the particular philosophical mood it creates and explains, as our own: as a convincing account of
what it does mean for us end-of-century, western intellectuals to be subject to religious
affection?' Thus, the important question is not primarily one of accuracy but whether or not this
account has explanatory power. Does it help us understand how we have come to be the people
we are?
Another way of putting the matter is to suggest that we understand Edwards as a literary
critic in the sense that Richard Rorty uses the term. A literary critic, according to Rorty, is
someone who has the skill of creating a canon, or positioning certain thinkers in relationship to

6° Edwards, Plain Sense, 13-14.
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one another in such a way that creates a new final vocabulary; a new set of words that we use to
justify our actions and beliefs. Rather than thinking that there are perennial categories in a field
(philosophy or theology for instance) that can judge any one set of propositions from any thinker
at any given time, a literary critic tries to re-describe diverse thinkers in such a way that makes
sense of their differences. A literary critic thus considers his work successful when the canon he
creates can provide a more persuasive and useful way of understanding the relationships between
thinkers and periods. In the course of resituating various thinkers in relationship to one another,
says Rorty, "we revise our opinions of both the old and the new. Simultaneously, we revise our
own moral identity by revising our own final vocabulary.' Thus, a literary critic turns out to be
more persuasive and useful when we notice that we gain something in adopting his redescription. A literary critic is successful when his canon helps us get along better.
The task of assessing Edwards as a literary critic will extend over the next few chapters.
Already, though, we can begin to see how Edwards' account provides us with some advantage
over the line of thinkers that have gone before him. Edwards writes about nihilism from within a
tradition of reflection on the matter, and it will be beneficial to briefly recount that tradition in
order to understand what kind of gain Edwards provides. The two most direct influences on
Edwards' account of nihilism are Nietzsche and Heidegger.
Nietzsche was not the first person to use the term nihilism; in fact, he uses the word
sparingly in his own body of writing. His most concentrated discussion of the topic can be found
in a book he never lived to publish, The Will to Power. But his appropriation of the term has
proven definitive. Nietzsche used nihilism to describe what he saw as the destiny of western
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civilization for the next two centuries.62 He recognized that the quest for truth and truthfulness,
which has extended over the course of western history as we have come to know it, was
collapsing under its own weight. We westerners once liked to think that our convictions about
the world corresponded to a realm of Truth that was transcendent of our immediate experience
but nevertheless accessible to our rational capabilities. We placed value on the pursuit of truth,
and the exercise of truthfulness found in the practices of religion, theology and philosophy. And
we structured our lives around the corresponding notions of God and creation, knowledge and
mere belief, facts and values, good and evil. But Nietzsche understood that this era had run its
course; for the ways we sought justification for our beliefs had proven over the expanse of this
project to be untenable, faulty, and self-defeating. Therefore the notions that once seemed to be a
necessary part of existence now appear to be contingent upon our desire for truth and certainty.
Truth itself appears merely as something human beings value. And that realization significantly
devalues the status of our own convictions. If they are not the truth or true in any traditional
sense of the word, then they are mere personal preferences that we use to make sense of our
lives.
According to this account, nihilism is not a prescriptive doctrine that aims at inducing the
collapse of truth. Rather, nihilism is the observation that the collapse of the western project has
been the latent and inevitable inner logic of western thought and civilization. Certainly, major
figures in the west have influenced our collective imagination because they have encouraged us
to think about our most basic convictions in terms of values. For instance, Rieff helpfully brings
to our attention that no account of the western world can under-estimate the influence someone
like Sigmund Freud has over our own self-description. But often, a mistaken perception of
62 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 3, comments, "What I relate is the history of the next two centuries. I describe
what is coming, what can no longer come differently: the advent of nihilism."
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nihilism is that its influence extends only as far as the tenability of something like Freud's human
psychology, or as we shall see, Nietsche's will to power. It is sometimes thought that nihilism
can be defeated by isolating the individual faults of these independent thinkers and their
doctrines, and providing better doctrines that ought to stifle their influence as soon as everyone
sees how foolish or bad they really are. But nihilism is more than the sum of the most influential
`nihilists.' Nihilism is an historical observation, an attempt to articulate why we are the way we
are on account of the people we have been. In particular, this historical account narrates the
necessary self-defeat of the thing we have valued the most: truth and truthfulness.
All of this tracks with what I have already been describing as nihilism. But at some points
in Nietzsche's writings, the story he tells is only an historical observation about the inner logic of
western thought and life since Plato.63 At other times, however, the story has the character of
asserting non-historical doctrines aimed at inducing the collapse of truth. In other words,
sometimes Nietzsche's arguments seem to depend on his description of the fundamental human
condition: the will to power, or the will to self-preservation and enhancement of life. His
argument in Beyond Good and Evil can serve as a good examp1e.64 Already in the first chapter
Nietzsche neatly dispatches hundreds of years of arguments that human reasoning has some
purchase on certainty and truth. The futility of this tradition, he thinks, ought to lead us to a more
interesting question: why do we need truth in the first place? If our best efforts at finding the
truth only lead us to believe in truth, why are we so intent on believing? Why not rather believe
in interpretation; that the cause of our knowledge is not things in themselves but the will to

63 Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche. "How the True World Finally Became a Fable" in Twilight of the Idols in The AntiChrist, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols And Other Writings, ed. Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, trans. Judith
Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 171.

m Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, ed. and trans., Marion
Faber (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 3-24.

50

power? In this way, Nietzsche uses the doctrine of the will to power as an alternative
interpretation about the way things really are. The will to power is a tool Nietzsche uses to
dislodge the confidence we have in truth.
But these kinds of arguments in Nietzsche's work create some confusion about what he
meant and whether or not his account is cogent. On the one hand, the validity of his account
would seem to depend on the accuracy of items like the story he tells about the origins of
morality in On the Genealogy of Morals.65 In this book, Nietzsche gives an alternative account of
morality that does not rely on the traditional Platonic notion that virtuous behavior leads one to
achieve an objective good that is latent in the structure of reality. He argues that the notions of
good and evil derive not from the existence of a True world but rather from the desire of a ruling
class to secure its own power by calling its way of life natural or necessary.' Given that this
work often claims to see the hidden motive behind history, it is doubtful that one could prove this
in any convincing manner. Likewise, even in his later work, his argument sometimes seems to
depend on the tenability of his description of human being as will to power.67 Given the

65 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic, trans. Douglas Smith (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996), 11-76.
66 Nietzsche, Genealogy, 13, asserts that, "the pathos of nobility and distance, the enduring, dominating, and
fundamental overall feeling of a higher ruling kind in relation to a lower kind, to a 'below'—that is the origin of the
opposition between 'good' and 'bad'. (The right of the masters to confer names extends so far that one should allow
oneself to grasp the origin of language itself as the expression of the power of the rulers: they say 'this is such and
such', they put their seal on each thing and event with a sound and in the process take possession of it.) It follows
from this origin that there is from the outset absolutely no necessary connection between the word 'good' and
'unegoistic' actions, as the superstition of the genealogists of morals would have it. Rather, it is only with the
decline of aristocratic value-judgments that this whole opposition between 'egoistic' and 'unegoistic' comes to
impose itself increasingly on the human conscience."
67 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 275-76, writes, "The valuation 'I believe that this and that is so' as the essence of
'truth.' In valuations are expressed conditions of preservation and growth. All our organs of knowledge and our
senses are developed only with regard to conditions of preservation and growth. Trust in reason and its categories, in
dialectic, therefore the valuation of logic, proves only their usefulness for life, proved by experience—not that
something is true."
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historicizing claims of his conclusions, though, it would be hard to see how anyone could
convincingly sustain the consistency of this position."
Heidegger recognized the confusion in Nietzsche, and tried to take the argument a step in
the right direction by separating the account of western philosophy from its dependence on the
will to power.69 Heidegger thinks that with the notion of will to power, Nietzsche was the last
metaphysician; the final practitioner of the very tradition he saw collapsing. As a metaphysician,
Heidegger thinks that Nietzsche had a description of the truth of what exists as a whole, i.e.
Being. That description was the will to power. But Nietzsche's metaphysics was no accident or
arbitrary assertion, argues Heidegger. That Being would be conceived as the will to power was
the logical consummation of the tradition since Plato. This tradition held that the underlying and
explanatory structure of existence—Being—could be thought of in its totality. And the only way
to think of Being as a whole was through representational thinking. Representational thinking
understands Being as an object available for the subject's examination. But this only makes the
thinking subject the ground of Being. Being becomes merely the object of the subject so that the
subject becomes the ground of its own ground. Thus, metaphysics consummates itself when it
understands Being as that which is grounded in the human will for certainty and selfpreservation; or as Nietzsche put it, the will to power.

681 do not mean to suggest that Nietzsche's arguments really do depend on his doctrine of the will to power. In
fact, a careful reading of Nietzsche often turns up surprising ways in which he qualifies the will to power as another
ungrounded conjecture, and that Nietzsche's intent is merely to provide a provocative or more useful alternative. For
instance, Gavin Hyman, "John Milbank and Nihilism: A Metaphysical (Mis)Reading?" Literature & Theology 14
(2000): 430-43, helpfully points us to the preface of Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals to see this very kind of
qualification. However, I do mean to say that Nietzsche's use of the will to power does sometimes create confusion
because they seem to make his arguments depend on these kinds of proofs.
69 Cf. Martin Heidegger, "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God is Dead,'" in The Question Concerning Technology
and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper Perennial) 53-112. Cf. Martin Heidegger, The Will to
Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics, vol.3 of Nietzsche, ed. David Farrell Krell, trans. Joan Stambaugh, David
Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1987). Also, Martin Heidegger, Nihilism, vol. 4
of Nietzsche, ed. David Farrell Krell, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1982).
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Especially in his later work, Heidegger expresses a great deal of worry about the history of
metaphysics that culminates in nihilism; for the western tradition is not merely a set of ideas but
a way of life that was part and parcel of human engagement with the world. And that
engagement has profound consequences. As we have already seen, one primary concern for
Heidegger is the place technology has in shaping our existence.70 Technology, like western
metaphysics, tries to secure the world as an object for the study and use of the subject. And at the
end of the western project of metaphysics, our existence is defined by technology's ability to
organize the world for us. Thus, Heidegger thinks that in our technological age the world now
presents itself to us as standing reserve, or raw material to be stored for creating and recreating
our existence at will.
Technology is an important example for Heidegger of the way in which Being comes to
manifest itself at the end of metaphysics. Although completely contingent on the historical
tradition of metaphysical thinking rather than the more doctrinal will to power, Heidegger thinks
that Being now presents itself to us as nihilism. "Thought out from the destining of Being," he
writes, "the nihil in 'nihilism' means that Nothing is befalling Being...Metaphysics is an epoch
of the history of Being itself. But in its essence metaphysics is nihilism. The essence of nihilism
belongs to that history as which Being itself comes to presence."7I Thus, Being, in the sense of
the totality of existence, still remains an important question for Heidegger to the extent that
Being tends to be the overarching framework in which his account of nihilism arises.
This aspect of Heidegger's account will prove to be a misleading way of describing the
problem, which will become clearer in light of John Milbank's engagement with nihilism and
Heidegger. For now, it is enough to let Richard Rorty have the final word concerning Heidegger.
Heidegger. "The Question Concerning Technology," 3-35.
71
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By his own claims, Rorty places himself and his criticisms of the Platonic tradition in continuity
with Nietzsche and Heidegger, as well as Wittgenstein and Dewey.' In an essay that compares
Heidegger and Dewey on the tradition of philosophy stemming from Plato, Rorty observes that
Heidegger has trouble casting off the tradition because he still finds a place for Thought. Or to
put the matter in a way that tracks with what I have written above, Heidegger still finds a place
for philosophy in the sense of a discourse that can speak about Being as such. But, Rorty says,
this tendency in Heidegger only displays a hope for the holy and the religious, and this hope is
"just what was worst in the tradition."73 After all, given the trajectory of the Platonic tradition we
ought to be able to recognize, as Nietzsche did about Truth, that Being is just a hope developed
solely within the parameters of the tradition—in that sense, a 'religious' rather than necessary
hope. For, Rorty argues, Heidegger has nothing from which to recommend that we take Being
seriously as such. "All he can do to explain why we shouldn't shrug off Being as a vapor and a
fallacy is to say that our fate is somehow linked to that tradition."74 But such a case is far from
demonstrating the necessity of thinking in terms of Being in the first place.
In contrast to Heidegger, Edwards describes nihilism more simply as the result of a certain
way of thinking about the world that began with Plato. He does not need to make allusions to
Being. In fact, Edwards embraces the irony latent within his own account of the matter.
And now one can also easily see that my own potted narrative of who we have
become—the narrative that represents us as normal nihilists—is itself a distinctly
normal nihilist narrative. By representing our past as a series of replaceable sets of
values (gods, Forms, egos), as alternative structures of interpretation succeeding one
another as the varying conditions of life (intellectual and otherwise) demand, the
narrative belongs to, as Heidegger would snidely put it, 'the age of the world picture'
it is itself helping to define and to sustain...Thus my narrative places itself within its
72
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own frame, forcing us to see not only the past but also the present—this account
itself—as interpretation in service to a form of life...To us normal nihilists, obviously
it must seem as if we must be normal nihilists: and that is right, only we must be
careful not to turn the 'must' into a metaphysical imperative rather than a rhetorical
need. Thus devaluation devaluates the very account that succeeds in explaining our
mood of devaluation. Even our normal nihilism is just a banal contingency, not an
uncanny insight into the Order of Things."
In other words, Edwards' own description of our condition is not making a claim any more
interesting than the following: nihilism is our normal condition because we have been committed
to thinking about the world in Platonic terms. Unlike Heidegger, Edwards does not hold out hope
that since nihilism is the latest means by which Being has come to presence, we might yet have
something to say about Being. Unlike Heidegger, Edwards does not have the hope that Being can
still save us from our nihilism. That, after all, is the worry that precipitates Edwards' book.
Given the contingency of our thinking about Being, we should realize that no such thing can
save us from our consumption of the world. Nor would we likely want it to if it could.'
For those of us Christians with a serious investment in 'God', accepting the terms and
validity of Edwards' narrative might seem like suicide. But, I am adopting this narrative of
decline because it poses a question to Christian life and witness that demands an answer: Why?
Why do Christians gather on Sunday morning to pray in the name of a first century Jew from
Nazareth? Why do we forgive sins, baptize, and celebrate the Lord's Supper? Why do we say
things like Jesus is the Son of God and insist that God is triune? Why do we insist on following
Jesus? What justifies our life together? These are the kinds of questions that our condition of
normal nihilism forces upon us. We must give some justification for our life as Christians that
does not ground our existence fmally in our own desire and will; otherwise Christianity is just
another shop in the mall. Before giving my own answer to these questions, I will evaluate two
75
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prominent attempts at justifying the Christian faith in an age of normal nihilism: that of John
Milbank and Stanley Hauerwas. These chapters will help clarify the difficulty facing Christian
life and witness in our age and set the stage for my own constructive answer in the final chapters.
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CHAPTER TWO
JOHN MILBANK'S RESPONSE
The pathos of modern theology is its false humility. For theology, this must be a fatal
disease, because once theology surrenders its claim to be a metadiscourse, it cannot
any longer articulate the word of the creator God, but is bound to turn into the
oracular voice of some finite idol, such as historical scholarship, humanist
psychology, or transcendental philosophy. If theology no longer seeks to position,
qualify or criticize other discourses, then it is inevitable that these discourses will
position theology: for the necessity of an ultimate organizing logic...cannot be
wished away.'
Anyone who does Christian theology in the contemporary west must take seriously the
argument behind these opening lines to John Milbank's Theology and Social Theory: Beyond
Secular Reason, because no single work in theology today has treated the issue of Christian
justification with greater focus, nuance and scholarship. And in that sense, Milbank's work is an
anthem for contemporary theology. Despite Milbank's enormous range of scholarship and his
idiosyncratic knack for turning a bad phrase, the book's thesis is quite simple. For centuries now,
Christian theology has been marginalized by disciplines like philosophy, sociology, politics,
history and economics, which claim to have a more fundamental understanding of the world than
theology. Each of those disciplines has gained an authority over Christianity on account of their
ability to tell us the way things really are without the outworn language of "God." Thus, secular
reasoning has not only held a right over theology, but has gained public consensus as a more
authoritative science. In the process, these disciplines argue that putting aside the language of
theology has set us free to understand the world as it really is, without colloquial superstition or

Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 1.

57

prejudice. The results have been disastrous for Christian faith and life. Milbank fears that secular
reason has given westerners the ability to construct what appear to be perfectly coherent lives
without ever thinking once about God, let alone the church or the church's more particular
confessions like the doctrine of the Trinity or the divinity of Jesus. This must be a fatal disease
for theology because even though its claims are about a God who is creator, it has forfeited the
right to speak authoritatively about creation. On the one hand, if Christianity wants to regain
some status of relevance under these conditions its talk about God must be translated into the
language of historical scholarship, humanist psychology, or transcendental philosophy. On the
other hand, if theology refuses to translate its convictions, it threatens to become just another
topic alongside others with its own particular subject and study (i.e. revelation) with little or no
necessary consequences for our greater understanding of the world in which we live. Given the
way secular reason has situated theology, the question "Why go to church?" finds no answer.
Rather than accepting these parameters for doing theology, Milbank challenges them. In a
provocative way, Milbank argues that the story secular disciplines tell about the way they have
emancipated reason from superstition and prejudice cannot be sustained. Upon closer inspection,
secular philosophy, history, politics and economics stem from arbitrary changes within Christian
theology; changes that were theologically unorthodox if not outright heretical. Thus, without the
guise of "pure" reason, the move to the secular depends on political motivations rather than
necessary advancements. Once the secular is deconstructed in this genealogical fashion, theology
can reposition itself as queen of the sciences by demonstrating that it has a better account than
the secular sciences ever did.
But just what is better and who determines that standard? Much depends on how Milbank
answers that question. And that raises the topic of nihilism in Milbank's work. Just as no single
book in contemporary theology has given as much focused attention to the topic of Christian
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justification, no single work of Christian theology has given such a nuanced account of nihilism
than Theology and Social Theory. Nihilism, Milbank claims, is the postmodern form of secular
reasoning. The modern form marginalized Christian theology by measuring it against the
universal truths supposedly found within their disciplines (i.e. Marx on religion and economics).
Nihilism lacks the ability to make claims about a single universal truth. "It can, however,
relativize and question claims to universality. Its more insidious method reveals no secret behind
the mythos, but merely points to other 'truths', and shows how these are suppressed by a
totalizing perspective."2 As Milbank defines it, nihilism is the new form of social theory standing
over-against Christian theology, marginalizing Christian claims to truth by pointing out the
necessary violence of making any comprehensive claim.
By the conclusion of Milbank's massive argument, the options are either secular nihilism
or Christian theology. But Milbank makes an important move within his account of nihilism that
distinguishes it from the description of nihilism that I have been borrowing from James Edwards.
Milbank makes that move already in the opening lines quoted above. "For the necessity of an
ultimate organizing logic...cannot be wished away./13 Even nihilism itself, which according to
Milbank undermines every claim to a totalizing truth, has its own ultimate organizing logic: that
the world is at base ruled by a necessary and arbitrary violence. Every totalizing claim is an act
of violence because every truth is merely the historically contingent and arbitrary movement of
one cultural form to another. This organizing logic is the new secular social theory. Whereas the
promise of modern secular social theory was its ability to give us coherent lives apart from the
parochial claims of theology, postmodern secular reason has only followed through with the
consequences of thinking about the world apart from a transcendent source. Now we live
2
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incoherent lives because we lack any authoritative means of judging between competing claims.
We have no reasonable way to say that one cultural form is good or right in comparison to
another. So, nihilism now appears to be the social theory that makes our incoherence and
violence necessary. This 'nihilism' is an opportunity, Milbank thinks, for Christian theology to
reassert itself over-against the secular.4
Milbank draws his account of nihilism from the writings of a select but influential group of
philosophers, including Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze. And while some
of them would certainly be hesitant to affirm Milbank's claim that they hold to an ultimate
organizing logic, the genius of Milbank's work appears to be the way he uses the Christian
counter-logic to expose their prejudices for violence. Over-against such nihilism, Milbank offers
the Christian ontology of ultimate peace, in which every difference is not ultimate but reconciled
in its participation in the triune God's creative activity. Just to the extent that Christianity does
not understand the world to be ruled by a necessary violence, the Christian organizing logic
reveals itself as the uniquely better social science.
But does this argument do the work against nihilism that Milbank claims for it? Does the
attractiveness of the Christian ontology really overcome nihilism? This is doubtful. In staking out
the unique Christian difference, Milbank does not claim to be a foundationalist. That is to say,
Milbank does not think that Christianity can be defended according to some universal standard of
truth; a standard that would prove the truth of Christianity to any competent person. In agreement
with the nihilists, Milbank does not think that such foundations exist. So the Christian ontology
4 Cf. John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward, "Introduction" in Radical Orthodoxy: A New
Theology, ed. John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward (London: Routledge, 1999), 1, who write, "For
several centuries now secularism has been defining and constructing the world. It is a world in which the theological
is either discredited or turned into a harmless leisure-time activity of private commitment. And yet in its early
manifestations secular modernity exhibited anxiety concerning its own lack of ultimate ground....And today the
logic of secularism is imploding...For this new project regards the nihilistic drift of postmodernism (which
nonetheless has roots in the outset of modernity) as a supreme opportunity."
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hangs suspended in utter contrast to secular social theory without any logical way of discerning
between them. "If my Christian perspective is persuasive," he writes, "then this should be a
persuasion intrinsic to the Christian logos itself, not the apologetic mediation of a universal
human reason."5 Thus, the persuasiveness of his argument for the Christian difference is only
based on the attractiveness of Christian ontology. This means that for Milbank, the final
justification for Christianity is the sheer appeal of its metaphysics.
Anyone following the line of argument made by James Edwards, that our normal nihilism
is the condition in which our highest values are devalued insofar as we understand their status as
values, will already see the problem with Milbank's position. Even though Theology and Social
Theory is a profoundly dense and scholarly argument, it will only be necessary to draw out its
major movements to see the difficulties it has as a response to our normal nihilism. Hopefully,
Milbank's most erudite reader will recognize these basic movements and the problems they
encounter when placed in contrast to Edwards. The trouble with Milbank's is that he tries to
justify Christianity on the value of its metaphysics for western life.
This chapter will critically examine and evaluate two specific features of Milbank's attempt
to overcome nihilism. The first feature of Milbank's argument is that nihilism is an organizing
logic, an account of Reality as it always is and has to be. The second feature is that nihilism can
be overcome and defeated by the persuasiveness or attractiveness of Christian metaphysics. By
the term metaphysics I mean the philosophical practice of providing ultimate and comprehensive
explanations of the world in which we live.6 Milbank's argument for Christianity depends on the
belief that human beings cannot escape the project of metaphysics. He finds that even the

5

Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 1.

6 I will sometimes use the term metaphysics in ways that seem synonymous with ontology. Ontology, as I will
use it, is the particular organizing logic that founds one entire metaphysical enterprise or another.

61

nihilists, who categorically deny the possibility of such explanations, still depend on metaphysics
to do so. The two features of Milbank's argument emerge from this single conviction. As I
demonstrated briefly in the previous chapter, the metaphysical charge against the nihilists might
apply to Nietzsche and Heidegger. But it is hard to say how it could possibly apply to Edwards'
account of the matter. For Edwards, the devaluation of our highest values is not an insight into
the way things have to be. Rather, it is only an observation that our most basic convictions have
lost their ability to convince us that they are something more than our convictions. In the end,
Milbank's failures will end up recommending Edwards.
The Nihilism of Theology and Social Theory
The ultimate failure of Milbank's strategy for justifying Christianity in Theology and
Social Theory depends on his definition of nihilism. Milbank derives this definition from a
canonical list of nihilists and their works. Those include Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger,
Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Gilles Deleuze. While these thinkers are diverse and
nuanced, Milbank lumps them together; and he is not hesitant to do so because despite their
differences, Milbank finds common features between them that he wants to place in stark
contrast to Christianity. "I am concerned," he writes, "with what is common to the outlook of the
major Nietzscheans, and I deliberately treat the writings of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Deleuze,
Lyotard, Foucault, and Derrida as elaborations of a single nihilistic philosophy, paying relatively
less attention to their divergences of opinion."7 That single nihilistic philosophy has three
enduring and related characteristics. First, these thinkers hold to an absolute historicism. Second,
and most important to Milbank's argument, an ontology of violence sustains their historicism.
And third, the first two features lead to a nihilistic ethics, in which violence and coercion are
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necessary features of human behavior and social organization. The apparent success of
Milbank's argument depends on his claim that their historicizing must, but cannot be, sustained
by an ontology of violence. The nihilists deconstruct every claim to the truth as a mere accident
of history, contingent on arbitrary historical circumstances and thus always masking an equally
justifiable alternative. But in order to sustain these arguments, they must posit an ontology or a
description of the way things are always and everywhere—namely, that there exists an inherent
and primordial violence. But this is just the sort of claim that cannot be sustained within the
parameters of an absolute historicism. And he demonstrates their ungrounded character by
juxtaposing these thinkers with the Christian ontology of primordial peace. Such juxtaposition,
however, does not prove the Christian alternative. It only exposes the nihilists' preference for
violence and recommends the Christian alternative for its preference and commitment to peace.
Thus, Christianity appears to be a uniquely different social theory. Only the Christian ontology is
able to envision the world without the necessity of violence and coercion.
Many have already attempted to discredit Milbank's reading of one or another of his
canonical nihilists by showing that they do not fit the broad definition Milbank gives them.8 This
may or may not be true; but that is an interpretive question beyond the scope of this project
because it is not relevant to the devaluation of our highest values. This sort of attack on
Milbank's argument misses a more important point about nihilism's threat to Christian life and
witness. Milbank justifies Christianity according to its value as the single alternative to
8 Cf. On Derrida see, Hugh Rayment-Pickard, "Derrida and Nihilism" in Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy:
Postmodern Theology, Rhetoric and Truth, ed. Wayne Hankey and Douglas Hedley (Burlington, VT: Ashgate,
2005), 161-75. On Foucault see, David Toole, Waiting for Godot in Sarajevo: Theological Reflections on Nihilism,
Tragedy, and Apocalypse (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 23-88. On Nietzsche see, Gavin Hyman, "John
Milbank and Nihilism: A Metaphysical (Mis)Reading?" Literature & Theology 14 (2000): 430-43. Hyman's
critique is very similar to mine in the sense that it questions the validity of Milbank's attempt to situate and
overcome nihilism as metaphysics. However, Hyman's commitment to nihilist textualism devalues Christianity in
the same manner. Cf. Gavin Hyman, The Predicament of Postmodern Theology: Radical Orthodoxy or Nihilist
Textualism? (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001).
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nihilism's social theory. Despite his claims to overcome 'nihilism' he nevertheless justifies
Christianity in a way that devalues it. He makes Christianity the highest possible value to
contemporary western life. While he might in fact be correct about the ontological tendencies in
writers like Nietzsche and Heidegger, which I have already alluded to in the previous chapter,
nihilism as I am describing it, cannot be positioned as an ontology of violence. As Edwards says,
"Even our nihilism is just a banal contingency, not an uncanny insight into the Order of
Things."9 Instead, it is better to understand nihilism as our normal condition: an economic
disposition we have towards any ontological claims insofar as they have lost their power to
convince us that this is the way things really are.
Nihilism as Absolute Historicism and Ontology of Violence
In order to demonstrate Milbank's misunderstanding, let me first unpack his definition of
nihilism. The first character of nihilism is absolute historicism. By this, Milbank means that the
nihilists think that every structure of meaning stems from contingent and historical
circumstances. But the challenge is not merely the historical nature of every claim but more so
that this sort of historicism "refuses to tell [the] Kantian and Hegelian (or sociological and
Marxist) stories about a constant human subject. Instead, it is only interested in disinterring the
thresholds of emergence for many different fictions of subjectivity in the course of human
history. Milbank points us to the transition from Kant and Hegel's philosophy to Nietzsche's
genealogy. Whereas Kant and Hegel held out the hope that the contingent character of our
thinking about the world could be overcome by appealing to the objectivity we have through
some kind of access to the thinking subject, absolute historicism refuses even that as an
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Archimedean point of leverage. Instead, Nietzsche's genealogy denies altogether that the subject
can be a transcendental point of reference. The genealogical method does this by telling the story
of a more basic striving for power behind every disinterested claim. This story is meant to
dislodge all claims to objectivity by recognizing that behind every disinterested claim to truth
stands the will to self preservation and enhancement of life. Absolute historicism, according to
Milbank's telling, holds that every framework of meaning is conditioned by history's arbitrary
movement from one power-complex to the next and cannot be reconciled by talk of the progress
of the Spirit or a transcendental ego.
The importance of an ontology of violence already begins to emerge from this description
of absolute historicism. Absolute historicism relativizes every claim to objectivity insofar as it
sees behind it the action of the will-to-power. "Hence, genealogy is not an interpretation, but a
new 'joyfully' nihilistic form of positivism which explains every cultural meaning complex as a
particular strategy or ruse of power. No universals are ascribed to human society save one: that it
is always a field of warfare."" Of course, Milbank recognizes that Nietzsche's genealogy
intends to undermine confidence in the objectivity of any perspective by "exploding the 'eternal
verities' which it claims to promote, and exhibiting the 'base' origins of its apparently noble
pretensions."I2 But intention does not necessarily mean that his genealogy is true or objective. It
could be just another way of putting the matter; a way intended to unsettle, but nevertheless just
another historically conditioned way. In other words, the possibility still exists that the will-topower is only one interpretation among a number of others. But Milbank thinks that Nietzsche
and the nihilists overtly assert a comprehensive account of reality. Moreover, he argues that they
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must posit this ontology in order to sustain their absolute historicism. Here is where Milbank
draws on his account of Christianity in order to assist his argument against the nihilists.
In order to explain how Christianity assists the argument, I will transition from Milbank's
discussion of genealogy and Nietzsche to his discussion of the nihilist ontology in the work of
Martin Heidegger. Milbank focuses especially on the earlier work of Heidegger in his Being and
Time." Like Nietzsche, Heidegger's work begins with the problematic condition of our historical
contingency. But rather than construe this in terms of the will-to-power, Heidegger sees the
problem of contingency latent in the task of philosophy itself, especially in the metaphysical
manner of thinking. According to Heidegger, metaphysical thinking aims to answer the question
of being: What is the meaning of being? Heidegger recognizes that typically, philosophy has
tried to answer that question by referring us to more perfect instances of particular beings
themselves. Plato's forms might be one example of just this kind of thinking. The problem,
though, with this kind of answer to the metaphysical question is that individual things occur
always within a complex web of other things, each of which has its own purposes that in turn
depend on certain historical circumstances and movements. The desk, for instance, upon which I
am writing is not merely a reflection of a more perfect form of desk, Heidegger would argue, but
has its own existence in relationship to the quite ordinary task of academic scholarship (which
places it in the basement of a theological research library built in the 1950's). Academic
scholarship, especially in its unique western form, has a number of factors that determine its
everyday ordinariness: the attainment of degrees, status, livelihood, and the functional operation
of western society according to a distinctly scientific manner. And, the greater web itself, in
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Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper,
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Social Theory, 296-302.
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which my desk exists, has a historical determination that cannot simply be abstracted at any one
point and viewed in its entirety. What stands in the way of our doing so is the ontological
difference—the difference between individual beings that happen to exist in any given
circumstance and at any given time, and Being itself, which is no thing in particular but the sheer
happening of beings in time. The metaphysical way of thinking ignores the ontological
difference and makes Being a more perfect, now hypostasized and permanent, form of particular
beings.
But this kind of projection only transgresses the ontological difference. It ignores the
occurrence of Being in time and projects Being as a thing, even the most perfect instance of that
thing. If we respect the ontological difference, we would recognize that every specific instance of
being or beings simultaneously conceals Being from our vision. And as beings who exist within
time we cannot hope to escape the way in which our perspectives are given by the circumstances
of history.
Milbank acknowledges the validity of Heidegger's concern for the ontological difference.
But as is typical of Milbank's conviction that an organizing logic is inescapable, he questions
whether or not it is possible even to think without applying the kind of totalizing perspective
Heidegger denies. In fact, he sees a hidden metaphysics operating in Heidegger's own
description of the problem. Being remains forever elusive for Heidegger because it is always
concealed in the historical contingency of beings, hidden from the gaze of our limited
perspective. Being remains forever absent in beings. Milbank detects the work of an arbitrary
metaphysics in Heidegger: the doctrine of an ontological fall in which Being retreats from itself.
Milbank thinks this description is an unnecessary conclusion.
One might want rather to say that as much as a being is a particular existence and not
Being itself, it yet exhibits in its sheer contingency the inescapable mystery of Being.
Precisely because Being and beings are not on the same level, nor related within any
common arena, the difference of a being from Being in no way obliterates or conceals
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Being itself. It would then follow that to live in forgetfulness of Being is to live in a
culture which discounts religion, and seeks purely immanent explanations.I4
The key to understanding Milbank's argument with Heidegger is this: By presenting
another option, he reveals Heidegger's hidden commitment to violence. In this case, he finds it in
the way Heidegger constructs our historical contingency so that Being always conceals itself,
always removing from us the possibility of fully knowing the source of our existence and always
stuck in the concealing flux of time. Milbank asks simple questions of this position. Is this the
only way to understand the ontological difference? Could it not also be possible that beings show
forth the mystery of Being in their very situatedness? Are the only two options for accounting for
the ontological difference metaphysical thinking or nihilistic concealment? Could we not equally
consider a third option, an option unique to Christianity—the analogy of being, in which we
understand that beings reveal rather than conceal Being by their movement toward an ultimate
end and good within contingent circumstances.I5 This Christian alternative, perfected by Thomas
Aquinas, must only be denied, Milbank thinks, if we uncritically assume that no transcendence
exists which holds beings together in teleological activity. In other words, only if we posit Being
as the arbitrary movement through time of one culture to the next (i.e. violence is a description of
the way things really are) do we have to insist that Being is forever concealed from sight.
Milbank puts it this way: "the idea of an inescapable ontological fall is, consequently, the
transcendental support for Heidegger's nihilistic version of historicism, and the very heart of his
philosophy."16
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Christianity's ability to account differently for historical contingency and difference makes
it seem as if nihilism prefers the story that violence is the way the world works. And it is the
Christian difference that makes violence appear to be just another story. A historicism that is
absolute appears to be only one of the ways of handling the historical contingency of every claim
to truth, and one that requires us to adhere to an ontology of violence. Thus, Milbank uses
Christianity as an alternative interpretation or encoding of existence that seems to unsettle the
nihilist story as just another perspective on the matter. The nihilistic encoding of reality as
violence has no more justification than the Christian alternative and appears to be an arbitrary
choice rather than a rational necessity. t7

17 In his later work, Milbank strengthens his case against Heidegger by arguing that Heidegger's account of the
ontological difference suffers from a kind of metaphysical thinking similar to the "onto-theological" constitution of
metaphysics Heidegger wants to overcome in the first place. Milbank, "Only Theology Overcomes Metaphysics," in
The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 42. contends that Heidegger's
description of the ontological difference relies on a conjecture and projection of the nature of Being on the basis of
the sheer phenomenology of beings as he observed them. "[B]ecause Heidegger believed that he had considered
Being not 'speculatively' (metaphysically), but according to Being's own giving of itself as a phenomenon. This
meant that what was sheerly 'apparent', namely the self-occlusion of Being in beings, was taken as identifying
Being as such." Milbank goes on to point out that Heidegger's account of the self-occlusion of Being is in fact
speculative and requires a faith in that which is not seen. Even stronger, Milbank recommends Aquinas' analogy of
attribution, in which the movement of beings points towards its end in God. This too requires a faith in that which is
not seen. But contrary to Heidegger, Aquinas does not practice ontotheology, in which one begins with the
observation of beings and go on to posit from them an account of Being. Rather Aquinas practices theoontology in
which beings relate analogically according to a notion of the good derived from God. In this manner, Milbank
moves beyond the argument in Theology and Social Theory that nihilism and Christianity are two equally
ungrounded myths. Instead he argues on the basis of a more robust Christian Platonism that only theology can
overcome the problems latent within metaphysics. Or, as he would later write, "Only Theology Saves Metaphysics."

Nevertheless, Milbank's argument in this piece still retains all the problems that Theology and Social Theory
does. Milbank offers a correct reading of Heidegger and the theological tradition building from him. The essay
quoted above is a response to Jean-Luc Marion's attempt to articulate 'God' without the concept of Being. Milbank
rightly argues that Marion's reliance on Heidegger's description of the ontological difference maintains the authority
of secular reasoning over-against theology. But Milbank's 'solution' still has trouble answering the important
question of right and authority since the only thing that would recommend theology is its ability to save metaphysics
from its own ontotheological tendencies and allow the west to have coherent discourse about the good. For as
Milbank never seems to tire of admitting, theoontology is always a conjecture judged by its speculative
attractiveness and can never rule out the possibility of nihilism on neutral or dialectical grounds. Cf. John Milbank
and Catherine Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2001), 29, "Therefore, Aquinas does not really have
recourse to an a priori vision of the Good in the sense of a Kantian epistemological reflection on the structures of
finite understanding, but to a Platonic and Augustinian ontological recollection of something real and eternal. If this
recourse indicates the limits of Aristotelian cosmological aspirations in Aquinas, it is equally the case that, like
Augustine, he refuses (as he thinks, against Anselm) any purely a priori philosophical theology, or argument from
the conception of the highest perfection to the necessity of its existence. On the contrary, Aquinas does not regard
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The pivotal point of comparison between the two is the Christian ontology of ultimate
peace. Before moving on to a critique of Milbank, it will be necessary to elaborate on what he
means by his account of Christianity as a peaceful ontology. Milbank not only places the weight
of his argument on the differences between ontology because they seem to be such obvious
points of distinction. More so in Theology and Social Theory, the stress on ontology follows
from his stress on narrative and what he calls meta-narrative realism.
Meta-Narrative Realism and Theology as Social Theory
Milbank's argument for meta-narrative realism and theology as social theory sets the
parameters for judging between one ontology and another. An ontology operates as the director
of human social practices. Thus, while speculative, a culture's guiding ontology is nevertheless
embedded in a particular form of life, and can only be judged by the performance it directs. But
how does one decide between different internally coherent performances? This is the question of
justification. By what right does Christianity claim to be more authoritative; more demanding of
our attention and adherence than others? Christianity is justified by the unique way its ontology
makes violence an unnecessary part of our culture. This section will trace Milbank's metanarrative realism and theology as a social theory in order to grasp Theology and Social Theory's
final answer to the question of justification.
The success of the secular sciences in modernity has been attributed to their ability to
locate a privileged point of contact with Reality; a place of unmediated exposure to the way
things really are that could not be doubted or questioned. Such a point of contact would serve as
a foundation for all human knowledge because it would give us the ability to sort through the
perfection self-evident when reduced to bare possibility, and therefore is able to entertain (apparently) equally a
nihilistic possibility: although the highest good would have to be, there need not be a highest good." The point I am
now making requires a fuller investigation into Milbank's Platonic doctrine of God, and that will be made in the
later chapter on Luther.
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diversity of claims and convictions and determine which ones were valid and which were mere
belief. Such foundations for knowledge would provide privileged perspectives for human
understanding as well as for judging the validity and meaning of any given belief or conviction.
But like many today, Milbank recognizes the necessary limitations human language places on
our ability to find such foundations. We never have access to the world apart from language.
Even our supposed foundations, where we thought we had privileged points of contact with
Reality cannot escape the dress of human language. With these insights in mind, Milbank
concludes that language does not reflect Reality as much as it shapes reality for us.
Therefore, narrative, Milbank argues, is the most basic form of human understanding
because language is our most basic means of making sense of the world. We do not have access
to rules of human behavior or facts about the world prior to our use of language. Rather, we
make meaning by relating prior events to current events in a fashion that produces a causal story.
Even our most scientific languages are stories we tell about a cause. Therefore,
The adequate explanation of a text, or anything whatsoever, means merely its
representational repetition, a narration of text or thing which identifies causes as
occasions taken serious notice of by later events. Thus to say 'movement' and
`causation' is just to say 'meaning,' because something becomes of causal
significance only when it is connected with a later subordinate event which
presupposes it.1
But this does not mean that all knowledge is the arbitrary construction of human stories:
The text, if we are attentive, forms a loose and complex knot of resistance, but we do
not first of all register this resistance and position it precisely (explanation), and then
pass on to the more freewheeling tasks of the spirit. On the contrary, we register this
resistance in any number of ways. We may place the pressure here or there,
complicate the knot here, undo it a little there—yet infuriatingly perhaps, we cannot
undo the knot altogether (a final deconstruction is always endlessly postponed).
Always we feel the resistance, although this is from elsewhere, and we cannot
precisely place it, for it belongs, ultimately, to a whole wider network of resistances
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and counter-resistances which we ourselves, by our intervention, are further
adjusting and altering. t4
Even though human language places necessary constraints on our knowledge, all knowledge is
not arbitrary. In the act of our making sense through narrative, we find limitations of play—
resistance formed from the complexity of the knot made by our language. We cannot ignore
these limitations, and this sets a limit to the creativity of our narration and allows us to recover a
sense of realism; or a sense that our language tracks and can be judged.2°
Metanarrative realism is Milbank's description of how cultural meaning complexes like
Christianity or nihilism play within the resistance of the knot. Cultures consist of practices that
are directed by the narratives they find authoritative. The ongoing existence of a culture requires
it constantly to reread the narrative as it guides the culture through time and history in faithful
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20 Tracks with what? In his later works, Milbank strengthens his realism through a more robust Platonism by
which he argues for a recovery of the notion of truth as correspondence. In Theology and Social Theory, Milbank
seems to have little sympathy for any notion of correspondence. But in Truth in Aquinas, he and Pickstock contend
that Aquinas' notion of correspondence is ontological rather than epistemological, and just to that extent, a viable
alternative to modern epistemological notions of correspondence that end in nihilism. Whereas modern
correspondence theories of truth construe the act of knowing as the subject properly checking the mind's
representation of a thing over-against the thing-in-itself, Aquinas conceives of knowing as a mode of being itself
that brings the thing-in-itself to its fulfillment as an idea in the mind of God by its proper assimilation into the
human intellect. Key to grasping what Aquinas means here is to recognize that objects have a real existence in the
human intellect. Human knowledge of them is a real event in the life of the object. This requires that the human
mind must have a proper desire for it; things only have existence in relationship to other things—as Heidegger
already points out—and human desire catches the way one thing relates to all others. Human desire for the good is
essential to our knowledge, then, because the thing does not have an existence apart from the way it forms and is
formed by human desire. Human knowledge is about the process of discerning whether something is being faithful
to its intended purpose, according to the divine intellect. Thus all knowledge must grasp the analogical proportion of
things to God by intuiting the proper harmony of one thing to another, and not just the thing independently of its
proper telos. All knowledge, then, is participation in the divine intellect through the aesthetic intuiting of the good or
God.

This notion of truth as correspondence is not contradictory to the 'realism' in Milbank's metanarrative realism,
because it still requires an aesthetic grasp of the analogical proportion and hence a prior doctrine of God or the
speculative moment of ontology. Likewise, the argument in Truth in Aquinas does not evade the criticism offered
below of metanarrative realism because even though they say more specifically that theological language tracks with
reality in the mind of God, this notion of truth as correspondence nevertheless does not offer new evidence that our
ideas do correspond to reality, but only offers a different way of viewing Truth in which our ideas might correspond
to reality; one in which no ultimate good is equally a possibility, faith is necessary for reasons, and theology is
relevant. Such sophisticated insight into truth still does not escape Nietzsche's simple question of why we still hold
to these notions when they require that we believe that they work in the first place.
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practice. Here, a speculative moment arises in which we use our imagination faithfully to fill in
the gaps of our narratives and better represent the meaning of the whole story in order to redirect
the entire performance Therefore, the task of narration requires ontology, an imaginative, yet
ultimate account of the way things are to facilitate ongoing faithful practice.2I An ontology
faithfully guides readings of our authoritative texts, which in turn allows us to make sense and
meaning through communal practices. Therefore, an ontology is the speculative focal point of a
whole cultural meaning complex. Not only does it capture the meaning of a culture's
authoritative texts in imaginative and faithful ways, but it also directs a culture's faithful
performance. Ontology directs the way we tell the story and act out performances that faithfully
imagine our present in continuity with the narrative. And when Milbank identifies the Christian
ontology as one of ultimate peace he means that the social practices of the church ought to
faithfully reflect the story we tell about God's peaceful donation of himself in creating the world
and becoming incarnate.
But how does one judge between the competing ontological claims of different cultural
meaning complexes. The false promise of foundationalism was that we could find one universal
means of judging all claims and all languages. But if each individual community has its own way
of complicating and undoing the knot of language, how does one judge between them? At this
point, there is a danger that the postmodern sympathies that lead Milbank to focus on ontology in
the first place also betray a nihilistic tendency in his own thought. In his own words, Milbank
casts the problem this way: "The 'challenge' of social science turns out not to be the challenge of
a knowledge that mirrors, but of a knowledge that is power..." so that the question becomes, "is

21

Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 383-88.

73

there anything but power? Is violence the master of us all?"22 If language does not reflect reality
but shapes it for us, how is all discourse not just the communal persuasion by power? Milbank
answers that question by referring us to the uniqueness of the Christian ontology. Every cultural
meaning complex requires an ontology, but the Christian ontology is uniquely able to account for
differences without the necessity of violence because it encodes reality as being of harmonic
peace rather than chaotic violence. Christianity believes that existence derives from the life of
the Triune God, who is harmonious difference in unity. Therefore, every difference is not final,
but reconciled in the life of the Triune God.23 But one point must be clear. We do not have the
ability to judge between Christianity and other cultural meaning complexes without laying aside
our own sympathies. There is not any purely rational means of deciding between different
encodings of reality. The only criteria for judgment are those of aesthetic taste.24
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In Theology and Social Theory it can appear that Milbank's emphasis on aesthetic taste stems from his postmodern emphasis on the inability of language to allow a final deconstruction so that all we have left is aesthetic taste
rather than rational discourse. This is not entirely the case. A point that comes out in his later work is that his
emphasis on aesthetics connects with his Platonic commitments to Truth and God. See, for instance, the footnote
above on Truth in Aquinas. A more revealing case is the discussion that occurs between Gordan Michalson and
Milbank. Michalson, "Re-Reading the Post-Kantian Tradition with Milbank," Journal of Religious Ethics 32 (2004):
367-68, asks Milbank the important question why anyone should believe the account he gives of western thought,
when at the same time his own commitment to the absolute historicity of all thought paradigms seems to undermine
the notion that his revision of the secularization narrative can carry any persuasive weight. "There is, in fact, a
curious asymmetry between Milbank's postmodernist attitude toward rationality and argument and his apparent
confidence that his ambitious program of revisionist interpretation will carry argumentative force: his position on the
former seems to undermine the authority vested in the latter." Milbank, "The Invocation of Clio: A Response,"
Journal of Religious Ethics 33 (2005), 3-4, responds by explaining his Platonic commitments toward rationality and
taste that make his greater 'argument' work. "If, nonetheless, I believe that there is final truth; that there exists also
essences (albeit elusive), and that there are good and bad ways to proceed even if they are not exhaustively
presentable in advance, then one's procedure can only be ad hoc and cumulative (though without even a
commitment to the emergence of a 'probability' from such cumulation)....The long but fragmentary gesturing to the
inaccessible is the key to the natural alliance of the most radical Anglo-Celtic empiricism with Platonism, whereas
the weaker version remains confined within immanence, because it non-empirically invokes some sort of imagined a
priori limits to the scope of its investigation. Since the cumulation is itself the stuttering argument, inseparable from
myriad specificities, it also develops its own criteria for its own success as it advances, and reveals a true method
and procedure along with the emergence of the substantive results of its methods, and not otherwise. Its assumption
is therefore radically realist: there are no prior criteria for the truth, since in that case truth would be governed by
something other than the truth, which would therefore have to be false. Since the truth is the truth, it declares itself,
with an apparentness that is only that of the truth, and is in consequence self-authenticating....At the outset of the
24
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Milbank makes this important qualification when he writes that "Claims for objective truth,
goodness and happiness can only be made by identification with a particular form of life that is
claimed to participate in them—and this identification cannot be dialectically tested."25 By
saying that objective claims to truth can only be made by identification with a particular form of
life, Milbank is building on the work of Alasdair Maclntyre. His seminal book, After Virtue
hopes to find a way to save rational argument, while also granting the historicist angle. In order
to hold both rational argument and the historical character of reason together Maclntyre targets
the fact/value distinction and the culture in which it arises. Maclntyre believes that our
contemporary nihilism stems from the in ability of the fact/value distinction to make sense of
competing commitments to what is good. The form of the fact/value distinction that Maclntyre
contends against comes from the Enlightenment's quest to find unobjectionable universal
reasons. Facts are those things that can be clearly articulated as true or false according to a
unanimously agreed upon standard of judgment. Values, on the other hand, are those things that
cannot fmd universal agreement but remain the expression of mere opinion. Since the
Enlightenment, moral statements have clearly been judged as values because there appears to be
no universal means of judging between commitments to an ultimate good. For example, we can
all agree with 'the fact' that industrial farming has certain effects. But we cannot agree on why
this is a problem. Our assertions of what is fmally good or bad about industrial fanning sound

quest for knowledge lies a wonder and an astonishment inseparable from the lure of something revealed and graceimbued—something one must love, trust, and have faith in."
Milbank, it turns out, is more a Platonist than a postmodem about argument, rationality, and truth. But one
must discern whether this Platonic realism does not stumble to answer the very questions posed by the age of
Cartesian Ego-Subjectivity. How does one begin to discern between competing claims that truth shines itself forth
and creates its own criteria for judgment? Milbank's Platonism only seems to anticipate the enshrinement of the
human subject as the ultimate arbiter of truth by being a 'radical' realist. But anyone who takes Edwards'
description of the devaluation of our highest values seriously can only laugh at the boldness with which Milbank
thinks his Platonism overcomes nihilism.
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more like special pleas to make the earth the way we like it. But, Maclntyre interrupts; the fate of
moral statements within the fact/value schema should not condemn such moral statements to the
status of mere opinion. And the incoherent discourse of liberal cultures formed by the fact/value
distinction is not necessary. Maclntyre's argument answers why.
Just to the extent that moral statements need to be justified according to an impersonal
standard, he thinks, they cannot attain to the status of fact. For moral statements only have
meaning within the framework of sustained traditions. A tradition, according to Maclntyre, "is an
historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the
goods which constitute that tradition."26 Traditions help us make sense of our lives by ordering
them towards certain good ends—goals that constitute a life well lived. Therefore, moral
statements have an objectivity to them that can be recovered if we recognize that they derive not
from a universal principle but from a particular form of life that has an extended agreement on
the ultimate goods. And this requires that we recover the significance of virtue. "A virtue is an
acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those
goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from
achieving any such goods."27 And practices are social activities in which the goods of a tradition
can be realized.28 Thus, moral statements can be objectively judged insofar as they lead us to the
achievement of certain goods or not. But their objectivity can only be recognized within the
particular form of life that upholds certain goods as the proper goal of human existence.
Milbank agrees with Maclntyre to the extent that the objectivity of our claims to truth or
goodness can only be tested within a particular form of life—a tradition. But he wants to go
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further than Maclntyre. He finds that MacIntyre's general recommendation of the virtues,
practices, and traditioned reasoning is itself a quasi-foundationalist attack on nihilism, as if
recovering a method of rationality will give us the ability to discover the way things really are. "I
want to insist against Maclntyre that at this level of 'objective' reasoning one is only talking
about the inner consistency of a discourse/practice, and that in so far as Christianity is able to
render a discourse/practice more consistent, this in no sense necessarily suggests a new adequacy
of discourse to 'reality'."29 Rather Christianity must argue both from and for the specific goods
internal to the entire Christian tradition. And when he says that the goods internal to the
Christian form of life cannot be dialectically tested, he means that there are no resources external
to the reasons within our own tradition that would enable us to judge which set of goods are
more true to human life as such.
The consequence is that Christianity lacks the ability to defeat nihilism by rational
argumentation. In fact, what Milbank recommends no longer fits the traditional notion of making
a rational argument, but something altogether different. "Maclntyre, of course, wants to argue
against this stoic-liberal-nihilist tendency, which is 'secular reason'. But my case is rather that it
is only a mythos, and therefore cannot be refuted, but only out-narrated, if we can persuade
people—for reasons of 'literary taste'—that Christianity offers a much better story."3° There is
no way to dialectically discern, in other words, between Heidegger's account of difference and
the Christian one. Neither is rationally grounded, but each is equally a socially embodied
encoding of reality, a mythos.
Therefore, "[T]he only possible response to nihilism is to affirm one's allegiance to a
particular tradition, and derive an ontology from the implicit assumptions of its narrative
2° Milbank,
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forms."31 As a socially embodied encoding of reality, Christianity not only has an alternative
account of reality, it is an alternative account. Christian theology, then, is social theory; the
critical reflection necessary for the ongoing faithful performance of its unique society. And the
primary distinguishing feature of this social theory is its ontology that directs its faithful
performance.
Unlike all other social theories, the Christian one does not assume an underlying primordial
violence. If the Christian mythos cannot be rationally tested against the nihilist mythos,
Christianity can only be 'objectively' distinguished by the uniqueness of the Christian social
theory and especially as it finds its performance guided by its distinctive ontology. Milbank
writes,
Christianity starts to appear—even 'objectively'—as not just different, but as the
difference from all other cultural systems, which it exposes as threatened by incipient
nihilism. However, it is only on the ontological level, where theology articulates
(always provisionally) the framework of reference implicit in Christian story and
action, that this 'total' difference is fully clarified, along with its ineradicable ties to
non-provable belief.32
In order to demonstrate that objective difference, Milbank borrows Augustine's critique of
the founding myth of Rome and develops it into a greater critique of every non-Christian
ontology. In The City of God, Augustine criticized Rome's ability to make true peace and
achieve true justice. For he saw that the Roman conceptions of peace and justice were derived
from their founding pagan myth, in which peace was established through a necessary act of
violence. Augustine found that the Roman notions of peace and justice could be deconstructed to
dominion and domination as ends in themselves. This deconstruction was possible because in
comparison to the Christian story, they assumed a necessary primordial violence. And that

31 Ibid.,
32
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assumption determined even their supposedly noble acts of creating order over chaos. Hence,
"While Augustine notes that the philosophers sometimes had intimations of an idea of goodness
going beyond such assumptions, he also realizes that they could not fully escape them, because
they were so deeply inscribed at the level of myth and ritual. Only changes at this level can really
alter public belief and practice, and make a genuinely non-polytheistic ontology possible."33 In
opposition, the Christian story of God's donation of himself as a peaceful act of willed
fellowship with the beings he created founds the other city, the city of God. And rather than
dominion, charity is the underlying feature of the Christian ontology. And Christianity stands
apart because it does not assume that every difference entails violence, but that every difference
has a place and is reconciled in the infinite activity of the creator to harmonize differences as the
creator himself is infinite harmonized difference.34 "By comparison," Milbank writes, "all others
myths, or narrative traditions, affirm or barely conceal an original primordial violence, which a
sacral order merely restrains. Even Plato and Aristotle were inhibited by such a mythical
inheritance: in the end they could only think of goodness and happiness as occupying certain
privileged sites of self-presence over against an irredeemably chaotic and conflictual cosmos."35
Hence, the Christian difference, and its final justification, is this: the Christian social
theory alone is capable of overturning the notion that existence is finally driven by violence.
Only Christian theology is able to overturn the guiding story of violence inherent in secular
reason, and most fully articulated in modern nihilism. By holding to an ontology of ultimate
peace, Milbank is not suggesting that real violence does not exist in the world. Nor is he
suggesting that the church, as the city of God, does not have a place for punishment and even in
33 Ibid.,
34
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rare cases coercion. Rather his point is to insist that the Christian ontology of peace alone allows
us to account for and deal with violence without assuming its necessity. What difference does it
make?
It helps, because it allows us to unthink the necessity of violence, and exposes the
manner in which the assumption of an inhibition of an always prior violence helps to
preserve violence in motion. But it helps more, because it indicates that there is a way
to act in a violent world which assumes the ontological priority of non-violence, and
this way is called the 'forgiveness of sins.'36
And this stands in stark contrast to the ethical nihilism of Milbank's canonical nihilists. This
ethics "teaches the needlessness of regret, and the necessity for resignation to the whole process,
where all is equally necessary and equally arbitrary; where everything depends on everything
else, and this dependence is enacted through constant struggle and counter-resistance."37
Therefore, the final justification for Christian faith is its difference as a social theory and the life
that is possible when its governing ontology helps us unthink the necessity of violence.
Beyond Nihilism?
The entire argument of Theology and Social Theory is far more nuanced and complex
than the above survey can begin to demonstrate. If one were to do its argument full justice it
would be necessary to mention Milbank's Christian reconfiguration of the classical virtues, his
complex engagement with the work of Gilles Deleuze, his unique reading of Augustine's two
cities, his deconstruction of Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals at the hands of Augustine, and the
specifics of his counter ontology of difference. But I have provided only what is necessary to
understand the fundamental moves Milbank makes to overcome nihilism. It can be summarized
this way: Nihilism holds the right to situate Christian talk about God because its absolute

36

Ibid., 411.

37

Ibid., 313-14.

80

historicism undermines any attempt at finding an ultimate organizing logic; absolute historicism
categorically rejects the possibility of metaphsyics, including and especially intelligible
transcendent causes like 'God'. But absolute historicism cannot escape the charge of being a
metaphysical claim, an organizing logic, though a distinctively immanent one. While Christianity
does not have any new universal reasons for recommending itself to us, its ontology does reveal
nihilism as just another unfounded mythos. What fmally justifies, giving right and authority to
the Christian mythos, is its unique ability to encode the world without assuming the necessity of
violence.
Even in this brief summary, Milbank's argument is dense. Just to sketch its basic outlines
required a discussion of Heidegger's Being and Time, MacIntyre's After Virtue and a brief
diversion into the philosophical issue of language and narrative rationality. Milbank aims to
address all the central issues and battle with every contending party that might raise an objection.
It is no wonder that the book is a landmark in contemporary theology. For our purposes of
understanding it, though, recall the context of Christian justification mentioned at the beginning
of this chapter. Milbank fears that if theology does not recapture the status of a metadiscourse, if
theology cannot encode the world for us, some other discourse will, and in so doing theology,
not to mention Christianity, will suffer an ultimate defeat. After all, its topic is none other than
the God who is creator. Nihilism threatens Christian theology because it can undermine any
totalizing claim. And given the state of affairs in the contemporary west that were mentioned
already at the beginning of the previous chapter, it does not seem to be a far stretch to think that
nihilism is the organizing logic of western culture. It does not seem extraordinary to conclude
that our inability to justify our most basic commitments implies that there is no Truth as such and
all things are at base chaotic. And, as we have already discussed concerning Nietzsche and
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Heidegger, Milbank seems to have some right to believe that certain nihilists make metaphysical
claims about the world that cannot be sustained by their own historicizing purposes.
However, nihilism does not have to make metaphysical claims. Nihilism is merely our
recognition that we lack any justification for our own convictions besides our own will to hold
them, which gives us a sense of unease and tenuousness about them—we recognize them as
values. This is what it means to regard nihilism as a mood rather than a set of theses or doctrines.
Nihilism is a disposition we westerners have towards any set of distinct teachings. That
disposition can be simply described as the devaluation of our highest values. We now recognize
in ways that we previously did not that "however fervent and essential one's commitment to a
particular set of values, that's all one ever has: a commitment to some particular set of values."38
And just to the extent that we lack any justification for them beyond the value we find in them,
our most basic beliefs appear to us as values—ways we make sense of our lives rather than
indubitable statements about the way things really are. And recognizing our convictions to be
values is just what devalues them. They no longer provide the stability and certainty that they
once claimed to offer.
At this point, it is necessary to address one important objection to this explanation of
nihilism. It could reasonably be argued that if nihilism is the recognition that we lack any
ultimate justification for our beliefs, does this not imply a universal perspective? How do we
come to the conclusion that we lack ultimate justification without being able to see from outside
of our own perspective that no future justification is possible? Does not nihilism both imply and
require a universal perspective on the way things really are?
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Simon Blackburn, who writes on the matter of Truth, makes a distinction that will be
helpful to uphold here between absolute reasons and relativist reasons. Blackburn's book, Truth:
A Guide,39 surveys the philosophical debate over the topic of truth. Although the two sides of the
debate have taken many names over the course of time, he characterizes them as the absolutist
and the relativist. The typical absolutist—the one who believes that there are final answers to
questions and that ultimate justification can be made for our convictions because Truth not only
exists but we have immediate access to it—will often hear the relativist position that all truth is
subjective to be offering absolute reasons. For instance, the relativist, or in our case we can say
the "normal nihilist," will give reasons for his position that are relative. He might say that since
we lack any justification for our most basic commitments, they are not the truth but merely
values. He might, like Edwards does, recall the story of Nietzsche's recognition that Kant's
categories do not entail the certainty he implies by them. One is still required to believe that they
correspond to things in themselves. And, as Edwards and Nietzsche both do, he might recall the
history of the philosophical quest for truth, certainty, and authority that goes back to Plato and
conclude that the futility of this history to find these things implies that our claims for truth are
merely values. These reasons are not dependant on an insight into the order of things, but are
merely conclusions drawn from certain contingent circumstances. They could just as possibly
change in the future if reasons arise that make us think otherwise; but for now, the conclusions
we draw are the best we can do. But the absolutist will understand these kinds of reasons to be
absolute reasons—insights into Truth as such. And as insights into Truth, the absolutist will think
that they necessarily contradict the relativist's conclusions. But that is a misunderstanding on the

39 Simon Blackburn, Truth: A Guide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). The following discussion can be
found in Blackburn, 47-55.
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part of the absolutist. For the absolutist mistakenly assumes that all good reasons have to be
absolute reasons.
Blackburn's distinction is helpful because it illustrates the kind of claim that Edwards is
making when he describes our condition as one of normal nihilism. The reasons he gives for our
devaluation are not absolute reasons, but the recollection of a self-defeating quest for certainty
and stability, a quest whose defeat is completely contingent upon the parameters set for certainty
and truth itself. "Thus the devaluation of our highest values: given our long commitment to the
value of rigorous honesty in thinking, we have left ourselves no intellectually respectable way to
dismiss the disconcerting thought that other, and radically different, forms of life have just the
same claim on some sacred ground as does ours; namely, no such claim at all.”40 And in that
way, Edwards' reasons are less absolute than even those of Heidegger, who understands our
nihilism to be the way in which Being now presents itself to us. "Even our normal nihilism is just
a banal contingency, not an uncanny insight into the Order of Things."41
Therefore, in light of Edwards, Milbank's criticism that the nihilists are committed to an
ontology of violence is beside the point. The more central question is whether or not Christians
can justify their faith and life as something more than another value. And in that sense, not only
does Milbank's strategy fail to overcome nihilism, but worse, it operates within the very
parameters of our normal nihilism. At the heart of Milbank's argument, he insists that
metaphysics are necessary. Everyone works with some sort of underlying organising logic, and
the only relevant question becomes who has a better encoding of reality. Milbank's theology
might have a distinctively peaceable ontology. And that ontology might in fact stand in contrast
to the work of some nihilists. But the question posed by nihilism is not one of comparison. The
4° Edwards,
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more important question is the one of authority and right. By what right does Milbank claim that
Christianity is more than just another ontology; by what right does Milbank claim that Christian
metaphysics is more than just another encoding of reality? Milbank's answer to that question
appeals to the Christian difference, the unique attractiveness of its peaceableness, and its
usefulness for the Christian west. These appeals should not be read as meager attempts at taking
whatever post-modernism theory on language and truth leaves Christians. Rather we ought to
read Milbank's metanarrative realism and his appeals to the aesthetic attractiveness of the
Christian social theory as full bodied attempts at persuasion "intrinsic to the Christian logos
itself'42 that Christian beliefs in God are true and tell us the way things really are.
However, these appeals do not overcome our normal nihilism. They only play within its
boundaries. If the only way to discern between competing metaphysical claims is through the
aesthetic appeal of one form of life or another, the final mode of judgment rests within individual
aesthetic sensibilities. Milbank tries to hedge the issue by proposing that Christianity is the only
form of life capable of producing a coherent vision of the truth, the only social theory capable of
reasonable rather than violent discourse. However, we should not be worried about which
discourse retains the possibility of truth, but that we must believe in truth in the first place. If
nihilism is just as likely an option, if the only objectivity available for Christian justification is its
difference, the truth no longer shines forth with unmistakable clarity. We have to judge it on the
basis of its aesthetic value. In an age of normal nihilism, we are astutely aware that the things
that matter most to us are merely preferences. We may not have made a conscious choice to
adhere to or admire them, but we lack the ability to give reasons for them beyond their value for
our lives. And just to the extent that we lack such justification, those convictions are
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pragmatically posited filters, personal preferences that we use to make sense of our lives. When
Milbank recommends Christian social theory on the basis of its attractiveness, its unique ability
to unthink violence, he is only recommending it as a value for our lives. It is hard to see how the
attractiveness of Christian metaphysics gets us beyond the desires and proclivities of the
shopping mall.
Ontology or Listening to Jesus; Or, Milbank or Hauerwas?
Typical of his writing, Stanley Hauerwas has a provocative critique of Milbank's work
that should draw our attention at this point. In regards to Milbank's ontological commitment to
non-violence, Hauerwas finds that Milbank is just plain wrong. Or, "In more friendly terms: it is
not that Milbank is wrong, but rather an indication that sometimes Milbank does ontology when
he ought to be listening to Jesus."43 The occasion for this comment is an essay that tires to
distinguish Milbank's non-violence form that of John Howard Yoder's and by extension
Hauerwas' own pacifism. Yoder, he argues, is not a pacifist, at least not in the sense that
Milbank is a pacifist. Yoder's pacifism derives from his belief in the lordship of Jesus. It is
because Jesus has called us to discipleship that Yoder practices non-violence, and it is only in the
course of following Jesus that one comes to name the violence he is against. Yoder allows Jesus
to define what true peace is, and the Christian commitment to non-violence requires one to
constantly learn and relearn the ways we are implicated in that which is contrary to such peace.
Another way of putting the matter is to say that Yoder's definition of non-violence is not more
determinative than his Christology or belief in the Trinity. Milbank, on the other hand, by
naming violence in the abstract, or by giving it ontological definition, always threatens to

43 Stanley Hauerwas, "Explaining Christian Non-Violence: Notes for a Conversation between John Howard
Yoder and John Milbank," in Performing the Faith: Bonhoeffer and the Practice of Nonviolence (Grand Rapids:
Brazos, 2004), 175.
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succumb to the temptation to let ontology become determinative of our theological claims.
Certainly Hauerwas would agree with much of what Milbank has to say about the church and the
non-violent constitution of existence. But, Hauerwas fears that Milbank's need for ontology
threatens to be a false proof of those claims. That is an argument that demands our attention.
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CHAPTER THREE
STANLEY HAUERWAS' RESPONSE
The last chapter concluded that Milbank's response to nihilism is a path that cannot lead
Christian faith and life beyond the devaluation of our highest values. No matter what some
secular thinkers might hold, it is not helpful to regard nihilism as a position or ontology. When
nihilism is positioned in that manner, one gets the false impression that it can be defeated by
presenting a better and more functional position. But better and functional are the precise
economic categories that make nihilism the condition in which our highest values appear to be
values, and just to that extent they devalue themselves. Despite his masterful and nuanced
accounts of Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Augustine, Milbank's appeal to the attractiveness of the
Christian ontology ends up reducing Christian faith and practice to another value to be judged
according to its usefulness for life. Milbank's appeal to Christian ontology does not overcome,
but operates within the parameters of nihilism.
As we will see over the course of the next two chapters, John Milbank and Stanley
Hauerwas agree about much more than they disagree. But the concluding paragraph of the last
chapter suggested that their disagreements might make a meaningful difference for how
Christians address the challenge of nihilism. In an essay that explores the commitment both men
have to non-violence, the priority of ontology is the matter over which Hauerwas displays his
divergence from Milbank. Milbank's problem, Hauerwas thinks, is that having an ontology of
non-violence presumes that we can know what violence is prior to the knowledge we gain from
being trained to live our lives within the peace that is a present reality in the dominion of God
through Jesus. And such knowledge betrays Milbank's best insight that without universal
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foundations for justifying Christian beliefs, the best we can do is out-narrate the opposition. The
best we can do is display the difference Christian beliefs make in the never-ending process of
description and redescription of our world according to the central Christian narratives about
God. On the contrary, "Attempts to find the one feature that makes violence violence, that
shortcuts the process of analogical reasoning, must be resisted as a premature if not violent
attempt to get a handle on history."' Milbank's move to ontology circumvents the ongoing
process of reasoning necessary to properly display the Christian difference. Ontology is a power
play that impatiently forgoes the extended argument required to give good reasons for
Christianity by showing the difference Christian beliefs really make. That difference cannot be
reduced to an ontology but can only be displayed by witnesses.
The meaningful difference, then, between Hauerwas and Milbank is the priority of
witness over ontology, and this chapter will explore what difference witness makes for
overcoming the problem of normal nihilism. However, in order to grasp the significance of
Hauerwas' focus on witness one cannot ignore his deep agreements with Milbank's strategy for
Christian justification. Like Milbank, Hauerwas recognizes the challenge of justification that
arises when "the secular" gains authority over the theological. If we can have an adequate
description of the world in which we live without recourse to talk about God it becomes difficult
to see how such theological language might be true. When we can get along and live perfectly
coherent lives without ever speaking about God, or more problematically, the God of Jesus,
Christian beliefs and practices become devalued as that which we do in the privacy of our free
time with little or no consequences for our daily lives. Put differently, if Christianity loses its
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right and authority to tell us the truth about the world, it becomes little more than another
religion.
While Milbank's work in this area focuses more specifically on the secular and can even be
described as post-secular,2 Hauerwas' work is best described as post-Constantinian.3 For
Hauerwas, the problem just described has surfaced especially in the realm of politics. When
Christianity became an official state religion, Christian convictions tacitly became depoliticized
in order to secure agreement between the aims of the state and the practice of the Christian faith.
Substantial Christian beliefs appeared more timeless and ideal, and less embodied in everyday
practices. Since they lack any immediate reference and have little tangible consequences,
Constantinianism has the effect of making Christian truth claims unintelligible to those who do
not already assume its basic tenets. In one way or another, all of Hauerwas' work deals with the
difficulty this condition creates for understanding the truthfulness of Christian claims. But the
majority of Hauerwas' theology tries to draw out the particular way that modern, liberal politics
makes Christian truth problematic. Rather than nihilist social theory, the agent of secularization
that gets the most attention in Hauerwas' writings is liberalism. Liberalism has been able to
devalue Christian claims by privatizing them, ensuring that we cannot know what it means for
Christian beliefs to be true because they have no critical "purchase"4 on the world in which we

2 James K. A. Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-secular Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker
Academic, 2004), for one, organizes Milbank's Radical Orthodox sensibility according to this theme.
3 The seminal post-Constantinian theologian is, of course, John Howard Yoder. And a seminal text for
identifying the post-Constantinian problem is John Howard Yoder, The Constantinian Sources of Western Social
Ethics," in The Priestly Kingdom: Social Ethics as Gospel (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984),
135-147.
41 am borrowing the term purchase from Hauerwas in order to give a short hand description of the
phenomenon that takes place when Christian beliefs are no longer taken to have meaningful referents in public
discourse. Stanley Hauerwas, "Postscript: A Response to Jeff Stout's Democracy and Tradition," in Performing the
Faith: Bonhoeffer and the Practice of Nonviolence (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2004), 215, writes that like Stout, he
worries "that the justifications often given for liberal democracies render strong Christian convictions politically
irrelevant and imply that such convictions have no purchase on the way things are."
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live. Hauerwas aims to reverse this trend by showing not only how Christian beliefs have ethical
consequences, but also by demonstrating how the lives that embody Christian beliefs display the
way things are.
For Hauerwas, Christians must be able to give an account of nature in order to exhibit the
truthfulness of our talk about God. But unlike Milbank, this account does not take the form of an
ontology that can rule all the sciences at once. Instead, it takes the form of pragmatic witness.
The basic lines of this argument are on display in a representative essay entitled, "The Truth
about God: The Decalogue as Condition for Truthful Speech."5 There Hauerwas begins to argue
why lives faithfully lived matter to Christian justification—that we can only know the truth about
God when we see that the community formed by the politics of God's dominion exhibits the way
the world really is.
The essay begins with a problem. Typically, in the modern situation, the relationship
between God and ethics has been construed in such a way that our talk about God turns into a
special kind of pleading. On the one hand, we have justified Christian moral precepts on account
of their correspondence with a general morality that is available to any rational person. But "such
accounts of morality are destined to run aground precisely because they confirm modernity's
presumption that God is, at best, something 'added on' to the moral life."6 On the other hand, we
have justified them on the grounds of God's sheer authority and command with little regard for
their natural goodness. But "then the God who commands risks appearing as arbitrary or at best

5 Stanley Hauerwas, "The Truth about God: The Decalogue as Condition for Truthful Speech," in Sanctify
Them in the Truth: Holiness Exemplified (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1998), 37-59.
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external to God's own creation."' In either case, our talk about God lacks the justification
necessary to carry any public weight.
Rather than these two options, Hauerwas argues that "a true and proper understanding of
nature cannot be had apart from a true and proper understanding of the politics of God's rule."8
God's dominion over creation is most manifest in the life of Jesus, who demonstrates to us the
true telos of human nature. The life and politics of Jesus, and consequently God's proper
dominion, is extended through the practices of the church. The church, which follows the politics
of Jesus through lives of holiness, gives a witness to the God of Jesus by displaying the goods
embodied in the living tradition and community. Thus, the politics of the church demonstrate that
"it makes all the difference which God commands and whose morality is commanded."9 As the
title suggests, the Ten Commandments are a necessary condition for speaking the truth about
God. The commandments prove God because they are natural law. But they are natural in the
sense that we recognize their goodness only when we see their embodiment in the lives of a
community that worships the God who has given them. All knowledge of nature is only possible
through the retrospective lenses of grace provided by the politics of the church.
The general lines of what I am identifying as Hauerwas' strategy for justifying
Christianity are already present in this essay. But so too is a difficult question. What reasons can
we give for thinking that the goods embodied by the Christian community are the way things
really are? If the lives of faithful witnesses, which are organized according to the belief that God
is most present and active in Jesus of Nazareth, display the truth about the world, how do we
come to know that? Certainly there are many different embodiments that work to display the
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world in one way or another. What distinguishes Christian practices? Hauerwas has a nuanced
answer to that question that will occupy us for the remainder of the chapter. But for now, it is
important to recognize the significance of this question for the problem of normal nihilism. This
question is the question of justification. And if Hauerwas cannot give an answer that does not
appeal to the value of Christian faith and life, his way is just as lacking as Milbank. I will
conclude that Hauerwas tends to give an answer which appeals to the value of Christianity. And
in a certain sense, the deck is already stacked against Hauerwas in the way he sets himself to
justify Christian beliefs according to their ability to form lives. As he asks rhetorically at the
conclusion of his Gifford lectures on natural theology, "but can such lives be anything more than
attractive or unattractive?"I° The important issue in the rest of the chapter will be to discover
how Hauerwas answers the question that began this paragraph.
This will be challenging. To say that Hauerwas' theology is occasional is an
understatement, both in terms of the volume of ad hoc essays and in terms of the greater aims of
his theology. Hauerwas' work should be understood as a prolific attempt at out-narrating the
opponent by displaying the ways in which Christian theological language works to reveal the
way things are.11 The temptation for any scholarly account of Hauerwas will always be to fill in
the gaps in such a way that explains him without the hard work of thoroughly reading what he
has written and in the process risk being transformed by his Christian vision, or not.12 In the

I° Stanley Hauerwas, With the Grain of the Universe: The Church's Witness and Natural Theology (Grand
Rapids: Brazos, 2001), 231.
I I Despite all the misunderstandings of his theological work, Hauerwas has been explaining himself in the
introduction of his books since 1981. For a recent and accessible self-description, see Stanley Hauerwas,
"Connecting Some of the Dots, or An Attempt to Understand Myself," in A Cross-Shattered Church: Reclaiming the
Theological Heart of Preaching (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2009), 144-56.
12 Cf. Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic (Notre
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 6, "Without presuming that my work has anything like the power
of Wittgenstein's, it remains my intention that the essays, like his aphorisms, should make the reader think at least as
hard, if not harder, than the author has about the issues raised."
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following discussion I will not attempt to provide a comprehensive theology of Stanley
Hauerwas. Instead I will present the content of one of his most significant book length
arguments: The Peaceable Kingdom. t 3 Then I will ask of it the same question I asked of the
essay above.I4
Truth and Non-Violence in The Peaceable Kingdom
Liberalism and Devaluation
The subtitle to The Peaceable Kingdom identifies it as a primer in Christian ethics.
Hauerwas's concern for ethics relates directly to the question of the truthfulness of Christian
beliefs and thus precisely to the question of justification. If Christian talk about God has no
public consequences, one loses the ability to demonstrate how Christian beliefs are true.
Therefore, the following will treat The Peaceable Kingdom as a theological text intent on
answering the question of justification. Furthermore, it will even be possible to read this work as
a response to the condition of normal nihilism. Take, for instance, an initial account of the
context in which this book arises as a response.
Underlying such a view or morality [that makes up our current situation] is the
presupposition that we are required by our modern predicament to make up our 'own
minds' about what is good and bad. Indeed, those who do so with determination are
seen as morally exemplary because they act autonomously rather than uncritically
accept convention. But the very notion we are 'choosing' or 'making up' our morality
contains the seeds of its own destruction, for moral authenticity seems to require that
morality be not a matter of one's own shaping, but something that shapes one. We do
not create moral values, principles, virtues; rather they constitute a life for us to
13 Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1983).

14 Of course, even in presenting the basic content of that argument, I can't help but put the pieces together, if
for no other reason than Hauerwas' own writing often resists such neat coherence. Therefore l need to be upfront
that my assistance in doing so comes from the many introductions to his books, but especially "Connecting Some of
the Dots." I have also drawn to a lesser extent from Samuel Wells, Transforming Fate into Destiny: The Theological
Ethics of Stanley Hauerwas (Carlisle, UK: Paternoster Press, 1998), and then, Emmanuel Katongole, Beyond
Universal Reason: The Relationship Between Religion and Ethics in the Work of Stanley Hauerwas (Notre Dame,
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000).
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appropriate. The very idea that we choose what is valuable undermines our
confidence in its worth.' 5
One could hardly ask for a better description of the "shopping mall" character of our lives and
the devaluation that takes place on its account.' 6 Even though Hauerwas does not address
directly the issue of nihilism in the greater body of his work, he is certainly not ignorant of the
problem of devaluation.
However, in order to explain how this situation has become our own, Hauerwas focuses
on the impact of "liberalism." That making up one's own mind is a morally commendable act
reflects a distinctive way of dealing with the problem of our fragmented moral existence. To
illustrate, Hauerwas borrows Alasdair Maclntyre's fictional story about the total demise of a
scientific culture. Contrary to our current culture in which science is a sustained practice, in this
imaginary post-scientific culture only fragments of scientific learning remain without the
sustained tradition in which they make sense. The practice of science as we know it has been
abolished. Likewise, MacIntyre and Hauerwas describe our current context as one of moral
fragments. We hold to convictions from a past tradition, but without the practices necessary to
sustain that tradition we can no longer give good reasons for acting the way we do. So, "even
though we feel strongly about abortion, divorce, dishonesty, and so on, we are not sure why we
feel as we do."17 The dominant response has been to seek a universal standpoint from which we
could judge all moral claims without referring to any one particular tradition or set of
convictions. This movement has been politically enforced by democratic societies in which the
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only unquestioned good is the freedom to use one's own reason to determine what is best.
Moreover, it has been philosophically backed by the likes of Kant's categorical imperative,
which grounds moral judgments in the capacities of autonomous reason; assuming that unaided
reason is the only point of contact human beings have with the universal and absolute. Typical of
this response, the field of ethics has been assigned extraordinary moral significance. Modem
ethics is the field in which we use our reason not only to determine what action is right or wrong,
but to arbitrate between competing rationalities. Its assignment has consisted of finding rules that
could judge any individual moral quandary independent of the extended context of the action.
But Hauerwas understands that freedom has become our fate. We are destined, it seems, to be the
makers and consumers of our own lives insofar as autonomous reason is the final judge. And so,
when we are faced with the hard task of giving reasons for what we do, we lack the resources to
respond because our reasons are grounded in our own autonomy.' Thus, without the justification
necessary to defend ourselves, we feel especially tempted to use violence and coercion to
maintain our integrity.
What most concerns Hauerwas, however, is the way this liberal strategy ends up
construing Christian beliefs. Since the goal of moral reflection lies in finding universal rules that
will be able to judge any one case regardless of its given context, the particularities that drive one
to act in the first place become incidental. Chief among those particularities is our more unique
beliefs about God, such as the divinity of Jesus and the Trinity. For instance, Christian arguments
against abortion that are made within the parameters set by liberalism do not regard the Christian
18 Cf. Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1981), 1-120, for an extended discussion of the greater social web built around this problem. Hauerwas
agrees with Maclntyre's assessment that the enlightenment project of justifying morality had to fail because moral
statements only have factual meaning within a tradition formed according to a teleology; attempts at finding
universal grounds in human nature as such only disguised the sheer human will and desire behind modern moral
sentiments. Maclntyre finds Nietzsche's critique of the enlightenment moral tradition to be correct, and the problem
of justification for western society to be central.
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act of baptism—an act done in the name of the triune God—to be of any material significance.
Nor would many Christians who are raised within the broader liberal tradition even see what
those particular beliefs have to do with public arguments over moral issues. Those beliefs must
be left behind in order to find reasons that can be applied in any given situation regardless of
one's 'religion' or other prior commitment. All other prior commitments, in fact, become
incidental to moral reasoning.
Edwards has already drawn our attention to what happens when the age of Cartesean
Ego-Subjectivity reduces God to the best idea we have. Hauerwas recognizes the unique way
that contemporary ethics accomplishes the same sort of devaluation. Once our more particular
beliefs are subordinated to reason's autonomy, which is backed by their political privatization,
our talk about God gets reduced to the sphere of personal motivation. The question of the truth of
Christian convictions is replaced by the question of their functionality. Are they sufficient
motivating factors for an individual to act according to a more universal rule that has been
established apart from any one particular tradition? Once the question has been changed from
truth to functionality, it is hard to rebut Feuerbach's claim that all talk about God is talk about
human need. Furthermore, if Christian beliefs are merely functional, it becomes hard to see why
we should give our lives to any beliefs of that meager, devalued status. It is not hard to imagine
just this sort of devaluation behind something like Smith's "Moralistic Therapeutic Deism."' If
youth are practitioners of religion it is because it has certain advantageous effects, such as
positive life outcomes. But mere functionality is something quite different than truth; for one, it
is hard to see why anyone would be willing to die for something that is only useful for one's
personal gain. If Hauerwas is right in his analysis, it is no wonder that American teens have a
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negative attitude to anyone who thinks that only one religion is true, or that we should order our
lives according to those beliefs. "And so the circle continues. The less sure we are of the truth of
our religious convictions, the more we consider them immune from public scrutiny. But in the
process we lose what seems essential to their being true, namely that we be willing to commend
them to others. For the necessity of witness is not accidental to Christian convictions."20
The constructive argument in The Peaceable Kingdom aims to reverse this trend by
demonstrating how Christian convictions refuse to be disembodied from faithful public practice.
"The task of Christian ethics," Hauerwas contends, "is to help us see how our convictions are in
themselves a morality."21 And once the unity of purposeful actions, moral precepts and cognitive
Christian beliefs are restored, we regain the context in which we can meaningfully ask the
question of the truth of Christianity. For then, beliefs can be tested by their ability to sustain
truthful lives in any given experience of the world. For Christianity, a truthful life is one that
reflects its own confession that the world is created. And this will require a life, or a community
of lives as it turns out, that are joyfully dispossessed of power so as to receive all of life as a gift.
This will require, in other words, peaceable witness. The concepts of narrative, character, and
agency help in this task, and it is to those that we now turn.
Narrative, Character, and Agency
Before moving on to describe how narrative, character and agency help in the task of
demonstrating that Christian beliefs are a morality, it is important to understand how Hauerwas
uses these concepts in the greater argument of the book. Narrative, character, and agency are the
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"conceptual tools"22 that Hauerwas uses to show that Christianity is not merely a set of beliefs.
When reading The Peaceable Kingdom it can be tempting to understand these as more than the
tools applied in this particular case. One could get the impression that they are a foundational
anthropology. For instance, Hauerwas places them along side a critique of the liberal strategy for
justifying moral claims. Let me explain how this might seem to be more than the appropriation
of conceptual tools.
One way of articulating the liberal strategy is to say that it is interested in Ethics as
opposed to ethics. On the one hand, Ethics desires to hold as valid only those moral precepts that
have universal acceptance. On the other hand, ethics are those sets of rules that each individual
tradition possess, and each seems to be valid only within that particular tradition. Thus they have
a lower status and require a qualifier such as "Christian" ethics. The quest for Ethics, then, is for
moral precepts that can be justified apart from any one particular commitment and history, such
as one's adherence to the Ten Commandments and the authority of the Hebrew Scriptures.
Ethics, in other words, asks us to step back from our particular circumstances, motivations,
goals, and commitments in order to make a 'rational' decision—rational means here, of course, a
judgment that has unqualified justification. But, Hauerwas argues, the search for Ethics is selfdefeating because it ignores the basic features of moral decision-making. After all, our projects,
commitments and goals are the only criteria we have to make a decision, and our actions can
only be judged in light of the history of our commitments and goals. The practice of Ethics, in
other words, robs us of the resources that make sense of actions like abortion; or even stronger it
robs us of the practices in which the language of abortion makes sense. After all, what we call
abortion can only be considered abortion in the context of practices that assume it is good to
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welcome the strangeness of new human life. Otherwise, it might as well be considered the
termination of a pregnancy. In any case, there is no neutral language available to describe the
action in the first place. And the language we use coheres, or at least it does when it is in
working order, with a series of purposeful actions that assume a good purpose—like welcoming
the stranger. Without such a context, Ethics can only be the idiosyncratic and subjective
appropriation of independent moral precepts. Hence Hauerwas quips that modernity is the
project "to produce people who believe they should have no story except the story they choose
when they had no story.'123 It seems that if we are to have authentic moral descriptions and be
actual moral agents, we need to recognize that our lives are historically constituted. We must
recognize that the decisions we make fit into a series of events within our lives that are organized
for the purpose of achieving a good (or at least they should if moral reasoning is to take place).
And if our lives are historically constituted, they require narratives to make sense of our
commitments, so that we might operate as agents by possessing the character to achieve the
inherent goods.
When reading The Peaceable Kingdom it is possible to get the impression that because
these concepts assist in the dismantling of Ethics, they are a ground for any reasonable depiction
of the ethical life, as if we have come upon the neutral starting point for considering the nature of
moral reasoning. However, we should resist understanding narrative, character, and agency in
this way because it would undermine the book's own insight that as contingent creatures we
cannot escape the commitments of our own personal and communal history. Rather, it is best to
consider these as conceptual tools that help display the Christian confession that the world is
created. When Hauerwas uses these conceptual tools to critique the liberal tradition, he is merely
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engaging in the task of out-narrating the opponent by undermining the confidence liberalism
places in Ethics. For instance, he writes that,
part of what it means to recognize the world as it is, rather than as we want it to be, is
to see that all existence, and in particular the human self, is narratively formed. Put
differently, it is our nature to be historic beings. Reflection upon the historic, and
therefore narrative character of our existence is an enterprise integral to
understanding what it means to claim as true the story Christians tell of God. For we
must show that in fact our existence, our nature, corresponds to that story—namely,
that we are beings whose life requires narrative display.24
These conceptual tools, in other words, are what lie at hand for Hauerwas to express the
Christian belief that the world is created. Those tools also enable our confession that the world is
created to have some cognitive purchase on the world in as much as they testify to the
inadequacy of the liberal project. "In other words, the enterprise of Christian ethics primarily
helps us to see,"25 and that vision is gained in part by the way these conceptual tools work
against the contending tradition in the hands of a Christian practitioner.
All that being said, the main purpose of these conceptual tools is to help us recognize
how Christian convictions work to shape the moral life. In that function, they find their
coherence in the Christian belief that the world is created by the God of Jesus. The central
consequence that Hauerwas draws from this confession is that we are creatures who depend for
our existence on a creator. Therefore, our lives are contingent rather than necessary. One way of
putting this is to say that since we are beings who exist by the purposes of a creator, our lives are
historical all the way down. There is no necessary reason contained within the world itself for the
world being the way it is. The world is not a closed and self-sufficient system that runs on the
necessity of its own rules. The only thing necessary is God. Therefore, if we are to understand
ourselves as created we must be able to recognize that our identity is determined by the unique
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history given to us by our particular circumstances. Narrative, then, is the proper means of
displaying this contingency because it enables us to account for the purposeful relations between
the actions in our lives. Stories help us connect one event to another in such a way that displays
the meaning and reasons behind our acts. Hence, "Narrative is required precisely because the
world and events in the world do not exist by necessity. Any attempt to depict our world and
ourselves non-narratively is doomed to failure insofar as it denies our contingent nature."26
Furthermore, the narratives we use will be more or less truthful. For the stones we tell
about ourselves will either make proper sense of our history and contingency, or it will lead us
astray to dishonesty about it. Narratives significant enough to account for the purposeful actions
within our lives are sustained by communities and not just individuals. In this sense, the
narratives that Hauerwas is referring to are those which sustain living traditions. A living
tradition is "an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in
part about the goods which constitute that tradition."27 We have already encountered a good
example of this sort of narrative in the story that has sustained the notion that secularization is
emancipation of human reason from religious authorities. It is just that narrative that allows for
and even maintains the political marginalization of Christian convictions in the name of Ethics.
And it is the truthfulness of this story which Hauerwas aims to undercut by demonstrating the
trouble Ethics has in maintaining meaningful debates about the moral life precisely because it
cannot account for our contingency. By contrast, the narrative that sustains the Christian
community is of a God who is most properly known according to the story that is told about him
in the scriptures. The God Christians worship is the God who raised Jesus from the dead, having
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formerly delivered his people Israel from slavery in Egypt.28 For Christians, then, "neither God,
the world, nor the self are properly known as separate entities but are in a relation requiring
concrete display. That display takes the form of a narrative in which we discover that the only
way to 'know' God, the world, or the self is through their history."29 The Christian narrative
leads us to believe that in order to know ourselves rightly as creatures, we also need a proper
corresponding knowledge of God and the world as it coheres in the narrative about God's life
with Israel and Jesus. And the truthfulness of that story is judged by its ability to provide us with
the skills to live as creatures. Christians claim that their story about God is "true and objective in
that they give us the skills rightly to see and act in the world, not as we want it to be, but as it is,
namely, as God's good but fallen creation."3°
But what does it take to see and act in the world as God's good but fallen creation? Here is
where the notions of character and agency come into play, as well as the corollary notions of sin
and peaceableness. Since we are historic beings, we frequently find that significant aspects of our
identities are formed for us by our circumstances. Looking back, it appears that we had little
choice in the matter of our existence; we did not choose our parents, the time of our birth, nor the
circumstances in which we were raised. Those in turn significantly determine the remainder of
our choices in life to such an extent that we appear fated. On the other hand, looking forward,
our existence as historical beings seems to mean that we can control our futures; we can secure
for ourselves the history we want to have. We think that we are free to choose the story we want
if we can only anticipate the consequences of our decisions. But this only hides the ways in
which our decisions are in large part already made for us by our social location. For instance,
28 Of course, 1 am borrowing this way of putting the matter from Robert W. Jenson, Systematic Theology
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 1:63.
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American middle class social mobility, in which one seems free to pick up and start over again in
a new place at any given time, is itself determined by the uniquely combined conditions of
capitalism and modern technology. Such freedom deceives us because we cannot stand back
from our prior history and decisions. Even though we would like to think that our true selves
exist apart from our history, we never have access to a transcendental position from which we
can make up our own minds. No decision can ever be made in abstraction from a location or a
moment in time. Therefore, the greatest deception of the transcendental perspective is that it
engenders a deep dishonesty about our selves. In the name of freedom, we think that we are "not
to be held to those 'decisions' I made in the past which were less than fully mine."3I
Such freedom is a delusion because we all embody some sort of character. Character is the
personality we acquire on account of our socially formed habits. My character is not something I
can choose or stand apart from. My character is given to me by the habits of response I develop
on account of the stories that are told about the world, and those stories come from the living
tradition of which I am a part. The transcendental perspective assumes that we can stand apart
from our character in order to make a decision. But we cannot. Having character is the necessary
consequence of being contingent creatures. In a certain sense, even the decisions we "freely"
make are already made for us by the kind of character we are. And when we ignore our
character, we lose the resources to make sense of our past decisions; and just to that extent we
lose the resources to be truthful about ourselves. Agency, however, names our ability to describe
ourselves by locating our actions within an ongoing series of purposeful events, which are
determined by the living tradition, or the community, of which I am a part. We acquire the skills
to be agents when we can inhabit our characters through truthful stories. "My power as an agent
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is therefore relative to the power of my descriptive ability. Yet that very ability is fundamentally
a social skill, for we learn to describe through appropriating the narratives of the communities in
which we find ourselves."32 Our true freedom, "therefore, is dependent on our being initiated
into a truthful narrative, as in fact it is the resource from which we derive the power to 'have
character' at all."33
Therefore, the "test of whether the narrative is true lies in whether the community can
maintain its integrity without resorting to control or violence."34 The temptation to act violently
arises when we lack the skills to account for our contingency, so that we develop an anxiety
about ourselves. That anxiety is produced by the need to protect and maintain our integrity
regardless of our ability to justify our actions. If the narrative that forms the community of which
I am a part does not give me the skills to recognize my self within an ongoing story—if the
narrative lacks the resources that allow me to fully recognize my contingency—then this
demonstrates the insufficiency of the narrative. In just this way, narratives are reality making
claims. For, "we can only act in a world we can envision, and we can envision the world rightly
only as we are trained to see. We do not come to see merely by looking, but must develop the
skills through initiation into that community that attempts to live faithful to the story of God."35
And a determining factor for the truthfulness of any narrative is its ability to form us so that we
see the world as it is (namely created), rather than as we want it to be. In gaining that vision we
become free from the temptation to violence. "There is, therefore, an inherent relation between
truthfulness and peaceableness because peace comes only as we are transformed by a truth that
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gives us the confidence to rely on nothing else than witness."36 On the contrary, a false narrative
will lead us into sin. Sin is our inability to accept the world as a gift from the creator, which is
manifested in our desire for control. "In other words, our sin—our fundamental sin—is the
assumption that we are the creators of the history through which we acquire and possess our
character."37 And so a truthful narrative will both give us the skills to recognize the contingency
of our lives, as well as the ability to recognize our inherent sin.
We already have here the basic framework for determining how Hauerwas answers the
question of Christian justification. If Christianity is true, the story Christians tell about God
should enable its practitioners to live contingently as creatures. That is to say, the Christian
narrative ought to give us the ability to inhabit our character so that we can act as agents who
refuse the temptation of violence. Christian justification, then, lies within faithful Christian
practice. But we cannot be peaceable our own. We need the help of others, who train us to see
the world rightly by initiating us into the practices necessary to gain such vision. Therefore in
order to grasp more fully Hauerwas' position, it will be necessary to understand the importance
of Jesus, the church, and casuistry in maintaining faithful Christians who will witness to the truth
of the Christian narrative.
Jesus, the Church, and Casuistry as Narrative Art
Hauerwas uses the tools of narrative, character and agency to explain the Christian
conviction that the world in which we live is the good but fallen creation of God. Since
Hauerwas places so much emphasis on God as the creator, one might get the impression that
Jesus is peripheral in Hauerwas' account of Christianity. But Hauerwas would disagree. Rather,

36

Ibid., 15.

37 Ibid.,

47.

106

narrative, character and agency provide "a framework that can help us understand the moral
significance of Jesus' life, death, and resurrection."38 Jesus is morally significant because he has
initiated the eschatological kingdom of God. And by participating in that kingdom through
discipleship, we are given the ability to live as creatures in a created world.
Hauerwas uses the imitation of God motif in order to explain Jesus' moral significance.
Just as Israel's vocation was to imitate God and reflect God's own character, the early Christians
found in Jesus' life, death, and resurrection "a continuation of Israel's vocation to imitate God
and thus in a decisive way to depict God's kingdom in the world."39 Especially significant is the
way in which Jesus deferred to God by dispossessing himself of the power necessary to defeat
God's enemies and bring about the kingdom through force. From the temptation in the
wilderness to his crucifixion, Jesus embodied the way God would deal with human sin; namely
through mercy and forgiveness rather than through coercion. The cross then becomes a key
moment in the life of Jesus because there he refused to use the power at his disposal to bring
about God's victory. The cross is a Roman tool for the execution of those who are a threat to
Roman power and authority. But in Jesus' possession the cross is God's ultimate victory.
Hauerwas puts the matter quite frankly: "[T]he cross is Jesus' ultimate dispossession through
which God has conquered the powers of this world."4°
It is important to recognize that in referring to the cross, mercy and forgiveness, Hauerwas
does not mean that God deals with sin through the forensic justification of the sinner. Jesus, in
his embodiment of God's dominion on the cross, provides a way to follow °1 And in following
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the path of non-violence rather than the destructive use of force, we participate in the life of God.
In other words, Jesus presents us with a real possibility of living truly as creatures dispossessed
of the false idols that lead us to violence.
For the announcement of the reality of this kingdom, of the possibility of living a life
of forgiveness and peace with one's enemies, is based on our confidence that that
kingdom has become a reality through the life and work of this man, Jesus of
Nazareth. His life is the life of the end—this is the way the world is meant to be—and
thus those who follow him become a people of the last times, the people of the new
age.42
Thus, we are able to live as creatures insofar as we follow the way of dispossession
initiated by Jesus. Forgiveness plays a key role here. In dispossessing ourselves of power and
control we are capable recipients of forgiveness. And forgiveness enables us to own up to our
past since we no longer need to fear and hide what is an integral part of our existence. Therefore,
"that we only have a history, a self, through the forgiveness wrought by God means that the
resurrection of Jesus is the absolute center of history./143 Jesus' non-violent life and death, then,
figure as the central feature of the Christian narrative, and provides us with the true possibility of
living as creatures. For we only come to be dispossessed of our ambitions to control our life in
our imitation of Jesus. "In him we see that living a life of forgiveness and peace is not an
impossible ideal but an opportunity now present.”44
But we cannot appropriate that life on our own. Rather, such appropriation requires a
community that gives us the skills to participate in God's peaceable kingdom. The church is this
participate in the ongoing narrative of God in Jesus. Hauerwas, Peaceable Kingdom, 94, writes that "the language of
'sanctification' and 'justification' is not meant to be descriptive of a status. Indeed, part of the problem with those
terms is that they are abstractions. When they are separated from Jesus' life and death, they distort Christian life."
To this degree, Hauerwas' call to imitation is a call to participation in the act of God in Jesus. However, when he
goes on to say that, "'Justification' is but a reminder of the character of that story—namely, what God has done for
us by providing us with a path to follow," he reads the narrative as a summons to salvation through imitation.
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community. Hauerwas' quip that, "the church does not have a social ethic; the church is a social
ethic"45 explains this in a direct manner. Liberalism asks whether Christianity has a social ethics
that can motivate us to abide by a more universal rule. But the work Hauerwas has done to show
that moral precepts derive from a people formed by their habits into a particular character and
according to a particular story already challenges the validity of that question. Every ethic
already is social in the sense that it requires a socially embodied set of goods to have moral
precepts in the first place. Therefore, the church does not have a social ethic but rather is a social
ethic. After all, the church is "the extended argument over time about the significance of [the
story of Jesus Christ in the world] and how best to understand it."46 That extended argument
requires people who are trained in the skills of seeing the world according to its story about God
in Jesus. It requires, in other words, a people who have attained the virtues necessary for
continuing the story of God's dominion in the crucified Christ into the present. These people
help us recognize how our own vision is limited by our sinful desire to control our own destiny
simply by being different than us. For, their difference allows us to recognize our own habits and
the (false) stories that underwrite them by placing them in relief. Thus, our recognition and
embodiment of non-violence does not come all at once, but only over the course of being trained
by a community to see the ways our own lives are already implicated in violence. That training
occurs through others who embody the story of Jesus and the peaceableness that he makes
possible.
Finally, then, casuistry plays a key role in our training. Casuistry not only allows the
church to extend its tradition across time, but it also allows the church to test the truthfulness of
its narrative. Casuistry has a place in the practice of Ethics, and it will be helpful to distinguish
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this from Hauerwas' use. Casuistry has typically been the practice of applying a universal moral
principle to any given situation. Hauerwas, on the other hand, considers casuistry to be the
practice of applying the narrative to any particular situation. Remember that we can only act in a
world that we can see, and that our seeing depends on our ability to describe our actions in a
meaningful way. But our speech coheres with a form of life. Our language is coterminous with
sustained habits that form our emotions and passions to respond in a certain way to different
situations. Casuistry is the community's practice of extending and testing the validity of its own
narrative by encountering new situations that would challenge its coherence. If Christians can redescribe any new situation in light of the Christian narrative in such a way that proves fruitful in
sustaining its vision and corresponding habits, that not only extends the narrative across time, but
validates its central convictions.
One example of this testing could be the challenge presented to the Christian prohibition
against premarital sex by contemporary American culture. In some communities, like college
dorm life for example, there do not seem to be any negative consequences for premarital sex. In
fact, premarital sex only seems, at times, to advance the American story of personal success
through self-fulfillment. Therefore, if it does not seem as if there are any negative consequences,
the Christian prohibition appears arbitrary, and the story from which the prohibition comes loses
its coherence because the prohibition cannot be sustained despite its fit within the narrative. In
that case, the Christian narrative loses its ability to account for reality, and just to that extent its
validity and justification. For if Christians cannot extend their narrative to account for college
dorm life, for example, this begins to demonstrate that, "there is something basically wrong with
how Christians understand the nature of human existence.'"'
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Therefore casuistry is the means by which a living tradition extends itself into
circumstances and experiences that it previously had not encountered. And these experiences
take place both within the community as members interact with one another, and as strangers,
who live according to a different narrative, challenge the validity of the church's narrative by
presenting an alternative social embodiment. If Christians cannot go on living peaceably in the
face of such a challenge, which is to say that if Christians cannot maintain the consistency of
their story within the test of their own diverse experiences, that demonstrates the insufficiency of
the community's narrative. But if Christians can go on, this demonstrates the truthfulness of the
Christian narrative, and the truthfulness of their talk about God. This is how Christian witnesses,
in their faithfulness and especially in their non-violence, demonstrate the truth of Christian
convictions about God.
Christian Peaceableness and Nihilist Irony
We have now come to the place where we can understand and begin to assess Hauerwas'
answer to the question of justification. I put the question this way: How do we know that the
goods embodied by the Christian community are the way things really are? If the lives of faithful
witnesses, which are organized according to the belief that God is most present and active in
Jesus of Nazareth, display the truth about the world, how do we come to know that? Certainly
there are many different embodiments that work to display the world in one way or another.
What distinguishes Christian practices? The answer Hauerwas gives in The Peaceable Kingdom
seems to be that the proof is in the practice. If the story Christians tell about God is true, then it
will be able to sustain faithful witnesses who find that in any given experience the Christian
narrative gives them the resources to live as creatures, dispossessed of their need to control their
own destinies. Remember that the test for whether any narrative is truthful is whether it provides
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us with the resources to sufficiently account for our existence. For the Christian narrative this
means that it enables us to account for our existence as contingent creatures.
At first glance, this seems to be a circular or even spiraling argument. The Christian
narrative provides its own criteria for judging whether or not it is true; and we judge the truth of
the Christian narrative on the basis of its ability to create lives that cohere to its basic confession.
But we should not be surprised at this. Hauerwas is merely being consistent in his own
conviction that as contingent creatures we have no neutral, non-traditioned, or non-partisan
criteria for judging the truth. We are all embedded in histories that we cannot escape. If we truly
are contingent creatures, if the God of Jesus truly is the creator as Christians claim, we cannot
pretend to have access to a transcendental point of reference by which we might judge any and
every claim. This does not mean that what Hauerwas proposes is hopelessly self-defeating; it
simply means that the truth of Christian convictions can only be tested over the course of
experience and practice. In that experience and practice, we come to see that the world is just as
the Christian narrative depicts it. This is what Hauerwas means when he says that narrative is a
reality-making claim. "If we somehow discover the world is not as that story suggests, then we
have good grounds for not believing in, or more accurately, not worshiping the God revealed in
the life, cross, and resurrection of Jesus."48 But we can only assess whether or not the world is as
the story suggests by risking our autonomy and submitting ourselves to the authority of the
narrative.
Therefore, one possible answer to my question is this: we come to know that the lives of
faithful witnesses display the world as it really is in so far as we have become the people
transformed by the Christian story. At this point, the discussion of this matter by Samuel Wells
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offers some insight. Wells suggests that "Hauerwas addresses the justification of Christianity in
pragmatic terms—since a theoretical justification would almost inevitably be foundationalist."49
Therefore, Wells describes how truth, for Hauerwas, cannot be separated from its embodiment.
Truth is assessed on the basis of the Christian story's ability to let us go on in life without
deceiving us, which means that the narrative is fruitful in producing the people and virtues it
claims. But, Wells suggests that there is a danger here. For it could easily be perceived that
without any external criteria for judging the truth of Christianity, Hauerwas is susceptible to the
threat of relativism: since there are no neutral means of assessing truth claims, then all truth is
what is true for us. But, he says, Hauerwas steers a careful path past relativism.
His path is to see the assessment of truth-claims as itself a skill. One learns how to
judge between stories by oneself living truthfully within a story. Who is the person
who says Christian claims are false? What story has taught such a person that is good
and right and true? Is this person criticizing Christianity for being something it never
set out to be—perspicuous, context-independent, objectively justifiable?5°
Therefore, one receives the ability to be a proper judge of the truthfulness of other stories by
being habituated into the virtues of a true story.
However consistent Hauerwas' argument is, it is not clear that this is a sufficient answer to
the justification question. Instead, it seems to beg the same question in a new form. Given that I
can only judge the truthfulness of Christianity in as much as I am transformed by its particular
goods, what makes me think that I could not just as easily do the same within another tradition?
Hauerwas does not take up this question in The Peaceable Kingdom. Nor does he try to address
the possibility that other religions, like Buddhism for instance, have an equally consistent and
capable tradition. Along with the majority of his writing, Hauerwas focuses on the problem
liberalism presents to Christianity. But the cause of our normal nihilism extends beyond
49
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liberalism. Simply put, nihilism is a normal condition when the there no longer appears to be one
clear and unmistakable truth to the world. Rather, since there are several different ways to
describe the world, we have to decide between them. Therefore, while the uneasiness behind my
question might be taken to be the uneasiness of an unbeliever, one who has not been properly
transformed, I take it to be a valid question posed to Christian faith and life in an age that worries
deeply that its own basic convictions are grounded in nothing more than our own will to hold
them. That is, I take it to be the question of justification pressed to its fullest extent.
Edwards highlights why the justification question is pushed to its fullest extent in our age
when he writes that "Even if one might be moved—for reasons of sentiment, or of political
advantage—to defend one of these sets of values over the others, one must at the same time
realize that such a defense has now become necessary: no form of life is unquestioned by us;
none is proof to our capacity and need for irony./751 No form of life is unquestioned by us
because none presents itself to us as the clear favorite; none shines forth with the unmistakable
mark of truth. None can silence our capacity for irony. In using the term irony Edwards is
borrowing from Richard Rorty, and Rorty's use of that term is worth a moment's reflection. For,
irony is one possible reaction to Hauerwas's response in an age of normal nihilism.
According to Rorty, irony is a response we have when we see the limitations of our "final
vocabulary." By final vocabulary, Rorty means the words we use to explain why we do what we
do.
All human beings carry about a set of words which they employ to justify their
actions, their beliefs, and their lives. These are the words in which we formulate
praise of our friends and contempt for our enemies, our long-term projects, our
deepest self-doubts and our highest hopes. They are the words we use to tell,
sometimes prospectively and sometimes retrospectively, the story of our lives.551
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Our vocabulary is final in the sense that we have no other words to use when we defend
ourselves. If we are pressed to explain or justify our use of that vocabulary, we can do nothing
but repeat what we have already said. "Those words are as far as we can go with language."
Irony occurs when we come to see that other people's final vocabularies are just as coherent and
impressive as our own. In other words, they strike us as having the ability to function just as well
as ours; and in this sense they place within us radical doubts about the superiority and
authenticity of our own way of life. For the ironist also recognizes that "argument phrased in her
present vocabulary can neither underwrite nor dissolve these doubts."53 Therefore, those struck
by irony realize that they do not have recourse to a neutral and universal language that could
judge between their final vocabulary and another's. The ironist responds to this situation by
holding her own convictions with a sense of uneasiness and suspicion, a sense of irony that her
own best reasons cannot settle the doubts she has on account of the success of others.
An important point to make about the response of irony is that it is not relativism.
Relativism provides a theory about truth and truth statements that secures a level of stability by
which anyone can judge any and all claims and vocabularies. That theory holds that all truth is
only what is true for you; and once that theory is established the relativist seems to have a point
of leverage from which to take a critical position over truth claims. But the ironist lacks just that
point of leverage. The ironist,
spends her time worrying about the possibility that she has been initiated into the
wrong tribe, taught to play the wrong language game. She worries that the process of
socialization which turned her into a human being by giving her a language may have
given her the wrong language, and so turned her into the wrong kind of human being.
But she cannot give a criterion of wrongness.54
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In other words, the deep-seeded uneasiness about one's own final vocabulary that plagues the
ironist does not come from a theory about truth, nor does it require a transcendental perspective.
Rather, it comes simply from the vertigo created when one recognizes that one's own best
reasons for living as one does do not provide one with the sufficient justification to settle the
doubts one has about one's own final vocabulary; doubts created by the existence of equally
justifiable alternatives.
Rorty's description of irony helps explain what Edwards means when he says that no form
of life is proof to our capacity for irony. The question of justification cannot be pushed to the
side by the mere recognition that our own forms of life provide their own criteria of justification.
Rather, recognizing that each tradition has its own set of criteria for judging truthfulness only
heightens our senses to the real possibility that we hold our final vocabulary because it works for
us. For another community's narrative could work just as well in forming someone to achieve the
goods presupposed by the story. But without any means for judging between the two, the world
does not appear to give us a definitive answer in one direction or the other. And this is a key
point. Hauerwas seems to proceed as if the world, or at least our experience of the world, will
help us decide whether or not our narratives are true. But if many narratives embody the world in
equally successful ways, the idea that the world can arbitrate between one and another loses its
descriptive and functional persuasiveness. Therefore, the answer that The Peaceable Kingdom
gives to the question of justification does not settle the matter of nihilism, but only intensifies it.
Having said all of this, it is still important to notice that Hauerwas is convinced that the
Christian story will be able to address all objections over the course of time, as long as the
church is faithful enough to produce faithful witnesses. In this sense he seems to agree with
Thomas Aquinas who says famously that "since faith rests on unfailing truth, and the contrary of
truth cannot really be demonstrated, it is clear that alleged proofs against faith are not

116

demonstrations, but charges that can be refuted." (Summa Theologiae 1a.1.8). But in light of the
question of justification posed by our condition of normal nihilism, such conviction is an
eschatological hope. And since Hauerwas is unwilling to project that eschatological hope into
anything as firm as an ontology, as we have already seen in his disagreement with Milbank," it
is not clear that his answer to the question of justification is anything more than an appeal that
Christianity works. In fact, the overarching argument of The Peaceable Kingdom tends to give
that sense: where liberalism struggles to account for our historical contingency and tends toward
violence, Christianity makes peaceableness a present possibility insofar as it allows us to account
fully for our contingency. Hauerwas wants to say that its success displays the way things are. But
without the type of ontological claim that Christianity will win out in the end, Hauerwas'
justification appears to be little more than an appeal to the functional success of Christian talk
about God, and hence an appeal to the value of Christian witness for the enhancement of life.
As a matter of fact, an appeal to the attractiveness of Christian witness runs subtly
throughout Hauerwas's work. It is subtle because unlike Milbank, Hauerwas does not set up an
opposition between two opposing meta-narratives competing against one another for our
approval. But his refusal to be so explicit coincides with his difference from Milbank. Hauerwas
prefers actually out-narrating the opponent by showing just how bad liberalism really is. This
strategy implies that Christianity will justify itself by its goodness. And on occasion, Hauerwas
explicitly mentions the role of aesthetic taste. I have already mentioned the conclusion of his
Gifford Lectures. But also his essay, "The Truth about God: The Decalogue as Condition for
Truthful Speech" concludes with these remarks: "Christians therefore should not be surprised to
55 Stanley Hauerwas, "Creation, Contingecy, and Truthful Nonviolence: A Milbankian Reflection," in
Wilderness Wanderings: Probing Twentieth-Century Theology and Philosophy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1997), 188-198, considers this possibility. But his conclusion tends toward the argument already reviewed in
Hauerwas, "Explaining Christian Nonviolence."
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discover that people who are not Christians find themselves attracted to the church not so much
by our beliefs, nor necessarily always by how we live, but by the God whom we worship and
who by his Spirit is pleased to dwell within and among us."56 This might be the case.
Nevertheless, despite his differences from Milbank, in the end, Hauerwas also tries to overcome
our normal nihilism by making Christianity highly valuable.
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CHAPTER FOUR
GOD AFTER NIHILISM
Gerhard Forde, who spent a life-time working on Luther's argument with Erasmus, writes
that "nothing would be more salutary in the life of the church today than a careful reading of
Luther's Bondage of the Will."' The previous three chapters of this dissertation have been the
argument necessary to support Forde's assertion that nothing can benefit the church today more
than to take Luther's book seriously. In the first chapter I described how nihilism is our normal
condition. For us westerners, the world no longer has one clear and unmistakable meaning.
Instead, there are many different interpretations of the world that present themselves to us as
valid depending on their aesthetic or practical value for our lives. In precisely this way, the basic
structure of western thought and life has turned upside-down. The sacred no longer stands overagainst the profane as that which gives life and order. "God" is no longer the author of our world
and God no longer commands unquestioned obedience and worship. Instead, the profane stands
over the sacred. We human beings give the sacred its status by assigning it a value. Therefore we
are the source and ground of "God".
As an integral part of western life and thought, the church participates in this condition. In
the first chapter I drew our attention to one example by citing what Christian Smith calls
"Moralistic Therapeutic Deism." This phrase summarizes a common form of religious practice
that does no more than help its practitioners cope with life. But I also identified more subtle and

I Gerhard 0. Forde, The Captivation of the Will: Luther vs. Erasmus on Freedom and Bondage, ed. Steven
Paulson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), vii.
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penetrating examples of the church's participation in our nihilism in chapters two and three.
Despite their best efforts to overcome the problem, both Milbank and Hauerwas tend to
contribute to it. They still appeal to the value of Christian beliefs and practices. And because of
their appeal to the value of Christianity, their work fits properly into the end of the story Edwards
tells about our condition.
Luther is quite different. Rather than appealing to the value of Christianity, Luther asserts
God's act in Jesus as the sole ground of Christian faith. In his dispute with Erasmus, Luther
makes one point clear: Jesus Christ is the only justification Christians have for their faith and
life. Human reason may not approve and our aesthetic sensibilities may not find it appealing, but
the sole reason for Christian faith is God's decisive action in Jesus. Of course, this statement may
not seem to be very insightful. It might seem rather obvious that Christians are Christians on
account of Jesus Christ. So the temptation always follows to assign Jesus some greater value, to
say more than this simple point. For instance, one way to say more about Jesus would be to find
in his life, death and resurrection a pattern for imitation that displays the truth about human
nature.2 But Luther refuses that temptation. The only justification Christians have for their faith
and life is the divine authority of the man Jesus of Nazareth.
By speaking of Jesus' divine authority, I mean to identify a specific conviction about the
man Jesus of Nazareth. This conviction derives from a narrative told about him in the New
Testament. The narrative contains these basic features: The man Jesus of Nazareth claimed to be
sent by the God of Israel and to have God's own authority in order to bring about the
eschatological consummation of all things. But Jesus' authority was put to the test by the leaders
of Israel, who thought his teachings and actions were contrary to the God that had delivered them
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from slavery in Egypt. So when Jesus would not back down from his claim to divine authority,
they crucified him with the help of the Roman authorities as a blasphemer. But God vindicated
Jesus by raising him from the dead. After appearing to his disciples and demonstrating to them
that he had risen, Jesus sent them out into the whole world with his own authority to make
disciples of all nations until he returns to judge the world. Based on this narrative, Christians
have only one justification for their faith and life: the divine authority of the man Jesus of
Nazareth. Jesus, in this case, is not valuable to anyone except to God. Therefore Jesus has no
appeal or value besides the authority given him by God, who raised him from the dead. Another
way of putting this is to say that only God justifies Jesus, not human reason or aesthetic taste.
The consequence of understanding Jesus in this way relates directly to normal nihilism. In an age
when Christianity is merely another value, Christians must justify their faith and life by
appealing to the divine authority of Jesus.
Luther does not spell out this underlying narrative about Jesus' authority.3 But Luther does
assume at least a form of this narrative in his argument with Erasmus. For Luther, God's
dominion over the world in the man Jesus is the irreducible center of all theological reflection.
James Nestingen, who writes about the competing theological frameworks at work in Luther's
argument with Erasmus, puts the matter quite simply: "At the center of everything is a person,
Jesus of Nazareth whom God raised from the dead, not an idea, a system of rules and regulations,
or a sequence of causes."4 Luther, in other words, does not try to move from Jesus to something
more universal and principled about God. Instead he draws the necessary consequences and
3 I will spell out the significance of this underlying narrative for this dissertation in the next chapter. For the
significance of this narrative in Luther, cf. Ian D. Kingston Siggins, Martin Luther's Doctrine of Christ (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970), 48-78.
4 James A. Nestingen, "Introduction: Luther and Erasmus on the Bondage of the Will." in Gerhard 0. Forde,
The Captivation of the Will: Luther vs. Erasmus on Freedom and Bondage, ed. Steven Paulson (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 2005), 16.
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conclusions about God's relationship to the world from the center. He even goes so far as to hold
in tension God as he is preached in Christ and God as he acts apart from the preaching of Christ.
Making the distinction between God preached and God not preached allows Luther to appeal
solely to God as he has defined himself. The genius of Luther's way becomes clear when his
distinction recoils on every other theology. This way alone lets God be God. Any other way of
dealing with God only ends up grounding God in the thinking subject, which is precisely the
cause of our normal nihilism.
This chapter will explore Luther's way of treating God in his argument with Erasmus as an
alternative response to our normal nihilism. First, it will recount some of the most significant
moves in the debate between Erasmus and Luther. Then, it will identify two key distinctions that
follow from Luther's position. The first distinction is between God preached and God hidden.
The second distinction is between a theologian of glory and a theologian of the cross. I will
describe briefly how these distinctions work and why they must be followed if we are to
overcome our nihilism.
Luther versus Erasmus
Systematic theology faces the perennial temptation to extract significant thinkers from their
contexts and force them to give answers to questions they were not asking. With that in mind,
one might legitimately ask what the Luther/Erasmus debate has to do with normal nihilism. The
debate took place within a politically insulated Christendom. Few, if any, were asking the
question that has been driving this dissertation: what reasons do Christians have for their faith
and life? However, the debate between Luther and Erasmus can be placed within the narrative
that leads to normal nihilism. Like James Edwards, Michael Allen Gillespie is one of those
contemporary thinkers who have been trying to tell a convincing story about the origins of our
present existence. And Gillespie takes the debate between Luther and Erasmus as a significant
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defining moment in western history. Without too much exaggeration, the story Gillespie tells can
briefly coalesce with the narrative I have been borrowing from Edwards. According to Gillespie,
the Luther/Erasmus debate was precipitated by what he calls the "nominalist revolution." Prior to
nominalism, westerners understood the world as being constituted by universals that had a real
existence, first in God, who is their source and goal, and then in individual things. These
universals gave definite shape to the world, and human reason could grasp the world's order by
participating in divine reason. But nominalism called the real existence of these universals into
question, asserting instead that all things are particular and that universals are mere fictions.
Placed in Edwards' vocabulary, the nominalist deconstruction of scholastic Realism destabilized
the relationship between sacred and the profane, and opened the question about the ground of our
being. The debate between Luther and Erasmus takes place within this period of epochal
upheaval and concerns more than just a theological dispute over human bondage and divine
freedom. Gillespie describes the context this way: "The deepest disagreements in the period
between the fourteenth and the seventeenth centuries were...not about the nature of being but
about which of the three realms of being—the human, the divine, or the natural—had priority."5
While I do not want to accept everything from Gillespie's genealogy, it does help fit the
debate between Luther and Erasmus within the concerns of normal nihilism, while also
recognizing their historical difference.' Luther and Erasmus not only debate about divine and

5 Michael Allen Gillespie, The Theological Origins of Modernity, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2008), 16.

Gillespie's narrative differs from Edwards in that he places primary significance in the nominalists rather than
Plato and the Age of the Forms. While Luther gained much from the nominalist critique of scholasticism, he does
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the argument between them presupposes the nominalist deconstruction of medieval realism that precipitated a sense
of ontological instability. A key aspect of the nominalist revolution was the distinction between God's ordained and
absolute will. In the quest to maintain the freedom of God, the nominalists found that God could not create
universals without constraining his omnipotence (since universals had a real existence in both creation and in God).
So the nominalists supposed that God operated within creation primarily on a contractual basis, creating a system of
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human freedom, but about which realm of being can serve as the stable and authoritative sacred
ground. Already in the preface to his De Libero Arbitrio and before discussing any definite
position on free will, Erasmus hedges the topic of human bondage altogether as something that is
ill-suited for Christian faith and life. In the process Erasmus raises the problem of Christian
authority and justification for speaking about God.' Luther did not miss the opportunity that
Erasmus presented him to discuss these important matters. He understood a danger in Erasmus'
position and responded by turning the question of authority toward Jesus. Therefore, over the
course of the discussion, the topic of divine and human freedom gets placed within a larger
discussion about the question of authority and the problem of God. I hope to show that Luther's
argument for the priority of God in Jesus provides a resource for Christians who are forced to
think about God in an age when the sacred and profane have inverted and collapsed. Therefore,
the following discussion of the debate will focus on the issues of Christian authority and God.

ordained rules that God himself could overturn if he found it necessary. When Gillespie reads Luther's Bondage of
the Will he overlays these nominalist categories on Luther's distinction between God preached and God not
preached, or God hidden and God revealed. Thus Gillespie, Theological Origins, 157-58, writes that "the doctrine
of the hidden God presents Luther with a problem that is deeply disquieting, for if the concealed God is the real God
and the revealed God merely the mask he presents to humans in Scripture, how can Luther know that he will keep
his promises, particularly about salvation? How can this God present the certainty Luther needs?"
However influential the nominalist categories are on Luther, they do not fit precisely at this moment in
Luther's argument. In fact, Luther, Bondage of the Will, 189, finds the matter significant enough to explain why
these nominalist categories do not apply to his argument. By making the distinction between God hidden and God
preached Luther suggests that the only certainty we have in the face of God's abstract hiddenness (the fact that God
does all in all with no apparent explanation) is the word God speaks when God breaks through the abstractness and
speaks up for himself. Furthermore, Luther argues that if we were to try and synthesize or fill in the gaps to make
the unexplainable acts of God coherent with his revealed will and spoken word, we will only exalt ourselves above
God. And no matter how hard we try to have God our way, we will never succeed. Therefore, it is best to let God be
God and hold him to account exactly where he himself wants to be known (the proclaimed word concerning Christ).
So if one is judging Luther by the standard of the Platonic sacred ground, he will end up looking just as confused as
Gillespie thinks. But, as I will argue in the course of this chapter, a better way to understand Luther's argument here
is to cast him in the light of the pre-platonic age of the gods. God is the personal and willful force working life,
death and all in all. For Luther, the best we can do is hold on to such a God when and where he makes available to
us. Cf. Oswald Bayer, "The Plurality of the One God and the Plurality of the Gods," trans. John R. Betz, Pro
Ecclesia 15 (2006): 338-54.
7 With her discussion of the early letters between Erasmus and Luther's camp Erika Rummel, Erasmus
(London: Continuum, 2004), 90-96, suggests that the issue of Christian authority was already disputed between the
two camps, and that it was a central difference between their attempts to reform the church.
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In the typical fashion of a scholastic debate, Luther replies to Erasmus point by point in his
De Servo Arbitrio. So he never gets around to putting together a complete argument for his
position. Instead he argues from his position against Erasmus' De Libero Arbitrio. So the best
way to see Luther's answer to the question of justification and God will be to set the two
arguments side by side, starting with Erasmus.
Erasmus on Authority, God, and Free Choice
"I have now completed the first part of this book. If in it I have persuaded my readers of
what I undertook, namely that it is preferable not to dispute matters of this kind too pedantically,
especially in front of the masses, there will be no need for the argument for which I now gird
myself..."8 This passage summarizes the argument Erasmus makes in the preface and
introduction to his book on free choice. It would be altogether better if Christians do not take this
matter too seriously. For nothing could be of more harm to Christian piety and concord than to
commit oneself wholeheartedly to the opinions of men. The topic of divine and human freedom
has been fervently pursued by so many learned men with so little success or progress that there
seems to be no point in getting worked up one more time over an intractable debate. From a
humanist scholar at the end of the scholastic period and the beginning of the modem, this sort of
protest about the issue should not be surprising. However, Luther's response gets its fuel from
the reasons Erasmus gives for thinking that the freedom of the will is a matter of human opinion.
In his preface and introduction, Erasmus presents three main concerns that create
boundaries for understanding the topic. The first boundary deals with the propriety of making
assertions about the kinds of topics that have been debated over and again with little success. If
the topic has proven so insolvable, it seems unfruitful to throw oneself entirely into a position
8 Desiderius Erasmus, A Discussion of Free Will, in vol. 76 of Collected Works of Erasmus, ed. Charles
Trinkaus, trans. Peter Macardle (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 21.
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that can produce a probable opinion at best. That sort of argumentation only makes for
unnecessary quarrels that threaten Christian unity. Rather, Erasmus recommends his own
dispassionate and temperate approach. He writes: "And I take so little pleasure in assertions that
I will gladly seek refuge in Scepticism whenever this is allowed by the inviolable authority of
Holy Scripture and the church's decrees; to these decrees I willingly submit my judgment in all
things, whether I fully understand what the church commands or not."9 The position of the
skeptic on these matters is preferable, Erasmus argues, because it handles the issue of authority
well. To make something like an assertion about a matter that can be endlessly debated tends to
produce people who are blinded to the truth by their own passions. Assertions, in other words,
honor human opinions over the authority of scriptures and the decrees of the church. Better to be
a Christian skeptic about these sorts of things and give the proper authority its due.
The second boundary that Erasmus erects around the issue coincides with the first. The
scriptures are unclear about some matters, and the issue of divine and human freedom is one of
them. "For in Holy Scripture there are some secret places into which God did not intend us to
penetrate very far, and if we attempt to do so, the farther we go the less and less clearly we see.
This is presumably in order to make us recognize the unsearchable majesty of divine wisdom,
and the frailty of the human intellect."I° The problem with making assertions about the matter of
divine and human freedom is that the scriptures are unclear about it. They do not provide a
unified and decisive position one way or the other. So every assertion on the matter will always
be the achievement of the interpreter who puts the disparate pieces of the scriptures together for
himself. When Erasmus finally gets around to debating the issue at hand, this is exactly what he
does. He gathers together the passages that seem to support free choice and then the passages
9
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that seem to oppose it. Then he organizes them on the basis of an inference about God. Given
that he takes the scriptures to be unclear, there seems to be no other option than to leave it up to
the interpreter to put the pieces together into a persuasive way. And this is just what Erasmus
does when he gets around to his argument for free choice. But his opening complaint about the
obscurity of the scriptures aims to stimulate a debate or a civil discussion rather than an assertion
or dogmatic position. Again, this seems to be the best way to handle the problem of authority.
Those, on the other hand, who adhere dogmatically to one side or the other on the basis of the
scriptures alone cannot answer the authority question well. If the same scriptures are honored by
both sides of the dispute, how is one to judge between them? What right does one have to hold
his position over someone else's position? The scriptures themselves cannot be the judge since
both sides read the same scriptures differently. So what authority is available to arbitrate the
case? One answer might be that an interpreter is right because he possesses the Holy Spirit. But
how does one test for the Holy Spirit? Does one judge by the character of the interpreter,
according to his piety or wisdom? Well, there are both wise and pious men on both sides of the
debate. Since there does not seem to be any good way to decide, Erasmus concludes: "let others
decide what claim they will make for themselves. For myself I claim neither learning nor
holiness, nor do I trust in my own spirit."11 It is better to respect the mysteriousness of the divine
majesty and take the position of skeptic and debater "than to define what passes the scope of
human thought."12
The third boundary follows from the first two and reveals Erasmus' commitment to peace
within Christendom through simple Christian piety. The third boundary is this: some truths are
not appropriate for the common ears. Even if Luther's position is true, it is still unprofitable for
I I Ibid., 20.
12
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the common Christian to know it. If all things happen by divine necessity, then God rewards his
own good works and punishes his own evil works. This picture of God is simply too unsavory
for the common Christian. So Erasmus protests:
if this were made known to the masses, how wide this would open the door to
godlessness in countless mortals, especially given the extent of their dullness, inertia,
wickedness, and their incorrigible tendency to all manner of evil? Where is the weak
man who will keep the unremitting and painful struggle against his flesh? Where is
the evil man who will strive to correct his life? Who will bring himself to love
wholeheartedly the God who has created a hell seething with everlasting tortures
where he can punish his own deeds in wretched human beings, as though he delighted
in their suffering?13
Erasmus, in other words, worries that the common Christian will be unable to love such a
God as Luther's. Nor would a Christian have any motivation to strive for good works. Here,
Erasmus is concerned to protect the Christianity he finds important. Despite his contention that
the scriptures are unclear about the issue of divine and human freedom (not to mention the
distinction between the divine persons, the two natures in Christ, and the unforgiveable sin)
Erasmus does find some things to be clear and plainly evident: the precepts for the good life.
And these precepts, along with an attitude that gives God glory when one does good works, and
seeks his mercy when entangled in sin make up the horizon of the Christian life. If Luther had
his way and we thought of God as working all things in all, this simple Christian piety would be
upset by an unjust God who rewards and punishes for no good reason.
These three concerns hedge the matter of divine and human freedom, and are for
Erasmus, "almost more to the point than the disputation itself."14 When Erasmus fmally
addresses the matter of divine freedom, he does so in a way that follows his own advice. Since
the best we can do is to produce a probable opinion, we should prefer a median position that does
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not disturb Christian piety. So even before investigating the scriptures Erasmus surveys the
tradition of positions and identifies two poles. The first pole is made up of those who are worried
that the faithful will be apathetic towards God and not strive for godliness. This side tends
toward the position that human beings have the ability to move themselves toward salvation. The
two central figures on this side of the debate are Pelagius (who thought that after the human will
was freed by grace it was capable of attaining salvation) and Duns Scotus (who thought that the
human free will could make the initial move toward salvation and was then rewarded with
grace). The other pole consists of those who worry that Christians do not take the grace of God
seriously enough. Those who make up this pole tend to focus on God's action and mitigate free
choice or get rid of all-together. According to Erasmus, this side includes Augustine (who thinks
that while human movement toward salvation is necessary, it is started, carried through, and
finished by the power of God's grace), then a position most likely attributable to Andreas
Carlstadt or again to Augustine, that free choice only produces sin and grace alone produces
good works; and finally there is Luther and Wycliffe who think that free choice is a fiction
because God is responsible for all things both good and evil.
The criterion that Erasmus uses to discern between these positions is whether or not they
maintain a balance between two constant concerns. On the one hand they need to give enough
credit to God's grace, but on the other they need to leave room for human freedom to strive for
the good. Erasmus finds that Augustine's position is "probable enough in that it leaves man to
study and strive, but it does not leave aught for him to ascribe to his own powers." But Erasmus
finds other opinions on this side of the pole "harder" and "hardest" to accept. His attitude toward
this far side of the debate, including Luther's position, can be summarized nicely with this
complaint: "I feel that these people are so anxious to escape reliance on human works and merits
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that the 'run away beyond their own house', as the saying goes.rr15 The saying "run away beyond
their own house," comes from a Latin proverb and captures well the sense that Erasmus wants to
give. These opinions are worried so much about honoring God that they run right past their
proper goal and fall into a greater problem—human complacency and an unsavory notion of
God.16
When Erasmus begins to investigate the scripture passages he follows the same basic
strategy as when he surveys the tradition. He groups the passages together into those that support
free choice and those that seem to oppose it. Then he argues for a probable opinion on the basis
of what seems best for Christian piety. In support of free choice are all the passages that have
some sort of imperative to choose the good rather than the evil. For example, when God speaks
to Moses in Deuteronomy, he says, "I call heaven and earth to witness against you today, that I
have set before you life and death, blessings and curses. Choose life so that you and your
descendents may live..." (Deut. 30:19). Erasmus lists passage after passage just like this one and
then argues that if human beings did not have the ability to choose, passages like these would be
ridiculous. God would be demanding from humans exactly what he knows they cannot do. One
passage that gets Luther's attention and becomes important for Luther's response is Ezekiel
18:31-32. "Why will you die, 0 house of Israel? For I have no pleasure in the death of anyone,
says the Lord God. Turn, then, and live." Erasmus asks of Luther's position, "Would the good
Lord lament the death of his people which he himself brought about in them?"" If human beings
do not have free choice, then God seems unjust to demand anything of us. For if our will is
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bound, God would seem not only to demand from us what we cannot do but also to punish us for
no good reason. Erasmus' complaint against such a God follows: "'Why bless me, as though I
had done my duty, when whatever happens is your work? Why curse me, when I sinned through
necessity?' What is the purpose of such a vast number of commandments if not a single person
has it at all in his power to do what is commanded?"I8 Without free human choice, rewards and
punishments would be of no consequence, and we would have no motivation before God to live
piously. Therefore, since God would be unjust and the commands and imperatives that canvas
the scriptures would lose their force, Erasmus concludes that we have to respect the position that
says human beings have free choice.
This inference about God is rather straightforward. Erasmus has to do much more work
to maintain the same inference about God in passages that seem to oppose free choice. One of
those passages turns out to be Exodus 9:12ff in which God hardens Pharaoh's heart. In order to
maintain his inference that God is just in his rewards and punishments, Erasmus says that God
hardened Pharaoh's heart for a just reason. To uphold this position, Erasmus applies two
theological distinctions. First, he distinguishes between God's foreknowledge and his will. God
willed Pharaoh to perish and was right to will it because he foresaw the sin that Pharaoh was
going to commit. This does not mean that God forced Pharaoh to sin. Rather God willed Pharaoh
to perish because he knew beforehand that Pharaoh would sin in that given situation. Of course,
this distinction only does so much work in making sense of the passage. After all, God is the one
who hardens and that means that Pharaoh seems to be acting by divine necessity. So Erasmus
applies the scholastic distinction between necessity of consequence and necessity of the thing
consequent. The force of this distinction is to make a place for human free will while at the same
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time honoring God's omnipotent will. On the one hand, if God wills something it must happen as
a consequence of his will. But it does not follow that whatever happened, the consequent
occurrence, had to take place. As Erasmus applies the distinction, Judas could have refrained
from betraying Jesus. But even if Judas had not betrayed Jesus, God still would have willed it
since God would have known what was going to happen. Therefore, "in the human sphere too we
can posit a certain necessity which does not exclude the freedom of our will."I9 When applied to
Pharaoh, this distinction would lead us to conclude that Pharaoh acted necessarily according to
God's foreknowledge. But this does not preclude the fact that Pharaoh acted freely, or with no
external constraint, according to his own wicked will. Such a subtle distinction allows room for
Erasmus to read these difficult passages and still find that God punishes and rewards on account
of free human choices.
In summary, Erasmus argues for free choice on the basis of an inference about God's
justice. In the scriptures, God clearly makes demands and promises rewards and punishments.
God would be unjust to do so if humans did not have the ability to choose between good or evil.
But Erasmus means this inference only for the purposes of debate, or to form a probable opinion
on the matter; and this reflects what Erasmus thinks is the deeper issue. Since the scriptures are
unclear about human free will (which simply means that he thinks some passages seem to imply
that human beings have free choice, while others do not), we lack the authority and right to judge
between competing interpretations. In cases like this, the best option for Christian unity and piety
is to debate as he does rather than to assert as Luther does. However, while Erasmus thinks that
this way of proceeding is the best manner of Christian faith and life, Luther finds that Erasmus
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places all of Christian faith in jeopardy because he has undermined the only certainty we have
about God.
Luther on Authority, God, and Human Bondage
See now, my dear Erasmus, what that most moderate and peace-loving theology of
yours leads to! You warn us off, and forbid us to try to understand the foreknowledge
of God and the necessity laid on things and men, advising us to leave such things
alone, and to shun and condemn them. And by this ill-advised labor of yours you
teach us both to cultivate ignorance of God (which comes of its own accord, and
indeed is inborn in us), and to despise faith, let go the promises of God, and treat all
the consolations of the Spirit and certitudes of conscience as of no account. Such
advice Epicurus himself would scarcely give!20
Luther did not miss the fact that Erasmus had taken the debate to a higher level. Luther did
not find this to be a distraction, however. By placing the matter of divine and human freedom
within the context of questions on Christian authority and the problem of God Erasmus had
gotten to the heart of the matter. By the conclusion of Luther's book, he even compliments
Erasmus for it: "You and you alone have seen the question on which everything hinges, and have
aimed at the vital spot..."21 But this complimentary stance only coincides with Luther's
conviction that Erasmus had gotten the most important things all wrong. Certainly the matter of
divine and human freedom belongs properly with the question of God and Christian authority.
But Erasmus' way of handling the matter only leads us to cultivate an ignorance of God and to
despise the Christian faith.
Luther instead asserts God's authority. More specifically, Luther asserts that God has acted
in a decisive way to bring about the redemption of all things through Jesus Christ. By any other
authority, Luther argues, Christian faith is merely a conjecture about God, grounded only in
human reason. So if we do not cling to God where he is to be found in Jesus, we only cultivate
20
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an ignorance of God. In the process of making this argument, Luther recasts Erasmus' concerns
about authority in light of God's action in Jesus. Then he answers the problem of divine justice
in a way that does not allow human reason to exalt itself above God. We will follow these two
important moves in order.
The first thing to notice about Luther's book is that he handles the authority questions quite
differently than Erasmus. Luther does not embrace the position of the Christian skeptic. Christian
faith and life does not consist of a cool detachment that allows one to avoid personal
commitment and struggle. Christianity consists of making assertions about, holding fast to, and
confessing Christ even unto death. Luther writes: "Nothing is better known or more common
among Christians than assertions. Take away assertions and you take away Christianity. Why,
the Holy Spirit is given them from heaven, that he may glorify Christ [in them] and confess him
even unto death..."22 Christians make assertions because Christ is the center of Christian faith.
Christians do not pick fights for the sake of academic debate, but to confess what we could
otherwise not know and to hold to the only thing we do know with certainty—that God has acted
in Christ to redeem the world. Take away assertions, Luther thinks, and you take away
Christianity. Such conviction about assertions already marks a stark difference from Erasmus on
the question of authority. For sure, that difference reflects the civil unrest present during the
reformation and the impending collapse of Christendom. While Erasmus sought the position of
the skeptic in order to preserve Christian unity and a simple piety that was underwritten by the
church's place in society, Luther thought Christianity was about Christ and nothing else. Nothing
could be more important to Luther's Christian than to confess Christ, "even if the whole world
had not only to be thrown into strife and confusion, but actually to return to total chaos and be
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reduced to nothingness."23 Luther already shifts the question of authority to Jesus. While
Erasmus would like to take the position of the skeptic for the sake of preserving the authorities of
scripture and church, Luther takes the position of an assertor and confessor in order to preserve
the significance of God's act in Jesus.
Luther handles the question about the scriptures in precisely the same manner. Whereas
Erasmus fmds the scriptures obscure and veiled, and therefore doubts their ability to serve as a
sole authority, Luther finds them clear about one thing in particular: Jesus Christ.
For what still sublimer thing can remain hidden in the Scriptures, now that the seals
have been broken, the stone rolled from the door of the sepulcher [Matt. 27:66; 28:2],
and the supreme majesty brought to light, namely, that Christ the Son of God has
been made man, that God is three and one, that Christ has suffered for us and is to
reign eternally? Are not these things known and sung even in the highways and
byways? Take Christ out of the Scriptures, and what will you find left in them?24
Of course, Luther admits that there are many passages within the scriptures that are unclear
in regards to the difficulty of reading a foreign text. But Luther does not allow these difficulties
to give precedence to the interpreter. Rather the central subject matter overshadows the problem
of reading the occasional obscure words or being unfamiliar with certain terms. "If the words are
obscure in one place, yet they are plain in another; and it is one and the same theme published
quite openly to the whole world, which in the scriptures is sometimes expressed in plain words,
and sometimes lies as yet hidden in obscure words."25
In the process of identifying their central subject matter, Luther also changes the purpose
and function of the scriptures within the debate to reflect the authority of God in Jesus. Erasmus
argues as if the Scriptures are source material to construct a position about divine and human
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freedom. Each party in the debate must look over whatever passages present themselves as
relevant to the issue, as it has already been defined by the interpreter, and then put together a
position. But when used in this way, Erasmus is right to question them as a sole authority. As a
resource for a more comprehensive position about divine and human freedom, they fail in their
task just as Erasmus thinks. Some passages seem to imply human freedom while others seem to
imply divine necessity. And the interpreter has to make sense of the implications by putting them
together on the basis of an inference about God. And God is the problem. Erasmus traces the
deficiency of the scriptures back to God himself, citing Paul's lament about God's inscrutability.
Since the scriptures are an insufficient resource for constructing a definite position about divine
and human freedom, we must conclude that there are some things about God that we simply
cannot know. On these things, the debater rather than the asserter will provide only a probable
opinion.
Luther, on the other hand uses the scriptures quite differently. He admits that there are
many things in God that are hidden and beyond human comprehension. But "God and the
Scripture of God are two things, no less than the Creator and the creatures are two things. That in
God there are many things hidden, of which we are ignorant, no one doubts...But that in
Scripture there are some things abstruse, and everything is not plain—this is an idea put about by
the ungodly Sophists..."26 What we do know for certain about God is openly published in the
scriptures. In fact, Luther finds that the scriptures make crystal clear something important about
God: the identity and purpose of his Son.27 "Matters of the highest majesty and the profoundest
mysteries are no longer hidden away, but have been brought out and are openly displayed before
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the very doors. For Christ has opened our minds so that we might understand the scriptures
[Luke 24:45], and the gospel is preached to the whole creation [Mark 16:15]."28 In other words,
God uses the scriptures for the sole purpose of proclaiming Christ.
So once again Luther shifts the topic of authority to God's act in Jesus by turning attention
from the question of scriptural interpretation to the place of the scriptures in God's action
through Jesus. The scriptures proclaim Christ, who is the Son of God. Luther helps this process
along by making a distinction between the inner and outer clarity of the scriptures. The outer
clarity of the scriptures is their proclamation that Jesus is the Son of God, and that he has
suffered for us and will reign eternally. This clarity directly concerns God. The stone has been
rolled away, as Luther says, so that through their proclamation we come to know that God is
acting in a clear and definitive way. God has bound himself to this word that proclaims Christ
clearly. Therefore, the external clarity pertains to "the ministry of the word" or the office of
preaching through which God acts to proclaim the reign of Christ. However, while the message
is clear, some people refuse to believe that it is God's word. The internal clarity, then, pertains to
matters of the heart. The internal clarity concerns whether or not we believe that the message
published to all the world about Christ actually refers to God.29 Between these two clarities,
though, Luther leaves no room for the authority of the interpreter to make sense of the text.
There is no room, in other words, for an inherent obscurity that needs to be cleared up by proper
interpretation in order to arrive at the real meaning. The authority of the scriptures derives
directly from their central content matter and their subsequent function of proclaiming Christ.
Thus, Luther answers the two initial authority questions by shifting the topic to God's
action in Jesus. When he addresses Erasmus' third concern, Luther follows suit. The third issue
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that Erasmus used to erect his boundary is whether the topic of divine and human freedom is
salutary for Christian faith and life in the first place. Erasmus thought it was not salutary because
Luther's position produced an unsatisfactory, even terrible, picture of God. Not surprisingly,
Luther finds Erasmus' position unsatisfactory because it obscures the only thing we know with
certainty about God—Jesus Christ. Luther's argument is straightforward. First, he contends that
if we do not know what human choice can accomplish before God or whether all things happen
by divine necessity, then we will not know how much we ought to do and how much we should
leave up to God. Such uncertainty places God's action through Jesus under a shroud of doubt.
Next, Luther argues that his own position on the matter is quite salutary for Christian faith and
life. Again, Luther's reasoning is straightforward. If we do not know whether God works all in
all, then we cannot know how far the proclamation of Christ found in scripture extends.
For if you doubt or disdain to know that God foreknows all things, not contingently,
but necessarily and immutably, how can you believe his promises and place a sure
trust and reliance on them? For when he promises anything you ought to be certain
that he knows and is able and willing to perform what he promises; otherwise, you
will regard him as neither truthful nor faithful, and that is impiety and a denial of the
Most High God....Therefore, Christian faith is entirely extinguished, the promises of
God and the whole gospel are completely destroyed, if we teach and believe that it is
not for us to know the necessary foreknowledge of God and the necessity of the
things that are to come to pass. For this is the one supreme consolation of Christians
in all adversities, to know that God does not lie, but does all things immutably, and
that his will can neither be resisted nor changed nor hindered.3°
If God does not control all things by the power of his will, if there is any room for human
merit or achievement, then the scripture's proclamation of Christ has no force. Then human
choice controls the destiny of the world rather than God in Jesus.
Again, the underlying assumption behind Luther's simple argument is that God is acting
definitively in Christ to bring about the redemption of the world. This assumption becomes
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clearer in Luther's conclusion and it will be helpful to pause here and bring this assumption to
light. In the final section, Luther uses the notion of two kingdoms to summarize the scriptural
proclamation found in Paul and the gospel of John. Those two kingdoms are the kingdom of
Satan and the kingdom of God, which are warring against one another. Satan is the ruler of his
kingdom, but Christ is the ruler of God's kingdom. In God's kingdom, "Christ reigns, and his
Kingdom ceaselessly resists and makes war on the kingdom of Satan. Into this Kingdom we are
transferred, not by our own power but by the grace of God, by which we are set free from the
present evil age and delivered from the dominion of darkness." 31 The absolute opposition
between the two kingdoms expresses Luther's conviction that God's work for the redemption of
the world is centered in Christ alone. Our salvation takes place when we are transferred to
Christ's kingdom by his grace rather than our works. Therefore nothing stands between our
participation in Christ's kingdom and our salvation. There is no middle or neutral ground
between Christ and Satan, and hence no place for our will.32 It is this conviction about Jesus
Christ, who is preached in the scriptures, that allows Luther to hold that all things happen by
divine necessity. If human beings have the power to choose and move themselves toward Christ,
then God's action in Christ becomes secondary to that power.
In fact, Luther goes so far as to say that divine necessity and human bondage are the two
halves of the Christian summa.33 It is important to understand why Luther makes such an
exaggerated claim. He says as much because divine necessity and human bondage express in unmitigating terms the absolute centrality of Jesus. In this sense, Luther does not start from
reflection on God's divinity in itself and then move to human bondage as the reciprocal part.
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Rather these two parts keep Christ as he is proclaimed by the scriptures in its proper place. For as
the two halves of the Christian summa, they ensure that God is in control; that God will follow
through and bring to completion what he has begun in Christ and that he will no go back on his
word as it is proclaimed through the scriptures. At the end of the entire work, Luther sums up
this position with a confession: Luther would rather not have free choice given to him because
then the certainty he has in God through Jesus would be lost. "But now, since God has taken my
salvation out of my hands and into his, making it depend on his choice and not mine, and has
promised to save me...I am assured and certain both that he is faithful and will not lie to me, and
also that he is too great and powerful for any demons or adversaries to be able to break him or to
snatch me from him."34 In just this sense, it is proper to read Luther's argument for divine
necessity and human bondage as a derivative of the scriptures' confession about the divine
authority of Jesus Christ.
Of course, this does not mean that Luther refrains from arguing about divine necessity at
the level of abstract theological reflection. Already in his review of Erasmus' preface he makes
just this sort of argument against the theological distinctions Erasmus puts to use.35 For instance,
he calls into question the distinction between God's will and foreknowledge by following
through on Erasmus' conviction that God must be just. If God is just he must be so immutably,
Luther argues, which means also that this applies to his goodness, will and knowledge. If, then,
God's will and knowledge is immutable, how can he foreknow without willing and how can he
will without foreknowing. "From this it follows irrefutably that everything we do, everything
34

Ibid., 289.

35 I am not interested in arguing this point in any great detail from the text of The Bondage of the Will. The
genre of disputation determines, for Luther, his willingness to stray into this sort of abstract attack of Erasmus'
position. I am indebted to Robert Kolb for pointing this out to me. Nevertheless, I think that a close reading of the
whole dispute demonstrates that Luther works out from the center, which is the Scripture's proclamation of Jesus
Christ. Cf. Oswald Bayer, "God's Omnipotence," Lutheran Quarterly 23 (2009), 85-102, for a more sustained
systematic reading of Luther's text in this regard.

140

that happens, even if it seems to us to happen mutably and contingently, happens in fact
nonetheless necessarily and immutably, if you have regard for the will of God. For the will of
God is effectual and cannot be hindered, since it is the power of the divine nature itself."36 The
most these kinds of arguments mean is that Luther is willing to work from the center, which is
Christ as proclaimed by the scriptures, and draw the necessary consequences about God and
humanity. Divine necessity and human bondage is not a derivative of God's divinity as such for
Luther as much as it is a derivative of the authority of Jesus proclaimed by the scriptures.
Therefore when Luther argues about divine necessity in terms of reflection on God himself, he is
arguing about how best to adhere to the authority of Jesus proclaimed in the scriptures.
Consequently, Erasmus' distinctions are not just theoretically flawed, but insufficient to treating
the Triune God. They obscure the proclamation of Christ by putting the human will between God
and Jesus.
Therefore, Luther recasts all three of Erasmus' concerns about authority in light of God's
act in Jesus. And in so doing, Luther treats God in a different way. By asserting the authority of
Jesus, Luther lets God be God. Erasmus, on the other hand, treats the scriptures as a resource for
a debate about God, which makes God out to be a human idea dependent on an inference about
divine justice. The Luther quotation we began with summarizes his contention against Erasmus.
If we do not let God be God by appealing to the only thing we know for certain about God
(namely Jesus), we cultivate an ignorance of God. Without Jesus, all we have left is a probable
opinion.
The second major move that Luther makes concerns God's justice. Shifting the questions
of authority to God's act in Jesus does not do away with the problem of God's justice. If divine
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necessity follows as a consequence of Jesus' authority, what do we make of evil? Is God also the
cause of evil; or is evil a force that works against God? This is an important question because at
first glance it seems to unravel Luther's assertion of God's authority. The former option (God is
the cause of evil) would seem to uphold divine necessity and the authority of Jesus. But then it
would also seem as if God is the author of evil and opposed to his own work through Jesus. The
latter option (that evil is an opposing force) would absolve God from evil. But in indentifying a
power that can war with God, the authority of Jesus would be jeopardized.
This troublesome question arises several times throughout the debate, but nowhere more
focused than on the passage from Ezekiel. Erasmus put the problem this way: "Does the good
Lord deplore the death of his people, which he himself works in them?" If God does will the
death of his people which he himself works, as Luther's position seems to imply, then God
seems to be against himself On the one hand, God does not will the death of the wicked, as he
states in Ezekiel. But on the other hand, many wicked people do not repent. So it seems as if
God, who works all in all, also wills the death of sinners against his own good will. Luther not
only anticipates the problem but also gives an answer. But he does not propose a theoretical
solution that would resolve the differences. Instead, he draws a distinction that recognizes the
different ways we encounter God. This distinction intends to keep God together when theoretical
problems seem to drive God apart. Luther then warns that we ought to adhere to the distinction
lest we find ourselves fighting against the divine majesty.
To deal with the problem of God's justice, Luther says we must distinguish between God
as he is preached and God as he is not preached. God as he is preached is God as we encounter
him through the Scripture's proclamation concerning Christ. In the scriptures proclamation, God
speaks for himself and expresses his will clearly. As we encounter God in preaching, God does
not will the death of the wicked. Instead, God as he is preached "deplores the death which he
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finds in his people and desires to remove from them." Therefore he wills "that sin and death
should be taken away and we should be saved." In other words, as we experience him in the
preaching concerning Christ, God clearly communicates his will to us. But apart from this
preaching, God has not defined himself. As we encounter God apart from the preaching of
Christ, God does many things that have no immediate explanation. Therefore Luther says that
apart from the preached word God hides himself from us and does not wish to be known. "God
hidden in his majesty neither deplores nor takes away death, but works life, death, and all in all.
For there he has not bound himself by his word, but has kept himself free over all things."37 With
this distinction, Luther admonishes us to take God seriously as God himself acts. On the one
hand, when God acts through the preaching of Christ we come to know exactly what God
desires. In the word about Christ, God binds himself and makes his desire and intent clear. But
apart from that preaching, God does many different things that often seem to have no explicit
coherence or consistency. God's acts apart from preaching often lack clear and distinguishable
patterns of behavior. And in this sense, God apart from preaching hides himself from us. The
point is quite simple. "God does many things which he does not disclose himself as willing in his
word."38 Apart from that proclamation, God does many things for which he has provided no
explanation. Some of those things even contend with the preached word. When some hear the
gospel and are saved while others do not, for example, it might appear that God apart from his
preached word conflicts with God's preached word. Luther simply points out that we do not
know for sure what God wills in this case. And we cannot make a generalization about it that
would seem to fix the problem. When the two seem to come into conflict, Luther warns us to
cling to God preached and have nothing to do with God hidden.
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It is our business, however, to pay attention to the word and leave that inscrutable
will alone, for we must be guided by the word and not by that inscrutable will. After
all, who can direct himself by a will completely inscrutable and unknowable? It is
enough to know simply that there is a certain inscrutable will in God, and as to what,
why, and how far it wills, that is something we have no right whatever to inquire into,
hanker after, care about, or meddle with, but only to fear and adore.39
Luther's warning gets to the heart of the question of justification in its broadest sense. As
creatures, we have no right or authority to the things of God. If we could give a sufficient answer
to the problem, then we would only exalt ourselves and what we think is reasonable above God
himself.
To the extent, therefore, that God hides himself and wills to be unknown to us, it is no
business of ours. For here the saying truly applies, 'Things above us are no business
of ours.' And lest anyone should think this is a distinction of my own, I am following
Paul, who writes to the Thessalonians concerning Antichrist that he will exalt himself
above every God that is preached and worshiped (II Thess. 2:4).49
To come up with reasons for God that God himself does not reveal is to exalt oneself above God
as he acts in Christ and the preaching concerning Christ. If we are to let God be God, then we
must observe the distinction and actually let God act in his inscrutable majesty and let God speak
for himself in the proclaimed word.
Now, at first glance, this distinction might appear to undermine the authority given to the
proclamation of the scriptures concerning Jesus since it affirms that God works in ways that do
not seem bound to the promises made in Jesus. This would be a correct reading of the distinction
only if Luther thought that we must find a principled answer to the problem of God. But Luther
uses this distinction to overturn the priority of such conjectures. Because God makes his will
known for certain through the person Jesus of Nazareth, this distinction allows us to hold the
things of God that are not certain or definable in a non-speculative unity with God in Jesus.
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Making the distinction allows the work of God hidden to remain together with the work of God
preached without Reason's speculation. In other words, the distinction works to maintain the
confession that the one who created all things is active in the person Jesus of Nazareth in a
manner that cannot be reduced to a more basic or universal principle about the world, such as his
justice. Thus, rather than compose a conjecture about the justice of God, Luther uses this
distinction as a way of teaching us to honor the God of Jesus as God.
After all, Luther is convinced that there is no sufficient answer to this problem. When he
says that God is hiding himself, Luther seems to mean that the living God will simply not allow
creatures to circumscribe him within a reasonable explanation. Every attempt to "pry into that
awful will" only leads to our frustration in the face of God's majesty. Luther's worry is not
merely a pious concern about maintaining God's transcendence. Rather Luther is warning us that
we cannot resolve the problem of God no matter how hard we try. For "if anyone persists in
investigating the reason for that [hidden] will, refusing to pay heed to our warning, we let him go
on and fight with God like the Giants, while we wait to see what triumphs he will bring back,
certain that he will do no harm to our cause and no good to his own."41 Luther uses Erasmus'
theological distinctions to demonstrate this point. Even if we grant the distinction between God's
foreknowledge and God's will, then we still run into the problem of God's justice. If God
foresees that free choice cannot will the good, or that Pharaoh would have hardened his heart on
account of his wickedness, why did God not give Pharaoh the grace to change his heart? The
responsibility for evil still finds its way to God. And "God appears to be just as cruel in bearing
with us through his long-suffering...For since he sees that free choice cannot will good, and that
it is made worse by the forbearance of the one who is long-suffering, this very lenience makes
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him seem extremely cruel, and as if he enjoyed our evil plight."42 Therefore, Erasmus'
distinction only seems to have delayed the problem rather than overcome it. But of course,
Erasmus might respond to this with the distinction between the two kinds of necessity. Pharaoh
could have changed his wicked heart and chosen the good, and that still would have been God's
will. But Luther draws out the consequences of that move.
But if God is robbed of the power and wisdom to elect, what will he be but the false
idol, chance, at whose nod everything happens at random? And in the end it will
come to this, that men are saved and damned without God's knowledge, since he has
not determined by his certain election who are saved and who are damned...and in
the meantime he has himself, perhaps, gone off to the banquet of the Ethiopians, as
Homer says.43
All the explaining we can do for God will never solve the problem. Our explanations will only
make matters worse.
Luther's advice here is purely practical. Nothing we say about God will change the reality
that God will go on just as before. "And if flesh and blood is offended here and murmurs [cf.
John 6:61], by all means let it murmur; but it will achieve nothing; God will not change on that
account.')44
Nothing will resolve the reality that God works life, death, and all in all. Erasmus'
distinctions do not change the fact that some people do not repent, for example. They only try to
explain them away so that they do not appear to be the problem they are. But such explanations
only make matters worse. No one can erase the problem of God's cruelty, unless he also makes
God into the idol chance. It is better to let God be God and cling to his action in Jesus. To
observe Luther's distinction between God hidden and God preached means to appeal only to God
as he has made himself available to us. And apart from that defined presence, "God" will only be
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a human conjecture. For, if God is a reality—not a human idea but a living God—we cannot
imagine that he will conform to our best explanations. Therefore, Jesus Christ, who is preached
by the scriptures, is the only justification we have for God.
Finally, then, when Luther does get around to speak about God's justice, he demonstrates
what it means to follow this distinction. Rather than speaking for God and construing an
explanation that would prove God's justice, Luther first recognizes God's supreme and
uncontestable will and the futility of human reason. "He is God, and for his will there is no cause
or reason that can be laid down as a rule or measure for it since there is nothing equal or superior
to it, but it is itself the rule of all things. For if there were any rule or standard for it, either as
cause or reason, it could no longer be the will of God.' Luther refuses to speculate because
speculation would only exalt ourselves above God, both as he is preached and not preached. If
God were bound to follow a rule conjured up by human reason then he would not be God, and to
seek after such a rule would only exalt human reason over God. Then Luther concludes that
God's justice is not a demonstrable conclusion but a statement of faith. Luther makes this point
at the conclusion of his entire argument.
Let us take it that there are three lights—the light of nature, the light of grace, and the
light of glory, to use the common and valid distinction. By the light of nature it is an
insoluble problem how it can be just that a good man should suffer and a bad man
prosper; but this problem is solved by the light of grace. By the light of grace it is an
insoluble problem how God can damn one who is unable by any power of his own to
do anything but sin and be guilty. Here both the light of nature and the light of grace
tell us that it is not the fault of the unhappy man, but of an unjust God; for they
cannot judge otherwise of a God who crowns one ungodly man freely and apart from
merits, yet damns another who may well be less, or at least not more, ungodly. But
the light of glory tells us differently, and it will show us hereafter that the God whose
judgment here is one of incomprehensible righteousness is a God of most perfect and
manifest righteousness. In the meantime, we can only believe this, being admonished
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and confirmed by the example of the light of grace, which performs a similar miracle
in relation to the light of nature."
That God is just will be revealed in the light of glory and cannot be illuminated clearly by
either the world we experience (the light of nature) nor even by the proclamation of the gospel
about Jesus (the light of grace), but only by the fulfillment of all things in God (the light of
glory). In the meantime, the light of grace gives us enough to trust God until the light of glory.
Again we see here how Luther works from God's act in Jesus to what must be implied. Even
with the knowledge of God that we receive in the proclamation concerning Christ, we still lack
the resources to prove God's justice. But we have reason to believe it according to the light of
grace. And until the consummation of all things, we can only believe it according to that light.
God after Nihilism
I hope that Luther appears to be a model for justifying the Christian faith after nihilism
simply by seeing him alongside Milbank and Hauerwas. Despite their differences, both Milbank
and Hauerwas appeal to the value of Christian peaceableness in a violent world. Therefore, in
order to deal with our normal nihilism, they try to make Christianity highly valuable. But this
turns out to be like trying to put out a fire with gasoline. Nihilism is a normal condition for
westerners because in the presence of many different possible ways of construing the world,
none presents itself to us as the clear favorite. The world does not appear to have one clear and
unmistakable meaning. Instead, there appear to be many different interpretations of the world.
And since we have to decide between competing claims, we human beings find ourselves,
wittingly or unwittingly, in the place of the sacred. The sacred gains its status on account of our
determination. Making an appeal to the value of Christianity only reinforces the nihilist.
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Rather than appealing to the value of Christianity, Luther leads us to appeal to the authority
of God in Jesus. This simple move makes a world of difference. By appealing to what God has
done definitively, while also refusing human speculation about the matter, God remains the
ground of our existence. In the terms of our narrative about western life and thought, the sacred
remains the ground of the profane in Luther's work. Luther lets God act for himself regardless of
what we might think about his action or what existential difficulties we might have with God.
Luther is especially clear about this when he refuses to provide a speculative answer to the
problem of God's justice. Clearly God's justice is a problem for any theologian because, when
taken altogether, God's actions do not seem principled. Ever since the Age of the Forms,
theologians have assumed that God must be rational and that human reason allows us to share in
God's reasons. But Luther is much more an Age of the Gods type theologian. For Luther, God
does not have to act according to the measure of reason or taste. God does exactly what he likes.
And that is a central theological problem for theologians. God's godness presents a problem not
just for theology but for theologians because God does not respect our best intuitions. God is
simply God. And when it comes to finding God's reasons, well, as Luther says, God often seems
to be hiding himself." To take such a God seriously means that the theologian must give up his
pretentions to be God. Luther's distinction between God preached and God not preached aims to
let God rather than the theologian be God. This feature of Luther's theology is exactly what
helps Christians in an age of normal nihilism. Luther's way denies the kind of thinking about
God that would put us in a position as judge and arbiter of God. Justification for "God" is in the

47 Compare Friedrich Nietzsche's, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books,
1974), 38, typically crude warning to philosophers: "`Is it true that God is present everywhere?' a little girl asked her
mother; 'I think that's indecent'—a hint for philosophers! One should have more respect for the bashfulness with
which nature has hidden behind riddles and iridescent uncertainties. Perhaps truth is a woman who has reasons for
not letting us see her reasons? Perhaps her name is—to speak Greek—Baubo?"
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hands of God alone. Any speculative resolution, Luther insists, would only make God out to be a
servant of human reason.
There are two sets of theological distinctions that can serve as rules for theological
reflection. These distinctions should help us maintain Luther's insight that only God can justify
himself, which he does through Jesus.
We have already encountered the first distinction. It is between God preached and God not
preached; or between God preached and God hidden. As we have seen, the distinction allowed
Luther to refuse the speculation about God that would resolve what seems to be a contradiction.
Speculation about God runs into trouble because it tries to deal with the reality of God by
providing a unifying explanation. But explanations are only abstractions about God. Luther's key
insight is that these abstractions are not God himself. And no matter what explanation we might
give to the problem of God's justice, for example, we will only be delaying the problem of these
two realities. Gerhard Forde observes that, "the attempt [to explain God with an abstraction] is
futile because it only shuffles masks. Just when one thinks that he or she has removed one
terrifying mask, another mask emerges and turns out to be even more threatening, though the
perfidy might not be immediately apparent. Such theologizing only substitutes another seductive
abstraction for the proclamation." The only solution to the shuffling masks is to let God break
through our theology and speak for himself.
Therefore, respecting the difference between God preached and God not preached has a
two-fold purpose. On the one hand, it puts a halt to explanations and stops human reason from
exalting itself above God. This is as much of a pastoral warning as it is a theological one from
Luther. God will not stop being God because we explain him. The two troublesome realities that
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Erasmus worries over will still take place no matter what we say about them, and that is the
problem. There might be many different persuasive explanations that make sense of these
realities. But the key point to be remembered, here, is that those explanations are human reasons
for God, not reasons God himself gives. As human reasons, they always make an aesthetic
appeal. They are always trying to be persuasive to human reason and taste. Therefore, theology
that does not let God be God and speak for himself cannot help but appeal to its value.
But observing the distinction between God hidden and God preached puts a stop to such
speculation. It keeps us from exalting ourselves over God. Once speculation about God finds its
end, then we can let God speak for himself So the second purpose of the distinction is to turn
our attention to God as he wishes to be known. This is what Luther means when he says that we
should have nothing to do with God apart from preaching but to pay attention only to the word.
The hidden God might seem to will the death of a sinner, but at other times, he may not. Apart
from the preaching that God himself has authorized, God does many different things for which
he gives no explanation. And, as Forde observes,
It is simply not true that God in general is bound even to an abstraction called the
revealed word...What would happen if we were to claim that the absolute God is
bound and limited by the word? We would revert to the situation in which the
preached word—"I desire not the death of a sinner"—becomes a general statement by
which God is bound and limited. But that is not true, nor does it accord God any
honor."
Therefore, Gillespie's common complaint that "not only does Luther have no explanation
for Satan's evil, he also cannot explain the Fall, which in the absence of human freedom and
responsibility is morally meaningless' misses Luther's point altogether. Of course Luther does
not have an explanation to these things. Luther wants to dissuade us from fmding an explanation
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that will do the job of making sense of the things of God in the first place. None will. And more
to the point, any explanation will only be our best effort. It is better to let God be God and cling
to him where he wishes to be found.'
If Christian theology wants to avoid turning God into a human value, it must observe the
difference between God hidden and God preached. Those who observe this distinction are
theologians of the cross. A theologian of the cross is a person "who comprehends the visible and
manifest things of God seen through suffering and the cross."52 This designation comes from
Luther's Heidelberg disputation. One deserves to be called a theologian when he does not ignore
God but embraces him where he makes himself available. The challenge of being a theologian of
the cross, however, is that the foolishness and humility of the cross is just where we find God. It
seems to be our perennial desire, even our bondage, to have God as we like him rather than as he
chooses to be. To appeal simply to the authority of a crucified first-century Jew does not have the
status of appealing to the alternative of peaceableness in a violent world, for instance. But that is
where God is to be found. A theologian of the cross, however, does not look beyond suffering
and cross; he does not look beyond Jesus. Luther summarizes his point when he says that, "For
this reason true theology and recognition of God are in the crucified Christ, as it is also stated in
John 10 [John 14:6]: 'No one comes to the Father, but by me.' am the door' [John 10:9], and

51 Gillespie's concern that the fall is morally meaningless also does not reflect a close reading of Luther's use
of divine necessity. One way to put the matter is to say that Luther is a pragmatist about the relationship between
human bondage and divine necessity. He observes the reality of our bondage and the reality of God's action in Jesus
and does not try to unify the two systematically. Our bondage, Luther thinks, is not that we are puppets, but that we
do exactly what we want. Cf. Luther, Bondage of the Will, 39. And we are bound to not want God to be God. This
aspect of Luther's thought leads Robert Kolb, Bound Choice, Election, and Wittenberg Theological Method: From
Martin Luther to the Formula of Concord (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 11-66, to conclude that Luther holds
two total responsibilities that are kept in practical rather than theoretical unity by distinguishing properly between
law and gospel.
52 Martin Luther, Heidelberg Disputation, in vol. 31 of Luther's Works, ed. and trans. Harold J. Grimm
(Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1957), 52.
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so forth."53 Rather than putting together a conjecture about the invisible things of God, rather
than finding a principled explanation for the world as we experience it, a theologian of the cross
will speak truthfully when he speaks first of God in Christ.
By contrast, a theologian of glory will look "upon the invisible things of God as though
they were clearly perceptible in those things which have actually happened [Rom. 1:20]."54 To
look upon the invisible things of God as though they were clearly perceptible is just what
explanations do. They try to look behind the reality of God to see a principle at work that can
organize God neatly into a coherent unity. But Luther asserts that these people do not deserve the
title of theologian because they are not observing God as he acts. Rather they are philosophers or
metaphysicians but not theologians. For rather than paying attention to God's particular actions,
these so called theologians devise their own conjectures about God that explain why God acts the
way he does.
These distinctions benefit Christians in an age of normal nihilism because they remind us
that we can only justify our faith and life by appealing to God's own action in Jesus. Only God
justifies God according to his own will and action. And God acts definitively in Jesus Christ.
Any other reasons for Christian faith and life will always end up appealing to the value of
Christianity.
Finally, then, we can return full circle to our opening narrative about nihilism. According
to these distinctions, the Age of the Forms already contains within it the seeds of our present
normal nihilism. These distinctions can apply directly to the divide between the Age of the Gods
and the Age of the Forms. In the Age of the Gods we experience the sacred first hand as an
active, personal, and willful force that controls the profane. In the Age of the Forms, the sacred is
33
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the a priori cosmic order that gives intelligible substance to the profane. In the Age of the Gods
we cannot always explain why something happened the way it did. The only explanation lies
within God, who often hides himself and refuses our curiosity. All of Job's pleading with God
only got him a lesson in who is the one with sole power, right, and authority. So all we can do is
honor God when we run into him, or even better when God runs into us. We can only honor God
as God lets himself be known. But in the Age of the Forms, "God" stands as the unifying and
principled Reason for the way things are. What happens does not happen by chance or arbitrarily
but follows an a priori order. God is that principled order, and we know God by recognizing the
principled reasons for the world. Luther's theological warning about these things is simple. To
treat God as the principled reason for the world will only lead us to ground God in our own best
theological efforts. The only way to properly justify our talk about God is to let the living God
speak for himself. Any other way can only make God out to be our best conjecture.
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CHAPTER FIVE
JESUS AFTER NIHILISM
In the previous chapter I argued that Christians will only overcome the threat of nihilism by
following Luther. Rather than appealing to the value of Christianity, Luther leads us to appeal to
God's act in Jesus as the sole justification for Christian faith and life. Such an appeal helps
Christians in an age of normal nihilism because it lets God speak for himself. Our age challenges
us with many different claims to authority; some claim the authority of the Bible, others the
Koran, and still others the scientific method. When so many different authorities exist side by
side, the world no longer presents itself to us as having one clear and unmistakable meaning.
After all, no one authority seems to be able to tell us the way things really are because in the face
of many other plausible authorities, none goes unquestioned by us, none simply stands out above
the rest. So we have to decide between them. That is exactly the problem. Authorities no longer
have the same status when we have to judge their authenticity, when we stand over them as those
who assign them value. That significantly devalues them. The sacred ground of our existence, as
Edwards puts it, loses its constructive force and authority when the profane has to prop it up. If
only God would save us by speaking for himself? But that is just what Luther thinks God has
done and continues to do in Jesus. God has broken through our 'probable opinions' to give us
something we can be certain about. By appealing to the divine authority of Jesus, Luther lets God
speak for himself.
Moreover, Luther's theological distinctions show what it means to let God speak for
himself. Especially by making the distinction between God preached and God not preached,
Luther demonstrates how Christians might let God's act in Jesus stand as the sole justification
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for their faith and life. Only when Christians resist the temptation of filling in the gaps to make
God's actions consistent with human reasoning will their theological speech let God be God.
Then and only then can we listen to God where he is to be found, namely in the preaching
authorized by God himself through Jesus.
But Luther's argument begs a gigantic question. Why do Christians say that God acts in
Jesus of Nazareth? What gives us the right to contend that God himself has spoken up and
defined himself through this man? The matter can also be described more conventionally.
Christians have traditionally claimed that Jesus is the Son of God. The Nicene Creed, which is an
authoritative way of expressing the Christian faith, puts it this way: I believe in one God, the
Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth and of all things visible and invisible. And in one
Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God. But what gives us the right to make this
confession about Jesus? This question has two sides. On the one hand, the question asks about
the man Jesus of Nazareth. What about Jesus makes us think that God is definitively present in
him. On the other hand, the question asks about God. What do we know about God that makes us
think God works through this man? This chapter aims to answer both of those questions together
by working systematically with Luther's distinction between a theologian of the cross and a
theologian of glory.
The range of topics and subtopics, not to mention the layers of scholarship that accompany
this question are enormous. It would require at least a book length argument to cover the
question sufficiently. The scope of relevant issues related to the topic extends from the
"historical" Jesus to the development of the Nicene Creed. And that only covers the first side of
the question. The second side concerning God would be just as immense in scale. I do not intend
to write another dissertation on this topic. So in order to make the question manageable, I will
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use John Milbank's article, "The Name ofJesus"1 to frame the issue. Milbank's way of treating
the question is not the only way, or even the best for that matter. But I have chosen to follow
Milbank's lead for a couple of reasons. First, in this piece, Milbank grasps how the question is
not merely historical in nature but also theological. Second, Milbank's argument serves as a good
illustration of a 'nihilistic' attempt to solve the problem. By nihilistic, I only mean that he
justifies the church's confession that Jesus is the Son of God by appealing to the confession's
value. Rather than refraining the issue myself, in the style of a chapter in a dogmatics, I will
write a critical response to Milbank's essay. I hope that my response will prove to be a helpful
example of how to handle the wide scope of issues. The bulk of my argument for this dissertation
consists in the way I have construed the problem of nihilism in the first four chapters. This does
not mean that my thesis in this chapter is insignificant to the greater argument. In fact, as I've
already mentioned, this question needs to be answered if Luther's response will carry any
weight. But these are the limitations of this dissertation.
Why Jesus? Three Nihilistic Answers
If Christians are going to give good reasons for their confession that Jesus is the Son of
God, they will have to navigate two related questions. The first question concerns the man Jesus
of Nazareth. What about this man leads Christians to link him so intimately with God? The
Nicene Creed, for one, goes so far in its formulation of the confession to join the man Jesus
ontologically with the Father. What can we say about the man who goes by the name of Jesus of
Nazareth that can justify a claim that significant?2 The second question arises whenever

John Milbank, "The Name of Jesus." in The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture (Cambridge,
MA: Blackwell, 1997), 145-68.
2 I am not interested in answering here the secondary questions, "Why is Jesus considered to be of one being
with the Father?" and "How does that particular confession make conceptual sense of an eternal God's incarnation
in time?"
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Christians try to give an answer to the first. When Christians say that Jesus is the Son of God
they imply that they know something about God in the first place that would lead them to
identify God intimately and uniquely with the man Jesus of Nazareth. But what reasons can they
give for having such a definite knowledge of God?
Typical of John Milbank's dense and thoughtful work, his "The Name of Jesus," captures
both sides of the Christological question in a short essay. Not only does Milbank briefly review
the current status of the question, surveying a chief challenge to the Christian confession and two
inadequate answers, he also proposes an alternative response. However, when placed in the light
of the forgoing discussion of our normal nihilism, Milbank's alternative does not seem to be any
better than the two inadequate responses he wants to transcend. Instead of two inadequate
responses, I will argue that his essay presents three nihilistic answers to the Christological
question. The critique of Milbank in this section will provide the platform for an answer that
transcends nihilism in the next section.
Milbank begins his essay with a candid summary of the `liberal' challenge3 to the
church's claims about Jesus. Both sides of the Christological question emerge already within the
liberal challenge, and a brief review of that challenge and the two inadequate responses will help
demonstrate just what is at stake when we try to answer the Christological question in an age of
normal nihilism.
First of all, the liberal challenge concerns the man Jesus of Nazareth. According to many,
the church's canonical gospels seem to leave a residue of evidence for another Jesus, a historical
Jesus, who can be reconstructed without the church's transcendent language. The events in
Jesus' life such as his teachings and crucifixion do not narrate events taking place on a vertical
3 Following Milbank's general summary, I am using the term liberal rather loosely. The content of the liberal'
critique will define that to which the term refers.
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level as the gospels suggest. Rather, they recall events of merely 'historical' significance.
Milbank summarizes their rereading of the gospel narratives this way: "Jesus offers God's
unconditional forgiveness; he teaches a new way of life founded upon non-rivalry, nonretaliation and mutual sharing...However, the kingdom suffers an initial rebuff: Jesus's mission
fails, he is crucified, and yet his steadfastness continues to provide testimony to the possibilities
he earlier proclaimed."4 This Jesus does not quite deserve the title Son of God. Instead he only
seems to be a precursor to the Enlightenment's ideals. For "In the new community which he
announces, particular cultic traditions, racial and even family attachments, become irrelevant: we
can relate to all human beings, despite, or through their differences, as sons and daughters of a
heavenly Father."5 Therefore, exactly by making him one of their own, liberalism gives just
enough reason to find Jesus insignificant. There are many other ways to achieve the goals of the
Enlightenment without referring to Jesus. Therefore, the church's doctrines of divinity and
atonement seem not only superfluous but ruses for their own cultic authority in that they seek to
bind us to their Jesus.
Of course, the legitimacy of any historically reconstructed Jesus has been called into
question at least since Schweitzer's The Quest of the Historical Jesus.6 But Milbank does not
bother attacking the dubious nature of historical reconstruction because liberalism has a second
and more potent protest to the church's Jesus that doubles the effect of the first.? This challenge
has to do with God. Besides the church's cultic authority, what manifest difference does it make
to call Jesus the Son of God? Milbank puts it this way: "As Jews insist, Jesus's death quite
4
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manifestly did not redeem, did not bring in the reign of peace, reconciliation and eternal life. The
church seems to make this death redemptive by claiming for it a secret, hidden efficacity which
we must 'believe in', 'relate to' and somehow appropriate in our individual lives."8 In other
words, there does not seem to be any manifest reality that warrants the church's confession about
Jesus. If there is no manifest reality, what does belief in Jesus' divinity amount to except a
private, interior, and merely religious fascination? It seems ridiculous to talk about Jesus'
relationship to the creator when the church's Jesus seems to have no material consequences.
Liberalism might be reconstructing Jesus to fit its own agenda, but at least that Jesus can make a
real difference in the world.
While Milbank does not make this connection himself, it is not hard to see that the liberal
challenge is another form of our normal nihilism. If we cannot reconstruct the historical Jesus,
then we seem to be helplessly stuck with many different interpretations of Jesus. But why respect
one interpretation of Jesus over another? Why does the church's Jesus have more authority than
the reconstructed historical Jesus? The 'liberal' response seems to give this answer: Because our
Jesus helps underwrite a form of life we find useful and good. The church's Jesus, on the other
hand, only binds us to a particular tradition and a cultic authority. We seem justified, then, in
defming the identity of Jesus by what we fmd valuable.9 In order to move beyond such nihilism,
Christians need to have a strong theological answer. We need to claim some right to the church's
confession about Jesus that appeals to more than Jesus' value. Put another way, Christians need
to be able to defend their claims with an authority not their own. Milbank outlines two responses
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to the liberal challenge that he finds inadequate. He calls them the 'cultic' approach and the
`Christ°logical' approach. Neither transcends the nihilism present in the liberal critique.
The cultic approach has the most difficulty answering the challenge. Milbank vaguely
summarizes the cultic approach this way: this approach "seems to say to people, you must accept
as a primary 'datum' a basic proposition that God became incarnate, and in addition that his
death by violence made atonement for your sins."' Exactly who Milbank means to describe
under this approach is not clear. One example, though, might be those who proceed as if
doctrinal propositions about Jesus can be taken un-problematically from the text of the New
Testament. When this is the case, the theologian merely, "compiles the doctrinal statements
contained in Scripture (in the text and context), groups them under their proper heads, and
arranges these doctrines in order of their relationship."'' Christians call Jesus the Son of God
because that is what the New Testament teaches. This procedure is usually backed by a
prolegomena assumption about the divine authority of scripture, namely that it is the inspired and
inerrant word of God and therefore an authoritative source for Christian doctrine.I2
This approach has difficulty answering the 'liberal' challenge because it unreflectively
accepts a text as an authority on God. Besides the fact that the supposedly inspired and inerrant
text says that Jesus is the Son of God, there do not appear to be other warrants for believing that
this speaks truthfully about God. So this approach leaves unanswered two important questions.
"First of all, by what process of thought does one arrive at the conclusion that someone is God
incarnate, or that a single death is universally effective."I3 And second, what difference does it
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make? What reality, besides the statement in a text, demands that we take this proposition to
telling the truth? The approach seems too extrinsic, as if nothing immediately demands the
proposition. And this extrinsicism ends in nihilism because it fails to answer the question of
divine authority. When pressed to give a reason for accepting the New Testament as an authority
to speak about God in the first place, this approach typically cites the inner testimony of the Holy
• 14
Spint.
In the face of those who do not immediately share this assumption, this is the equivalent

of asserting one's personal opinion. God, in this case, is unreflectively bound up with what
seems to be the arbitrary adherence to a text, and even seems to be extrinsic to Jesus himself.
Milbank terms the second approach "Christological," and attributes it to the work of Hans
Frei" and Ronald Thiemann.I6 Rather than understanding the church's confession about Jesus as
mere revealed datum, the Christological approach suggests that the identity of Jesus can only be
derived from the narratives told about him. When we see what Jesus of Nazareth was like, then
we will have reasons for indentifying him as the Son of God. Milbank describes the approach
this way: "The character of Jesus, as it emerges in the story, is a supreme pointer to the character
of God himself. This proposal seeks to call us back from empty dogmatic formalism to a
concrete content for belief"I7 While it is an advance on the extrinsicism of the cultic approach,
Milbank finds this approach inadequate also. For Milbank, the gospel accounts do not reveal a
substantial narrative character named Jesus. The gospels do not tell us about Jesus' intentions,
quirks, and inclinations. Instead, they identify Jesus by ascribing transcendent titles to the man.
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To finally "indentify Jesus, the gospels abandon mimetic/diegetic narrative, and resort to
metaphors: Jesus is the way, the word, the truth, life, water, bread, the seed of a tree and the fully
grown tree, the foundation stone of a new temple and at the same time the whole edifice."18 So it
seems as if the name "Jesus" does not actually add anything to our knowledge of his identity.
Whether or not the gospels provide a sufficient description of Jesus' intention can be
argued. Milbank does not mention the specific intentions that Frei thinks define Jesus' character.
Those include Jesus' willing obedience to the Father that leads to his crucifixion, and the
Father's subsequent vindication of Jesus through the resurrection.I9 Moreover, though, Frei
seems less concerned about giving reasons for Jesus' identity than he does with the more formal
matter of reading the gospels appropriately. He worries that since the time of historical criticism,
the gospels have been read as if their meaning was the historical events that lie behind the texts,
rather than the history-like narrative of the gospels themselves. This more formal concern only
tangentially touches the question about God. For instance, Frei does not feel burdened to give
reasons why these texts have the authority to tell us about God in the first place. This does not
mean that Frei's work is insufficient, but only that his primary purpose for writing limits the
scope of questions his work can answer.
For the purposes of advancing my argument, though, I want to draw attention to one way
that Frei's position might be developed to answer the more theologically loaded question. A
student of Frei's, William Placher, does ask the theological question. After arguing superbly
along with Frei on the more formal level that the gospels are history-like witnesses to truths both
historical and transcendent, Placher then asks why we should believe these texts. Why do we
give these texts authority and not others? Placher replies that on the human level the church has
Is Ibid.,
19
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made them authoritative. So the question is more like asking why we are Christians. But "Each
Christian comes to faith through a different combination of the haunting power of the biblical
stories, the moral inspiration of the lives of other Christians, the way life seems to make sense
when guided by Christian values, and who knows what other factors."" All of these reasons
depict the personal value these texts have for the individual believer. And Placher's theological
reasons do not improve matters. On the theological level Placher cites the work of the Holy
Spirit to personally convince us that these texts are authoritative, which is the equivalent of
giving no reason whatsoever. Or even worse, this answer uses speech about the Spirit to validate
our personal attraction to the texts.
In summary, then, both the cultic approach and one version of the Christological approach
do not overcome the nihilism latent in the liberal challenge. When pressed to answer the
theological side of the Jesus question, the cultic approach has nothing at all to say except that
God is vaguely associated with certain texts that Christians call God's inspired and inerrant
word. Placher's version of the Christological approach only confuses God with our personal
affection for Christianity. Milbank tries to move beyond these two options by giving a more
substantial theological reason.
Milbank's answer to the question about Jesus can be called the ecclesiological approach. In
this approach, "Christological and atonement doctrines are...theoretically secondary to
definitions of the character of the new universal community or church."2' Rather than focusing
attention on the unique character of the man Jesus in order to derive his divine identity, the
ecclesiological approach focuses on the unique character of the Christian ecclesial community.

20 William C. Placher, "How the Gospels Mean," in Seeking the Identity of Jesus: A Pilgrimage, ed. Beverly
Roberts Gaventa and Richard B. Hays (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 41.
21 Milbank,

"Name of Jesus," 148.

164

The community that patterns its life according to the Jesus-event in the gospels, and thereby
extends that event into the present, gives warrant for calling Jesus the Son of God. Milbank
hopes that the exceptional character of the new community will demonstrate why Christians go
to the extent of calling Jesus divine. No other ascription for Jesus could sustain such a practice.
Let me unpack this approach step by step. First, Milbank builds on his argument that the
character of Jesus does not sufficiently develop in the gospel narratives. He finds instead that the
gospels tell us about the founding of a new social practice. Jesus founds that new society. And
the gospels record not only events in the life of Jesus, but simultaneously the founding events of
the new community. Therefore, the character of Jesus remains illusive in the gospels because the
name Jesus and the new social practice coincide with one another in the narrative description.
For, "If we want to describe a founder precisely in the moment of origination of a practice, then
all we can do is to indentify him with the general norms of the practice, and this procedure is
followed in the gospels."22 The gospels, in other words, are not depictions of the man Jesus as
much as they are the blueprint for a practice that is to be continued into the present in yet new
and different situations. On the one hand, the events that happen to Jesus in the gospels cannot be
identically repeated. The stories about Jesus are uniquely his own, belonging to his own time and
circumstances. But on the other hand the way Jesus responds to his contingent historical situation
initiates a way of life that can transform the embedded structures of violence and establish a
practice of non-violence that can be extended into the present. Therefore, "The name of Jesus is
attached to a descriptive content at the point where the word of the gospel ceases to be mere
teaching, and is made 'real' and powerful in a new social body..."23
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In the second step of the ecclesiological approach, Milbank outlines the exceptional
character of this community. Milbank's account in this essay is abstract and multifaceted, which
sometimes makes it unclear. One theme recurs throughout, though. The Christian community
consists of a diverse and yet mutually reconciled community of people whose differences are not
demolished but harmonized in consensus. On the one hand, this community looks different than
a liberal society because our differences are not rendered insignificant by a policy of noninterference. On the other hand, this community looks different than one based on an abstract
consensus of the good, because the only abstract goal is "now consensus itself, meaning a society
without violence and unjust domination."24
Another way to discern the exceptional difference of the Christian community, though, is
to look at its founder. In his more recent book, Being Reconciled: Ontology and pardon, Milbank
describes more fully the transformative Jesus-event found in the gospels. Here, the theme of
unjust domination gets expanded to frame Jesus' death. Jesus, it seems to Milbank, dies an
almost accidental death. In the passions narratives, no one claims final sovereign authority for
killing Jesus. The Jewish authorities take him to the Romans to be judged by Roman authority.
But Pilate does not find anything wrong with him. And once he washes his hands of the whole
event, he hands Jesus back to the Jewish mob. But the mob does not kill Jesus either. The mob
hands Jesus over to the Roman soldiers, who then execute Jesus by no particular authority
whatsoever. But in dying such a death, Jesus exposes the arbitrary power structures of absolute
sovereignty. For instance, rather than use his assigned authority to protect Jesus, Pilate arbitrarily
makes an exception to Roman rule and hands Jesus over to the mob. But this exception, where
Pilate uses his power to ignore Roman law, proves the rule that absolute sovereignty is arbitrary
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power. Therefore, Milbank concludes that Jesus "died the death of all of us—since he died the
death that proves and exemplifies sovereignty in its arbitrariness."25
It is worth noting that Milbank's account of the passion contains an ironic element. Only
one thing rescues Jesus from dying a completely arbitrary death: the community that recognizes
Jesus' calculated submission and gives it ultimate significance. Milbank, of course, does not
intend this irony explicitly. But his whole account of Jesus' death is ironic in this way: in the act
of narrating Jesus' death as an arbitrary death, Milbank himself saves Jesus' crucifixion from
being absolutely arbitrary. After all, in order to keep such a submissive death from being plain
suicide, Milbank has to see an underlying motive in Jesus' submission that makes it arbitrary for
everyone except Jesus. In this way Milbank assigns Jesus' death universal significance exactly
by identifying it as arbitrary. So too does the community who recognizes along with Milbank
that "Jesus only submits to being handed over because he is in himself the very heart of all
transition as really loving gift, and thereby able to subvert every betrayal and abandonment."26
When the ecclesial community reads this narrative into the life of Jesus it finds in him "the true
aesthetic example for our reshaping of social existence."27
Third and finally, then, the community's appropriation of this unique Jesus-event signals
Jesus' divinity. For, "Jesus is 'identical' with God, not in terms of an underlying 'essence', or his
general human 'nature', but rather at the precise point of his irreplaceable specificity, or all that
goes to make up his 'personality' including his historical situation and his own response to it."28 .
Or, put differently, the doctrine of Jesus' divinity is a communal rule to take this event as the
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ultimate hermeneutical horizon of human life. Milbank puts it this way: "The 'divine
personhood' only works as a propositional 'belief ...if it is also taken as a pragmatic instruction
to go on re-narrating and re-realizing 'Christ' ."29 Therefore, by re-realizing this event, the
ecclesial community's own action validates their identification of this Jesus as the Son of God.
Here is where the ecclesiological approach provides a more nuanced theological answer to
the question about Jesus' divinity. Whereas the cultic approach and Placher's version of the
Christological approach had little to no theological reason for calling Jesus the Son of God, the
ecclesiological approach points to the unique efficacy of the Christian community. In so doing,
Milbank extends the argument already developed in his seminal Theology and Social Theory.
Recall, for a moment, how Milbank argued that Christian social theory was uniquely capable of
sustaining a community that found violence unessential to human life. All other forms of life in
some way assume the necessity of violence. But Christianity stands apart from all others as the
uniquely good and attractive alternative because it encodes the world as peaceable. Now we can
see more fully that this encoding of reality stems from the Christian community's imperative to
reads all things in light of the Jesus event. When it follows this imperative, the church
understands Jesus' personality as the present manifestation of being itself. "Jesus is perfectly
identified only as the source, goal, and context of all our lives: the esse of his personality is, in
Thomist terms, esse ipsum, or the infinite totality of actualized being which is 'eminently'
contained in God."3° And this unique depiction of God sets Christianity apart.
But this answer to the Jesus question only embraces nihilism. Milbank justifies the
divinity of Jesus by pointing it the doctrine's unique attractiveness. In fact, rather than
transcending the nihilism of the liberal critique, Milbank accepts its parameters. Liberalism
29
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argued as if the best we could do was find a Jesus who was useful and valuable. Milbank
answers the liberal charge by making the church's Jesus' highly valuable. Far from letting God
speak for himself, this only confuses God with our aesthetic intuitions.
I drew our attention earlier to the irony of Milbank's account of Jesus' death because it gets
to the heart of the problem. The gospels do not make Jesus' secret motive explicit. Milbank
might be able to find and exploit markers here and there. But there is only a little mentioned
about Jesus' motives for going to the cross, and even less to suggest that his primary motivation
was the subversion of arbitrary power. The ecclesial community has to read this into the text in
order for Jesus to have such significance. Milbank does not feign ignorance about this. After all,
unlike the previous two approaches, he does not argue for the divinity of Jesus on the basis of the
text, but on the attractiveness of the community that reads the texts this way. But that is just the
problem. If it is not the authority of the texts, what makes us think that Milbank's ecclesial
community is ultimate and final, and that no other future society can provide a truly better way
of life? What convinces us that we really do have in Jesus, esse ipsum? Milbank answers by
saying that the "supplementary speculative attractiveness in the notions of a God once incarnate,
and a sinless God alone able perfectly to suffer the effects of sin in one incarnate divine
person."3' What justifies the Christian depiction of God in Jesus? Our attraction to the form of
life the doctrine enables justifies calling Jesus divine. This answer enshrines human aesthetic
sensibilities as judge over God.
On Being a Theologian of the Cross
The previous survey of answers to the Christological question leaves us wanting. The
question "Why do Christians say that God acts in Jesus?" has been guiding this chapter, and the
31 Ibid.,

162.

169

three previous answers all appealed to the value of the confession in one way or another. Such an
appeal grounds the sacred in the profane, maintains our nihilism, and makes Jesus' divinity out
to be nothing more than our highest value. The last chapter argued that we can only avoid
making God out to be another human value by letting God be God. We will only stop exalting
ourselves above God when we embrace him where he specifically makes himself available.
Following Luther's terminology, we called a theologian who lets God speak for himself a
theologian of the cross. All others received the title of a theologian of glory. A theologian of
glory refuses to let God be God. This theologian gives explanations for God that God himself
does not give. But even stronger, the theologian of glory tries to make God seem persuasive to
human standards of judgment by seeing in God's actions a universal rule or principle at work. If
the previous chapter's contention about the two kinds of theologians is correct, we must now
apply the distinctions to Jesus. When we answer the guiding question of this chapter as
theologians of the cross, we will recognize that our theology cannot justify Jesus, no matter how
persuasive it is. Only God can finally justify Jesus, which he does by raising Jesus from the dead,
and proclaiming that event to the world through the apostolic word. Therefore, in order to avoid
nihilism, we need to be theologians of the cross by letting God have the final say about Jesus.
But what does it mean to be a theologian of the cross when we speak about Jesus? In his
book Theology Is for Proclamation, Gerhard Forde helps us see how the two types of theologians
operate in regards to the matter of Jesus' divinity. Forde finds that when we make a confession
about Jesus' identity, we are confronted by two levels of discontinuity. And the difference
between a theologian of the cross and one of glory comes down to the way each handles the
discontinuity.
The first level of discontinuity is formal and has to do with the elements involved in
making a confession. When making a confession about Jesus' identity, the simple fact of the
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matter is that we must give reasons. Even if we had the advantage of Jesus standing before us,
glowing with divinity as on the mount of transfiguration, we would still have to point to him with
some intent of explaining why this event signals his divine nature. "We are called upon to make
explicit what was implicit in him."32After all, even within the gospel narratives there often are
two different ways of accounting for the same Jesus. For example, some confessed that "It is
only by Beelzebul, the ruler of demons, that this fellow casts out the demons" (Matthew 12:24).
So we cannot escape the fact that when we say something about Jesus, there is a necessary
discontinuity between Jesus himself and our confession about him. We must answer Jesus'
question, "But who do you say that I am" (Matthew 16:15).
So when we make the confession that Jesus is the Son of God, we must deal with three
related elements. The first element is Jesus himself, the second element is the Christological title,
and the third element is the hearer of the title. The three exist in dynamic relationship with one
another, but I will begin with Jesus. To identify Jesus as the Son of God we must say something
about the man. For instance, we might talk about the miracles he performed or the way he taught
with authority in order to describe him as the Son of God. In any case, our descriptions of Jesus
help us give explicit content to the title we assign him. We cannot meaningfully say that Jesus is
the Son of God without filling in the title in a specific way. Of course, the title we assign Jesus
can often have influence over the way we describe him. For instance, if we begin with the
presupposition that God is omnipotent, then we'll tell the story of Jesus in a way that highlights
his omnipotence, maybe citing his ability to walk on water. In so doing, we create continuity
between the title and Jesus. But we also create continuity with the hearer. If the hearer holds
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certain presuppositions about God, then those presuppositions will either be reinforced or
confronted by the story we tell.
One can already anticipate how a theologian of the cross will handle the formal
discontinuity involved in calling Jesus the Son of God. The theologian of the cross will let the
story about Jesus shape the title Son of God. In so doing, the hearer's assumptions about God are
challenged and formed by Jesus rather than by anything else. Forde puts it this way: "If the title
is to be transformed by the story, so are we. To answer Jesus' question [about his identity] is to
be drawn into his story. '33 Rather than let the story about Jesus transform the title, the theologian
of glory will let the hearer's presupposition about God transform Jesus. When that happens, the
hearer maintains continuity with himself. He is not confronted or changed by Jesus. But Jesus is
transformed to fit into the assumptions of the hearer; and when this happens, as I have been
arguing, nihilism ensues. Milbank's appeal to the attractiveness of the Christian confession that
Jesus is esse ipsum presupposes this formal level of continuity with the hearer. Presented with
the option of violence or non-violence, his assumption is that we will be drawn to the
attractiveness of non-violence. Forde diagnosis the theologian of glory this way: "We know a
God when we see one! Like is known by like. But that only puts us back to square one. We try to
find a God to our liking in Jesus."34 Proposing the choice between attractive and unattractive
depictions of God in Jesus maintains the continuity of the hearer over-against Jesus.
All of this, though, is still a formal consideration, having nothing yet to do with the
particularities of Jesus. A second level of discontinuity exists within Jesus' own life, particularly
in his death and resurrection. Jesus' death by crucifixion put a radical end to all that Jesus had
claimed and done for himself prior to that point. As crucifixion, his death was judgment on his
33 Ibid.,
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identity. Jesus of Nazareth, baptized by John in the Jordan, claimed to be the one anointed by the
God of Israel to bring God's eschatological rule to earth. With a power and authority that he
claimed to have from the Spirit of God, Jesus proclaimed that the reign of God had come with
his own presence. He forgave sins with the authority of God, and with the power of God he
drove out demons, healed the lame, and raised the dead. However, in spite of his works, the
religious leaders of the Jewish people (those set aside to be the authoritative teachers of Israel)
called into question the legitimacy of his authority and the character of his works. Many of
Jesus' actions contradicted their interpretation of the law that God had given them through
Moses and which set them apart as his people. For instance, Jesus was a man known to be a
friend of sinners and tax collectors—he socialized with people who were legitimate outcasts
within the community of Israel in such a way that earned him the reputation of being a drunkard
and a glutton. Also, Jesus criticized the temple piety of the leaders, and broke the Sabbath
seemingly at will, all the while claiming to do so with the right of God. The conflict over
authority between Jesus and the religious leaders came to a head when they arrested Jesus and
put him on trial for falsely claiming to be the Christ of Israel and the Son of God. When Jesus
would not back down from his claims, they crucified him with the help of the Roman
government. Therefore, the crucifixion seemed to be the final sentence of judgment on Jesus'
identity. For instance, at the crucifixion "the leaders scoffed at him saying, 'He saved others; let
him save himself if he is the Messiah of God, his chosen one" (Luke 23:35). And because it
seemed as if Jesus was defeated by the religious authorities, his disciples scattered and fled from
him, even publically denying him.
Therefore, on account of the particular form of his death, discontinuity is an integral part of
Jesus' own identity. Had Jesus remained in the tomb, for instance, all of his works, teachings and
life would have been disregarded as materially insignificant for indentifying him as the Son of
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God, because the validity of those things was already put to the test on the cross. Therefore it is
significant that "When he was dead and buried, his followers did not get together in a little
liberal clique and comfort themselves with the fact that they still had his teachings. It was over.
Mostly his disciples seemed afraid that they might share his fate!"35 No positive reconstruction
of his life on the part of his disciples could possibly overcome the judgment made by the
crucifixion.
Consequently, the only continuity between Jesus and the divine title Son of God comes
from God's act of resurrecting Jesus from the dead. Though he was judged and rejected as the
one with sole authority to act on behalf of God, God nevertheless vindicated Jesus by raising him
from the dead. The apostolic preaching throughout the book of Acts, for instance, is formed by
these themes of rejection and vindication. Peter's Pentecost proclamation ends with this
statement: "Therefore, let the entire house of Israel know with certainty that God has made him
both Lord and Messiah, this Jesus whom you crucified" (Acts 2:36). Therefore, on account of the
discontinuity of the crucifixion, only God could justify Jesus, which he did by raising him from
the dead.
The two types of theologians will not only handle the discontinuity differently on the
formal level, but also on this more material level. A theologian of glory will find some continuity
in Jesus' life, death, and resurrection that circumvents the need for God's own vindication of
Jesus. Milbank's account of Jesus' passion is a perfect example of the theologian of glory at
work. I made a point of this already by noticing the irony in Milbank's focus on the arbitrariness
of Jesus' death. The way Milbank tells the story, Jesus subverts the arbitrariness of sovereign
power by submitting non-violently to an arbitrary death. Therefore, even though the event itself
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seemed arbitrary, there was an underlying motive that made the event more than arbitrary. Thus,
Milbank claims to be able to see through the cross and makes something significant of it. It was
not finally a completely arbitrary and contingent death, but a purposeful and calculated one, once
Milbank's narration helps us see the event from a transcendent perspective. But in this case, God
is robbed of his right to have the final word about Jesus in the resurrection. Instead the
resurrection gets placed into a larger story about arbitrariness, power and non-violence that is
contrived by the theologian on the basis of a presupposition about God's affinity with nonviolence and non-arbitrary power. God does not get to speak the final word by raising Jesus from
the dead. Instead the theologian narrates the cross in such a way that the unique event of Jesus'
crucifixion can be a means of identifying his divinity apart from the resurrection. But then, the
cross loses its function of creating discontinuity in the life of Jesus and God subsequently loses
the authority to make a final claim about him in the resurrection. Forde puts it this way:
What happened in the doctrine of God is thus repeated in the Christology. Just as the
systematic tries to make God so nice that there is no room for or purpose in the
preaching, so here the search for continuity with the 'real Jesus' reveals an attempt to
recast him in the role of one we would be most likely to accept had we been there and
had our wits about us.36
The theologian of the cross, on the other hand, lets God vindicate Jesus through the
resurrection. This theologian refuses the temptation to transform Jesus into a divine figure we
will recognize, accept, or find useful. Forde casts the matter in the economic terms of our normal
nihilism. "Jesus did not meet anyone's needs. He was of no use to anyone here. He was wasted.
Rather, Jesus was of use only to God, who raised him up."37 Therefore, "The cross itself is the
discontinuity planted in our way" of justifying Jesus on the basis of our prior notions of divinity.
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Instead of reconfiguring Jesus so as to find in him something attractive, a theologian of the cross
lets God's act of resurrecting Jesus have the final word about him.
When God gets the final word about Jesus through the resurrection, God alone gets to be
God in Jesus. This affects both sides of the Jesus question. On the one hand, as theologians of the
cross we do not construe the life of Jesus so as to find in him something we already would accept
as divine. In other words, the teachings and deeds of Jesus are "not important as detachable,
timeless truths, but rather as the words and deeds that got Jesus into trouble and incited the
people of this age to crucify him. God alone vindicates Jesus, not his deeds or his teachings," or
even the exceptional form of his death as Milbank thinks. On the other hand, when we construe
the life of Jesus in this manner, God gets the fmal word about himself. When we understand the
crucifixion as rejection and the resurrection as God's vindication of Jesus, we do not presuppose
some notion of divinity that we then apply to Jesus. Rather God alone has the final say about
himself. For not only is Jesus put to the test in the crucifixion, but so too is God. Will God finally
indentify himself with this man alone as Jesus claims for himself? The answer in the resurrection
is affirmative. "In all of that the very godness of God comes to light. God establishes the right to
be God. This is God's 'righteousness,' God's self-vindication, indeed, the propitiation that God
puts forward through the spilling of Jesus' blood under the law."38
We can summarize all of this by saying that a theologian of the cross will appeal to the
divine authority of Jesus. The significance of Jesus is not primarily his unique way of life, his
perfect death, or anything that we might find important about him. Rather the primary
significance of the man Jesus of Nazareth, (that which justifies him as the Son of God), is that
God has given him all authority in heaven and on earth to judge the living and the dead. This
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authority was put to the test in his crucifixion, and vindicated by God in the resurrection.
Therefore we can propose the first lines of a thesis about what it means to justify Jesus' divinity
in an age of normal nihilism: Christians can only justify their claims about Jesus divinity by
appealing to his divine authority, which God himself has given to him by raising Jesus from the
dead.
The Apostolic Approach
The thesis of this chapter differs from the previous three approaches we have already
encountered. The cultic approach appeals not to Jesus' divine authority, but to the vague
authority of the New Testament text as the inspired and inerrant word of God. While the
Christological approach derives Jesus' divinity from the canonical narratives about Jesus,
Placher's version nevertheless gives an unsatisfactory depiction of why the texts are
authoritative. He concludes that we find these texts authoritative because of their personal value
for us. Milbank's ecclesiological approach went in an entirely different direction, pointing us
away from the texts and toward the church's unique way of life and the attractiveness of the
Christological doctrines that underwrite the ecclesial community's appropriation of the texts. The
thesis of this chapter points Christians neither toward the text alone nor toward the church, but to
God's act of justifying Jesus by raising him from the dead. Up until now, however, my
considerations about Jesus have presupposed that we have access to the event itself. As a
conclusion, I will briefly unpack that presupposition. This too is a large question, about which I
can only sketch an answer. The sketch will follow what Nicholas Wolterstorff calls the church's
self narrative.39 By appealing to the church's self narrative, I want to point out the particular
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reasons Christians have for thinking that the apostolic testimony about Jesus is God's own words
about Jesus.
This chapter has been arguing that only God can justify Jesus and he does so by raising
him from the dead. According to the church's self narrative, the apostles are authoritative
witnesses to God's acts through Jesus, because God uses their eye-witness testimony as earthly
vehicles to speak God's word about Jesus to the world.
Early examples of this narrative are found frequently in Paul's letters, because he often
fmds it necessary to justify his own authority to speak about God. One example can be found in
the opening address of his letter to the church in Rome. Paul begins the letter by summarizing his
apostolic commission to bear witness to God's actions in Jesus. He writes,
Paul, a servant of Christ Jesus, called to be an apostle, set apart for the gospel of God,
which he promised beforehand through his prophets in the holy scriptures, the gospel
concerning his Son, who was descended from David according to the flesh and was
declared to be the Son of God with power according to the resurrection from the
dead, Jesus Christ our Lord, through whom we have received grace and apostleship to
bring about the obedience of faith among all the Gentiles for the sake of his name,
including yourselves who are called to belong to Jesus Christ (Romans 1:1-6).
Notice the direct line of descending authority from God and Jesus to Paul. Paul claims to
be sent as a servant of Jesus to proclaim the gospel of God. That gospel pertains to God's act of
resurrecting Jesus from the dead, by which God declares Jesus to be his Son. Therefore, Paul not
only stands as a servant of Jesus, but also as a servant of God who raised Jesus from the dead.
In another place, Paul spells out in more detail why he thinks he was commissioned by God
to be a witness to the resurrection. In his first letter to the church in Corinth, Paul writes,
Now I would remind you, brothers, of the good news that I proclaimed to you, which
you in turn received, in which also you stand, through which also you are being
saved, of which you hold firmly to the message that I proclaimed to you—unless you
have come to believe in vain. For I handed on to you as of first importance what I in
turn had received: that Christ died for our sins in accordance with the scriptures, and
that he was buried, and that he was raised on the third day in accordance with the
scriptures, and that he appeared to Cephas, then to the twelve. Then he appeared to
more than five hundred brothers at one time, most of whom are still alive, though
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some have died. Then he appeared to James, then to all the apostles. Last of all, as to
one untimely born, he appeared also to me. For I am least of the apostles, unfit to be
called an apostle, because I persecuted the church of God. But by the grace of God I
am what I am, and his grace toward me has not been in vain (1 Corinthians 15:1-10).
Paul considers himself one untimely born on account of the unusual way he came to be a
witness to Jesus' resurrection. Paul evidently did not witness Jesus' life, death and burial as the
other apostles did, nor was he part of the twelve. Instead, he formerly persecuted and opposed
"the church of God." Hence, he handed down to the Corinthians what he had received from
others who did witness the death and burial of Jesus. But Paul nevertheless came to know Jesus
as the living Son of God first hand when Jesus appeared to him as well. Therefore, when Paul
speaks about the resurrection of Jesus, he does so as an eye-witness to Jesus himself. This sets
Paul along side the other apostles who speak about Jesus with the same authority.
The gospel of Luke, for instance, records the apostolic commissioning this way: After
appearing to the disciples and demonstrating to them that he was alive by showing them his
hands and feet, and eating a piece of fish, Jesus sends them on his Father's mission to bear
witness to the things that had taken place concerning him. Jesus says,
Thus it is written, that the Messiah is to suffer and to rise on the third day, and that
repentance and forgiveness of sins is to be proclaimed in his name to all nations,
beginning from Jerusalem. You are witnesses of these things. And see I am sending
upon you what my Father promised; so stay here in the city until you have been
clothed with power on high (Luke 24:46-48).
When Luke introduces his gospel, he cites these witnesses as a source of his own orderly
account. He writes that
Since many have undertaken to set down an orderly account of the events that have
been fulfilled among us, just as they were handed on to us by those who from the
beginning were eyewitnesses and servants of the word, I too decided, after
investigating everything carefully from the very first, to write an orderly account for
you, most excellent Theophilus, so that you may know the truth concerning the things
about which you have been instructed (Luke 1:1-4).
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Also, this same self-narrative extends beyond the apostolic period, and is used by the
second century church to defend the authority of its teachings. Irenaeus, for example, not only
cites the same apostolic narrative, but also uses it in his polemics against the Gnostics. By
referring to "the Gnostics," I mean a diverse set of teachings and teachers in the second century,
who adapted the Christian scriptures to support a cosmology of emanations.' The Gnostics
posed a threat to the Christian faith because they were able to use the Christian scriptures to
describe a higher knowledge than Christians, which included comprehensive claims about God,
the nature of the world, the identity of Jesus, and the character and manner of salvation. In so
doing, Gnostic writers eliminated the possibility for Christians to make a simple appeal to the
authority of the scriptures. Both parties read the same scriptures and came to vastly different
conclusions. And if Christians were to refer to the scriptures in their defense, the Gnostics would
claim a source of knowledge beyond the scriptures to which Christians did not have privileged
access; a secret oral tradition. Irenaeus resolves this dilemma by referring to the authority of the
apostolic eye-witnesses. Jesus gave his teaching to the apostles and commissioned them to
proclaim it to others for life and salvation. So, the apostles proclaimed the same teaching of Jesus
by his authority; and those who received the apostles' teaching were gathered into the Christian
church, in which this common teaching prevailed and formed a common community throughout
the world. Irenaeus puts the matter directly.
For the Lord of all gave to His apostles the power of the gospel, through whom also
we have known the truth, that is, the doctrine of the Son of God; to whom also did the
Lord declare: 'he that heareth you, heareth me; and he that despiseth you, despiseth
me, and him that sent me.' We have learned from none other the plan of our
salvation, than form those through whom the gospel has come down to us, which they

40 Cf. Irenaeus, Against Heresies, in The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus, vol. 1 of The
Ante-Nicene Fathers, eds. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980), 315-58.
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did at one time proclaim in public, and at a later period, by the will of God, handed
down to us in the scriptures, to be the ground and pillar of our faith.41
And in order to confirm that the authoritative apostolic message about Jesus now resides in
the church's rule of faith,' Irenaeus provided a genealogy of those who had passed on the
tradition from the apostles to the present day.43 John Behr succinctly summarizes the argument
by stating that for Irenaeus, "the locus of revelation, and the medium for our relationship with
God, is precisely in the apostolic preaching of him, the Gospel which, as we have seen, stands in
an interpretive engagement with scripture."'
This brief account of the church's claim of apostolic authority does not do justice to the
complexity of historical and theological issues involved. But as a sketch, it presents a basic
outline of the reasons Christians have for thinking that the apostolic word about Jesus, contained
equally in the church's oral tradition and in the written scriptures, is God's own word.' Thus, the
sketch means to support this chapter's thesis that only God can justify Jesus, which he does by
raising him from the dead. After God raised Jesus from the dead, Jesus commissioned the
apostles to bear witness to the things that had taken place that culminated in his resurrection. The
apostles considered it God's own commissioning on account of the succession of authority from
God to Jesus and now to themselves as they had partaken in these events. Therefore this
chapter's thesis is most appropriately called the apostolic approach.
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Ibid., 414.
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Ibid., 330-31.
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Ibid., 416.

44 John Behr, The Way to Nicaea, vol. 1 of Formation of Christian Theology (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's
Seminary Press, 2001), 38-39.
45 I do not have the space here to develop more fully the relationship between scripture and tradition. For a
fuller account concerning Irenaeus, see Behr, The Way to Nicaea, 17-48. For a helpful summary of the way the
Lutheran tradition accounts for Irenaeus, see James R. A. Merrick, "Solo Scriptura and the regula fidei: The
Reformation Scripture Principle and Early Oral Tradition in Martin Chemnitz' Examinationof the Council of Trent,"
Scottish Journal of Theology 63 (2010): 253-71.
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There are, of course, limitations to this approach. The approach does not give Christians
reasons for their faith in the divinity of Jesus that any supposedly rational and good-willed
person must accept. The Age of Cartesian Ego-Subjectivity defined itself by the quest for such
foundations for indubitable knowledge. But the quest turned out to be self-defeating as soon as
we realized that we nevertheless had to define what makes a person rational and good-willed.
Without those reasons, the apostolic approach suggests that we have to take the apostle's word
for it that God raised Jesus from the dead. According to the bare outlines I sketched above,
Christians do not have reasons for their faith in Jesus beyond the apostolic word. But they do
have good reasons for believing that the apostolic word is the Word of God, and this is a great
advantage in an age of normal nihilism. According to this approach, Christian faith and life
depends on a word external to us. By contrast, Milbank's and Placher's approaches aim to
reinforce our own inner convictions about God by maneuvering theologically to make the
confession that Jesus is the Son of God appealing to us. In an age when we are worried that our
own best convictions are grounded in nothing more than our own will to hold them, these
approaches can only be disastrous. For, when we assume that the human will has the ability to
recognize and accept the things of God, "the subject stands over against the gospel as an object, a
theory that is to be accepted on grounds dictated by the subject.746 The cultic approach, for all of
its faults, nevertheless tries to maintain that external word by grounding the confession in an
inerrant scripture. But the kind of reasons the cultic approach gives for its faith in those texts
lacks the theological and historical nuance of the apostolic approach. The latter has a fully
Trinitarian account of the authority of these texts. It suggests that Jesus' life, death and
resurrection, along with the apostolic commissioning is the grounds for taking the scriptural
46 Gerhard 0. Forde, "Radical Lutheranism," in A More Radical Gospel:• Essays on Eschatology, Authority,
Atonement, and Eccuminism, ed. Mark C. Mattes and Steven D. Paulson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 11.
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witnesses concerning him as God's own word about Jesus. This word from God is external to us
in the sense that it does not try to appeal to our presuppositions about God, but instead
pronounces the apostolic message as the word of God himself to the entire world regardless of
our predisposition toward the message. Put another way, it does not make the gospel about Jesus
into a theory that is to be accepted on the grounds dictated by the subject. Instead, it lets God
stand over-against us with his word concerning his Son.
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CHAPTER SIX
HOLY SCRIPTURE AFTER NIHILISM
The (Im)Possibility of Holy Scripture in an Age of Normal Nihilism
Is Holy Scripture possible in an age when we worry that our most basic convictions are
grounded in nothing more than our own will to hold them? Certainly Scripture is possible. There
is a renewed recognition that the texts contained within the Bible were selected and assembled
by the church, and that these texts are an essential and authoritative part of this particular
community's common life (i.e. they are Scripture). Apart from this community, as Robert Jenson
suggests, "the one book immediately disintegrates into its component parts, splitting first into
Hebrew Scripture and New Testament and then into traditions, redactions, and so forth—to
which fragments the heathen may be entirely welcome."' Jenson captures the sentiment of many
Christian theologians today who have a post-critical stance on reading the Scriptures. Since the
church is responsible for assembling these diverse texts into a single volume for the purposes of
its common life, the Scriptures should be read according to the rules of that community But
Jenson's observation only heightens the sense of the problem. Rather than standing over-against
the church as the Word of God that speaks and forms a community from without, the biblical
texts seem contaminated by the church's all too human use of them.
This is a typical problem in an age of normal nihilism. In our age, no one authority stands
out above the rest as given, so it seems that we have no grounds for determining which authority

Robert W. Jenson, "Hermeneutics in the Life of the Church," in Reclaiming the Bible for the Church, ed. Carl
E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 90.
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is right beyond our own will to adhere to it. When it comes to the Scriptures, this problem
manifests itself in the area of reading. For a long time, the church's presuppositions about how to
read these texts were taken for granted. Most of western culture assumed that Christian doctrine
"provides the clarifying principles that guide exegetical judgment toward a coherent overall
reading of scripture as a unified witness.'" But in our time and place, the church no longer has
such a monopoly on reading its own Scriptures. Instead, the church appears to be only one
among a number of other communities with their own presuppositions about how to read the
text. So western Christians are faced with a new and daunting question: Why have a theological
reading of these scriptures as opposed to a sociological reading, or an ecological reading, or even
a historical-critical reading? What right do Christians have to claim that when they read the Bible
according to the practices and traditions of the church, (for instance, by distinguishing between
Old and New Testaments; or by reading the stories about Jesus as stories about God's action to
bring about the consummation of all things), they are doing anything more correct than people
who read the Bible as literature, or in a religious studies curriculum, or in private devotion as
self-help? To say, as Jenson does, that these texts belong to the community that assembled them
into a canonical whole only locates the problem; it does not solve it.
Despite his often controversial status, then, it is hard to disagree with Stanley Fish's
argument that "meanings only become perspicuous against a background of interpretative
assumptions in the absence of which reading and understanding would be impossible.153 After all,
as Jenson's quote makes clear, 'the Bible' will be read quite differently in a religious studies
curriculum than on Sunday mornings in church. If every act of reading is determined by our
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assumptions, what saves us from the impression that no sacred text can finally achieve
precedence over its users? What saves us from the impression that the Word does not shape a
people, but the community shapes the word? What saves us from the impression that when the
church reads the Bible, we do not get the Word of God, but the words and opinions of human
beings?'
We cannot answer this question by denying the role of the human reader. After
Christendom, we cannot get around the simple fact that the church already reads the Scriptures
based on interpretive assumptions by assembling these diverse writings into a single book.
Rather than trying to deny the activity of human appropriation, Christians must have a
theologically justifiable account of the church's interpretative assumptions. By a theologically
justifiable account, I mean that Christians must be able to describe their unique way of reading
the Scriptures as acts determined and directed by the triune God. John Webster puts it this way:
[T]he explications of [the act of reading] requires us to invoke language about the
presence and activity of God, and more particularly about the Holy Spirit. Such
language is, moreover, to be treated not as a distant and essentially non-functional
backdrop to much more important human undertakings. It has real work to do: the
invocation of language about God in the depiction of the human act of reading
Scripture is not ornamental but of the essence. However, in this context as in any
other, talk of God's action does not compete with, suspend or obliterate talk of
creaturely activity. Rather, it specifies or determines the character of creaturely
activity by indicating that creaturely acts take place in the overarching economy of
salvation, and that as acts of creatures they are the acts of those who are being made
holy, that is, transfigured by the Holy Spirit into conformity with the dying and rising
of the Son of God.'

4 My use of the term church cannot help but be vague in this opening introduction. I would like to say that the
church is the community of believers formed by and around the Word and Sacraments. But this definition
presupposes that the Scriptures speak the Word of God and gather a people. The problem that I am identifying asks
whether the Scriptures are merely gathered by a community, or whether God uses the Scriptures to gather the
community. If they are merely gathered by the community, then the church cannot be indentified as the body of
believers. Then the identity of the church transforms into a matter of mere political affiliation. In other words, if God
does not speak through the Scriptures, the Valentinians, for example, can only be excluded from the church on
political grounds.
5
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The church has to be able to give reasons why it thinks that its own use of Scripture is not
just another community's appropriation of a text, but the triune God's use of the text. As has
been the case throughout this dissertation, these reasons will not be persuasive to any rational
person, nor will they be beyond the pale of doubt. But, they will need to be coherent and
defensible reasons. And, they will have to be reasons that reflect the acts of God as he discloses
himself rather than reasons that appeal to the attractiveness of human conjectures about God. In
order to give such an account of the church's use, the rest of this chapter will answer two
questions. First, what reasons do Christians have for believing that God speaks through the
scriptures? Second, how does the church use the scriptures so as to be faithful to the way in
which God speaks through them? Phrased another way, how does the church read the scriptures
in a way consistent with its conviction that they are divine speech?
Before answering these questions, let me sketch the direction my argument will take in the
next two sections. I will answer the first question by arguing that God uses the apostolic witness
to proclaim the Lordship of Jesus for the purposes of bringing about the obedience of faith. The
New Testament Scriptures are authorized versions of the apostolic witness (which is properly
expressed as the fulfillment of the Old Testament) through which God speaks to gather a people
for himself. My answer to the second question will follow from the first. Since God uses the
Scriptures for this purpose, we ought to read the Scriptures as direct address from God. If we do
not, we will end up using the Scriptures as a resource for making inferences about God. When
the Scriptures are used as a resource for making an inference about God, they are removed from
their context within the triune economy of salvation. The Scriptures no longer operate as divine
speech, grounded in God's act through Jesus of Nazareth and the Spirit. Rather their coherence
and unity becomes grounded in the human intellect's ability to make judgments about God.
The Scriptures in God's Economy of Salvation
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If the church wants to overcome the impression that its use of scripture is nothing more
than another human rhetoric of power, it will have to give reasons why its acts of reading are not
merely human, but guided by the Holy Spirit. There are two stages of reflection necessary to
accomplish that task. The first stage has to do with the scriptures themselves. Christians must be
able to give a reason for why they think the texts gathered into the Bible are not just human
words but also the Word of God. The second stage has to do with finding guidelines that are
consistent with the Christian conviction that God uses these texts in particular to speak. This
section will answer the first concern by placing the scriptures within God's economy of
salvation.
Among others, John Webster notices that the way Christians have recently defended the
scriptures as the Word of God have been practically unworkable. As the "cultural metaphysic in
which classical Christianity had developed and helped form," collapsed, Christian theology
found itself in a state of disarray concerning its basic principles. Christian theology now had to
argue for the possibility of revelation when for a long period of time the Bible had been the
unquestioned principle source of revelation. To make a long story short, Christianity, "found
itself largely incapable of following and deploying the inner logic of Christian conviction in its
apologetic and polemical undertakings." And this further reflected that "Christian theology itself
had in important respects already lost touch with an orderly understanding of God's selfcommunication, and in its place offered rather stripped-down or misshapen versions of the
topic."6 Another way of putting all of this is to say that in both its defense of the scriptures and
its own systematic descriptions of them, contemporary Christian theology had forgotten the
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church's self-understanding of the way God uses their own writings.' In order to reverse this
trend, I will provide a brief account of the church's own self-understanding about its scriptures
and the way God uses them for his purposes; I will situate the Scriptures in God's economy of
salvation.
To claim that one brief account is the church's self-understanding certainly
oversimplifies the matter. As in the previous chapter, there are a complex series of issues and
layers of scholarship that accompany this topic. I can only hope to give a sketch of the church's
account of its own writings that proves to be generally faithful to the Christian tradition and
practically useful for the more constructive purposes of this chapter. In order to do that, I will
begin by offering what I consider to be a catholic description of the basic economy of salvation:
the rule of truth that Irenaeus recounts in Against Heresies. Irenaeus wrote Against Heresies as a
refutation of the followers of Valentinus, who claimed to possess a different interpretive key to
understand the scriptures. They contended that the Scriptures were about the emanation of Aeons
and the liberation of the spiritual man from the base and corrupt existence of the lower Aeons.'
Irenaeus refuted that claim by arguing that the church possessed this rule of truth, which was
handed down from the apostles themselves. The following passage from Irenaeus reflects a
catholic Christian key for reading the Scriptures. It depicts the coherence of Scripture as the
work of the Creator to bring all created things created into consummation through his Son, Jesus
Christ. While Irenaeus intended to use this rule as a key, I will use it as an uncontroversial
account of the God's actions, which has been assumed by "the Church,"—those who have been
gathered by and around this message—from the beginning. For, as Irenaeus writes, "the Church,
In his analysis of Barth, Peter H. Nafzger, "'These are Written': Toward a Cruciform Theology of Scripture"
(PhD. diss., Concordia Seminary, 2009), 52-98, shows how far this misunderstanding extends into contemporary
theology. My account of the place of the Scriptures in the economy is in part indebted to Nafzger.
8 Irenaeus,
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though dispersed throughout the whole world, even to the ends of the earth, has received from
the apostles and their disciples this faith..."9 He goes on to describe the faith this way:
[The Church] believes in one God, the Father Almighty, Maker of Heaven, and earth,
and the sea, and all things that are in them; and in one Christ Jesus, the Son of God,
who became incarnate for our salvation; and in the Holy Spirit, who proclaimed
through the prophets the dispensations of God, and the advents, and the birth from a
virgin, and the passion, and the resurrection from the dead, and the ascension into
heaven in the flesh of the beloved Christ Jesus, our Lord, and his [future]
manifestation from heaven in the glory of the Father "to gather all things in one," and
to raise up anew all flesh of the whole human race, in order that to Christ Jesus, our
Lord, and God and Savior, and King, according to the will of the invisible Father,
"every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the
earth, and that every tongue should confess" to Him, and that He should execute just
judgment toward all; that He may send "spiritual wickedness," and the angels who
transgressed and became apostates, together with the ungodly, and unrighteous, and
wicked, and profane among men, into everlasting fire; but may, in the exercise of His
grace, confer immortality on the righteous, and holy, and those who have kept His
commandments, and have persevered in His love, some from the beginning [of their
Christian course], and others from [the date of] their repentance, and may surround
them with everlasting glory.'°
The action of God in Irenaeus' rule focuses on the consummation of all things when Jesus
will return to judge the living and the dead. The life of Jesus does not get significant attention,
nor does the promises to Abraham, God's covenant with Israel, the Davidic promises, Israel's
betrayal of God and the tension between Israel's unfaithfulness and God's election, which
precedes Jesus' life, death, and resurrection. When judged as an account of the economy, which
Irenaeus does not primarily intend it to be, it lacks many elements. But I have chosen to start
here because it is a catholic expression of the church's faith, and it does include some of the most
basic features. To summarize: God works through Jesus in order to accomplish God's will of
setting creation right by assigning Jesus Christ, his Son, all authority to judge the living and the
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dead—to separate the righteous and those who have obey God's commandments from the
unrighteous and ungodly.
But how, exactly, do the Scriptures fit into this economy? In order to answer that question,
it will be helpful to begin to fill out this picture by turning to the gospel of Luke. In the Gospel of
Luke, and continuing into Acts, we fmd that the work of God to set all things right through the
Lordship of Jesus starts with Jesus, but then extends to the apostles, who are commissioned by
Jesus to speak (as well as baptize, celebrate the Lord's Supper, and obey Jesus' commands) in
his stead and by his command until he returns to judge. Furthermore, in order to complete this
task, Jesus gives them the Holy Spirit.
According to Luke's gospel, Jesus of Nazareth was anointed by the Spirit of God when he
was baptized by John in the Jordan River (Luke 3:21-22). In the power of the Spirit, Jesus
claimed to bring about the eschatological time of the Lord's favor (Luke 4:14-21). He taught
with authority about how to live within the will and reign of God, he healed the sick, he cast out
demons, he forgave sins, and he raised the dead. One way of summarizing Jesus' actions in the
Spirit is to say that he acted with the authority and power of the almighty God.
But this authority and power created conflict between Jesus and many of the leaders of
Israel. Jesus' authority and the conflict that it raised are both on display in Luke 5:17-26. In this
passage, Jesus is teaching and healing in the presence of the Pharisees and the teachers of the
law, when some men bring a paralytic to him by lowering him through the roof. When Jesus sees
the faith of these men, he forgives the paralytic his sins. But the scribes and the Pharisees then
begin to question Jesus' authority to forgive sins, asking "Who is this who is speaking
blasphemies? Who can forgive sins but God alone?" (Luke 5:21). So, in order to demonstrate the
origin of his authority Jesus addresses them and says, "'Which is easier, to say "Your sins are
forgiven you," or to say, "Stand up and walk?" But so that you may know that the Son of Man
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has authority on earth to forgive sins'—he said to the one who was paralyzed—"I say to you,
stand up and take your bed and go to your home' (Luke 5:24). The man did just as Jesus said,
demonstrating to all present his authority and power. But this was not the last word in the
conflict. The leaders accused Jesus of working by the power of Satan rather than God (Luke
11:14-23). And when they arrested Jesus and put him on trial from his claims to authority, he did
not back down (Luke 22:66-71). So they crucified him with the help of the Roman authorities as
a blasphemer. His crucifixion, then, served as what appeared to be the final test of his claims to
divine authority. For "the leaders scoffed at him, saying,

saved others; let him save himself

if he is the Messiah of God, his chosen one" (Luke 23:35)!
But God vindicated Jesus' authority by raising him from the dead. Jesus then appeared to
his disciples and demonstrated that the one who was standing before them alive was the one who
was crucified (Luke 24:36-43). Then Jesus commissioned his disciples to take part in the same
mission for which God had sent him, which had been foretold in the Old Testament Scriptures,
and promised them the power of the Spirit. Luke reports the commissioning when he writes the
following:
Then [Jesus] opened their mind to understand the scriptures, and he said to them,
`Thus it is written, that the Messiah is to suffer and to rise from the dead on the third
day, and that repentance and forgiveness of sins is to be proclaimed in his name to all
nations, beginning from Jerusalem. You are witnesses of these things. And see, I am
sending upon you what my Father promised; so stay here in the city until you receive
power from on high.' (Luke 24:45-48).
Therefore, according to this still basic account, the apostles participate in God's mission
through Jesus by their witness, for which they receive the Holy Spirit. The apostolic mission and
the important role of the apostolic word are on display throughout the book of Acts, but
especially in the story of Pentecost. Having received the Spirit from Jesus, Peter stands up and
addresses the crowd.
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You that are Israelites, listen to what I have to say: Jesus of Nazareth, a man attested
to you by God with deeds of power, wonders, and signs that God did through him
among you, as you yourselves know—this man, handed over to you according to the
defmite plan and foreknowledge of God, you crucified and killed by the hands of
those outside the law. But God raised him, having freed him from death, because it
was impossible for him to be held in its power...This Jesus, God raised up, and of
that all of us are witnesses. Being therefore exalted at the right hand of God, and
having received from the Father the promise of the Holy Spirit, he has poured out this
that you now see and hear...Therefore, let the entire house of Israel know with
certainty that God has made him both Lord and Messiah, this Jesus whom you
crucified (Acts 2:22-36).
When those present hear Peter's witness, they are cut to the heart and ask Peter what they
can do. He calls them to repent and to be baptized in the name of Jesus for their forgiveness and
to receive the Holy Spirit themselves. Peter explains: "For the promise is for you, for your
children, and for all who are far away, everyone whom the Lord our God calls to him" (Acts
2:39). Therefore, God uses the apostle's testimony about Jesus, in the power of the Spirit, to
bring about faith in the God and Father of Jesus.
In describing God's economy of salvation so far, we have a descending line of authority
from God, to Jesus, and extending to the apostles, who are commissioned to bear witness to the
things that happened concerning Jesus, so that those who hear it might repent of their unbelief
and sin and be incorporated into the body of those who trust and believe in the one true God.
Furthermore, the Holy Spirit who descended from God and remained on Jesus also plays a part
in the apostolic mission. Jesus gives the apostles the Spirit in order that they might fulfill their
role as apostolic witnesses. However, we have not yet spoken about the Scriptures' place within
this economy. And to take a step in that direction, it will be helpful to turn to the writings of one
who considered himself an apostle—Paul.
In his first letter to the Thessalonians, Paul makes a bold claim about his own words. He
writes, "We constantly give thanks to God for this, that when you received the word of God that
you heard from us, you accepted it not as a human word but as what it really is, God's word,
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which is also at work in you believers" (1 Thessalonians 2:13). Paul considers his own words not
just human words but God's own. The reason Paul can be so bold as to make this claim about his
own speech is that he has been commissioned as an apostle by God to speak on behalf of God
and proclaim the Lordship of Jesus so that all who hear the message might believe it, and live by
faith in the One who sent Jesus. As we saw in the last chapter, a key passage to understand
Paul's description of the role and purpose of his apostleship can be found in the opening address
of his letter to the church in Rome. He writes,
Paul, a servant of Christ Jesus, called to be an apostle, set apart for the gospel of God,
which he promised beforehand through his prophets in the holy scriptures, the gospel
concerning his Son, who was descended from David according to the flesh and was
declared to be the Son of God with power according to the resurrection from the
dead, Jesus Christ our Lord, through whom we have received grace and apostleship to
bring about the obedience of faith among all the Gentiles for the sake of his name,
including yourselves who are called to belong to Jesus Christ. To all God's beloved
in Rome, who are called to be saints: grace to you and peace from God our Father and
the Lord Jesus Christ (Romans 1:1-7).
Paul understands himself as one designated by God to speak the gospel about his Son in
order to bring about the obedience of faith to the Gentiles. How does God use Paul's
proclamation of the gospel to bring about the obedience of faith? Paul describes the logic of
apostolic commissioning later in his letter when he writes that,
if you confess with your lips that Jesus is Lord and believe in your heart that God
raised him from the dead, you will be saved. For one believes with the heart and so is
justified, and one confesses with the mouth and so is saved. The scripture says, "No
one who believes in him will be put to shame." For there is no distinction between
Jew and Greek; the same Lord is Lord of all and is generous to all who call on him.
For, "Everyone who calls on the name of the Lord shall be saved." But how are they
to call on one they have not believed? And how are they to believe in one of whom
they have never heard? And how are they to hear without someone to proclaim him?
And how are they to proclaim him unless they are sent?...So faith comes from what is
heard, and what is heard comes through the word of Christ (Romans 10:9-17).
As an apostle of God through Jesus, Paul was sent to speak on God's behalf about God's
Son, bearing witness to the things that God had done through Jesus so that all who hear his
words might trust in God and be saved. This proclamation about Jesus stands as the center piece
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of his mission to bring about the obedience of faith to the Gentiles. For he says about this gospel
message, that "it is the power of God for salvation to everyone who has faith, to the Jew first and
also to the Greek. For in it the righteousness of God is revealed through faith and for faith; as it
is written, 'The one who is righteous will live by faith' (Rom. 1:16-17). Paul also finds that his
responsibility as an apostle to bring about the obedience of faith requires more than speaking the
message about Jesus. It also requires exhortation to live out that faith in obedience to the
commands and will of God and in conformity with the new life that Jesus initiates. Just as
lrenaeus' rule suggests, Christians will be judged on whether or not they have obeyed the
commands and will of God. So Paul frequently exhorts believers to live according to the faith
throughout his letters.
In both cases, whether through exhortation to holy living or through proclamation about
God's action in Jesus, Paul places his own writings within God's economy of salvation through
Jesus to bring about the consummation of all things. That Paul considers his own written word to
have a place within God's work can be noticed in his opening greeting, where he addresses the
church in Rome on behalf of God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ. And again, in his second
letter to the church in Corinth, we see Paul using his written letter to exhort the Corinthians on
God's behalf.
All this is from God, who reconciled us to himself through Christ and has given us
the ministry of reconciliation; that is, in Christ God was reconciling the world to
himself, not counting their trespasses against them, and entrusting the message of
reconciliation to us. So we are ambassadors for Christ, since God is making his
appeal through us; we entreat you on behalf of Christ, be reconciled to God (2
Corinthians 5:18-20).
Finally, then, we are in a position to more fully account for the role of the Scriptures in
God's economy of salvation. Just as Paul considers his own writings to be part of the apostolic
commissioning to bring about the obedience of faith, so also are the other written scriptures in
the New Testament. The New Testament Scriptures are the written form of the apostolic
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message. They are no different than the apostolic message, but derive their divine authority and
purpose from the mission of the apostles. (The same can be said of the Old Testament Scriptures
since the apostolic preaching about Jesus is properly expressed as a fulfillment of the Old
Testament.)
In his argument with the followers of Valentinus, Irenaeus reiterates this understanding of
the authority of the written scriptures, and even though we have covered this material in the
previous chapter, it will be helpful to recall it here in order to demonstrate the catholicity of this
understanding. Later in his argument, Irenaeus found it necessary to defend the authority of the
Scriptures against the claim that the followers of Valentinus had a secret faith that was not
written down, but nevertheless came from the apostles themselves. Irenaeus responds to their
claims by drawing a direct line of descent from God to Jesus to the apostles and then to the
written Scriptures. He writes,
For the Lord of all gave to His apostles the power of the Gospel, through whom also
we have known the truth, that is, the doctrine of the Son of God; to whom also did the
Lord declare: "He that heareth you, heareth Me; and he that despiseth you, despiseth
Me, and him that sent Me." We have learned from none others the plan of our
salvation, than from those through whom the Gospel has come down to us, which
they did at one time proclaim in public, and, at a later period, by the will of God,
handed down to us in the Scriptures, to be the ground and pillar of our faith."
In summary, then, Christians believe that the Scriptures are the Word of God because
they do God's work to bring about the obedience of faith through the proclamation of the
Lordship of Jesus. According to this account, God sent Jesus in the Spirit to act in God's
stead and with God's authority, Jesus initiated the reign of God by using his divine power
and authority to teach the will of God, heal the sick, raise the dead, and forgive sins. Jesus
was crucified for this as a blasphemer, but was vindicated when God raised him from the
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dead. Jesus then commissioned his disciples by his own authority and gave them the Spirit
to continue his mission by witnessing to the things that God had done through him, and to
teach those who hear the message to obey everything that Jesus commanded. God uses their
word to bring about and sustain faith in God so that all who believe in Jesus and his Father
might be saved from the wrath of God against all ungodliness to be revealed in the fmal
judgment. The scriptures, then, are the written form of the apostolic Word of God. And
Christians consider their Scriptures to be God's word because he has ordained them for the
purposes of speaking according to this apostolic mission.
Reading Scripture in God's Economy of Salvation
This chapter has been aiming to address this problem: Can Christians distinguish between
their own use of Scripture and God's use? Or is all reading merely a human rhetoric of power?
Again, I do not want to propose a way of reading the Scriptures that is free from interpretive
assumptions. Christians in the modem west cannot ignore the fact that they read the Scriptures
based on their assumptions. So in this section, I want to discuss how Christians should go about
using the Scriptures in order that they can have defensible reasons for thinking that their use of
Scripture is God's use.
The last section took a necessary detour to describe how words written by human beings
can be considered the word of God. Having accomplished that task, we must now orient the
church's reading of Scripture within God's economy of salvation in such a way that is consistent
with our conviction that God speaks through the Scriptures. In the previous section I argued that
God uses the Scriptures to declare the Lordship of his Son so that those who hear it might believe
the message and live by faith in the God. But how do Christians read the Scriptures in a way
consistent with God's purposes of creating faith and directing believers to live according to that
faith in obedience to the will of God?
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This section will answer that question by arguing that Christians ought to read the
Scriptures as direct address from God. As direct address, God speaks in two different ways
through the Scriptures. In order to describe the two different ways that God speaks, I will use the
distinction between law and gospel. The distinction between law and gospel has a complicated
history that extends back before the time of Luther (who made it popular in his own way), and
forward within the Lutheran tradition:2 But I have a simple intention for the distinction. By
distinguishing between law and gospel, we can recognize the two different ways that God speaks
through the Scriptures as God gathers a people for himself through Jesus and in the Spirit. On the
one hand, God speaks about his Son through the apostolic witness in order to elicit faith. This
message takes the form of a promise, or a word of gospel. On the other hand, God speaks words
of law, by which God makes demands of us so that we will live in accordance with God's will.
Both of these kinds of words exist in the Scriptures, and God uses both in order to bring about
the obedience of faith. Therefore each word has its proper place and function within the
economy, and they should not be confused with one another.
Before moving on, let me take a moment to be as clear as possible about my use of the
law/gospel distinction in this section. The distinction between law and gospel, as I will be using
it, is not an instruction to read each individual passage as if it had immediate existential
significance, and that its significance could be one of two different categories: either it kills us
(which is a function of the law) or it makes us alive in faith (which is a function of the gospel).
Lutheranism has used the law/gospel distinction in this way; not just to read the Scriptures, but
also for the purposes of pastoral care. But I will not focus on this existential aspect of the

12 Cf. Robert Kolb, Martin Luther: Confessor of the Fatih (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 50-55.
Also, Timothy J. Wengert, Law and Gospel: Philip Melanchthon's Debate with John Agricola of Eisleben over
Poenitentia (Grand Rapids and Carlisle: Baker and Paternoster, 1997).
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law/gospel distinction. So when I use the terms law and gospel I am not referring to passages that
have a particular effect on us.
Instead, I will be using the law/gospel distinction to refer to the form of God's address
through Scripture. That form can be either a demand (law) or a promise (gospel). While God
finally determines what effect the Scriptures have on us, we still need to have instructions on
how to use the Scriptures in a way that is consistent with God's purposes of addressing us. In
other words, we cannot merely let the text speak for itself. This chapter has been arguing that in
an age of normal nihilism, there is no such thing as letting the text speak for itself. We cannot
avoid the fact that we are users of the text. So, I will be arguing that in order to read the
Scriptures in such a way that God uses them for his purposes, we must situate the Scriptures
within a pre-understanding of what God wants to say through them.
God wants to speak to us about Jesus, which he does through the apostolic witness, in order
that we might hear the message about Jesus and live by faith in God. Therefore, in order to allow
the apostolic witness about Jesus to function in this manner, we need to read the broad story
about Jesus' Lordship as gospel. But "gospel" in this sense does not mean an existential word
that makes us feel accepted by God. It might or it might not make us feel accepted. Rather, as I
will be using it, "gospel" means a speech act by which God makes a promise to us. This latter
notion of gospel does not depend on the way someone might receive the text; it depends on the
way we read the text so that God speaks to us through it just as he has ordained and
commissioned it. Therefore, to say, "read this as gospel," is to give concrete instruction on how
to read the story about Jesus within the economy of salvation. Likewise, in order to bring about
the obedience of faith, God also sent the apostles out to call us to action and to live faithful lives.
Therefore, God uses portions of Scripture to make demands of us. This is what I refer to as "law"
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as opposed to "gospel." "Law" in this case, does not refer to the way certain passages make us
feel convicted. It simply refers to the way that God uses the Scripture to make demands of us.
Not every minute, individual passage will be either an expression of demand or promise.
Since God uses the whole story about Jesus to bring about faith, the story about Jesus taken
together as a whole should be read as gospel.' But in light of the promise made through the
whole story, we should also expect to find individual passages in Scripture that express this
promise. But not every passage has to express this promise. For instance, many passages should
be understood as mere descriptions, such as when Jesus says, "All things have been handed over
to me by my Father; and no one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father
except the Son and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal him" (Matthew 11:27). But those
descriptions will support passages that do make demands or promises, like when Jesus says,
"Come to me, all you that are weary and are carrying heavy burdens, and I will give you rest.
Take my yoke upon you, and learn from me; for I am gentle and humble in heart, and you will
find rest for your souls. For my yoke is easy and my burden is light" (Matthew 11:28).
Also, as is evident from this passage in Matthew, some statements can be both demands
and promises; or as Luther says, some passages can have both a legal and evangelical use." For
instance, this passage makes a demand in the sense that Jesus wants those who are weary and
heavy burdened to obey and follow him. And it makes a promise in the sense that it offers mercy
and blessing to those who come to Jesus. Both uses are possible, and God uses this passage to
make both demands and promises. However, my use of the law/gospel distinction will not focus
13 Cf. Martin Luther, A Brief Instruction on What to Look for and Expect in the Gospels, in vol. 35 of Luther's
Works, ed. and trans. E. Theodore Bachmann (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1960). 116-123, helpfully depicts this by
suggesting that there is one gospel which is described many apostles; that the gospel is simply a story about Christ,
and that before we read this story about Christ as an example to follow, we should first read it as a gift from God to
us.
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on whether the demand of this passage kills or gives life. That aspect depends on the disposition
of the hearer toward the passage, about which I am not concerned in this chapter.
In any case, the important aspect of the law/gospel distinction is this: When we read the
entire story of Jesus' Lordship in light of God's purposes to bring about the obedience of faith,
we will realize that God intends to use the Scriptures to make promises to us concerning Jesus
and demands on us to live according to God's will. For God has ordained Jesus Lord over all
things. And there are two consequences of God's action. First, God wants us to hear the message
of Jesus' Lordship as a promise of favor and mercy to us so that we will trust in him. But God
also wants us to obey God's will and to listen to Jesus' commands. Therefore, God speaks
through the apostolic Scriptures in order to accomplish both of these ends. I will be arguing that
by recognizing that God makes demands and promises in the Scriptures, Christians will be
properly guided in reading them for these divine purposes.
Moreover, I will argue in this section that if Christians do not recognize the fact that in
Scripture God makes both demands and promises, they will approach the Scriptures as a source
book for making inferences about God. And when the Scriptures are used in this way, they lose
their context within the Triune economy—they no longer operate as divine speech stemming
from God's act through Jesus and in the Spirit. Instead they operate in a different context and
economy—the work of the human intellect to make a conjecture about God. When the Scriptures
are transferred from the economy of the Triune God to the economy of the human intellect, the
Scriptures' coherence and unity becomes grounded in the human ability to make judgments
about God rather than in God's own acts.
This final point relates directly to the central problem of this chapter. In an age of normal
nihilism, Christians must be able to give defensible reasons why they think that their use of
Scripture is also God's use. But if interpreters do not recognize that God makes both demands
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and promises through the Scriptures, then the unity and coherence of the Scriptures will be
grounded in human speculation about God. Therefore, the assumptions that Christians apply to
read the Scriptures will not be grounded in God's acts, but in the human intellect's ability to put
all the pieces together in persuasive way.
The remainder of this section will unpack this thesis by discussing the two different
economies in which the Scriptures might fit: the economy of the human intellect to make sense
of God and the economy of the Triune God to create the obedience of faith. These two
economies are already at work in the debate between Luther and Erasmus. Luther argues that we
should place the scriptures within the economy of the Triune God, while Erasmus argues on
behalf of the economy of the human intellect. I will use the debate between these two men in
order to frame my discussion.
Reading Scripture in Two Different Economies
In his debate with Luther over the freedom of the will, Erasmus already understands the
futility of reading the Scriptures within the economy of the human intellect. Erasmus thinks the
Scriptures are unclear. And by unclear, Erasmus means that if one wants to formulate a definite
position on the topic of human bondage, for example, one will encounter some passages that
seem to support human freedom and some that seem to oppose it. The scriptures do not present a
clear and unified position one way or the other. Since they are unclear, every position on the
matter can only be the work of the interpreter who stands over the scriptures and organizes them
into a coherent and unified way. Given this particular deficiency of the scriptures, there seems to
be no other way of operating than to let the interpreter assemble a meaning in a persuasive way.
And that is exactly what Erasmus does when he gets around to using the Scriptures. He lumps
the passages together that seem to support free will and those that seem to oppose it, and he
organizes them into a unified and coherent position on the basis of an inference about God,
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namely that God would be unjust to punish if we do not have the ability to choose the good or
not. About this, Steven Paulson remarks that, "Erasmus was traditional and old according to his
method of reading Scripture (or any book for that matter) in one fundamental sense; he believed
that the work of the exegete was to harmonize apparent contradictions in Scripture, acting as
something of a neutral referee."I5
To his credit, Erasmus already understood the consequences. One immediately encounters
a multiplicity of competing interpretations about the same topic with no clear way of discerning
between them. The scriptures themselves cannot be the final judge of their meaning since the
meaning of the scriptures is exactly what is being debated. So Erasmus rightly concludes that we
are left with the impossible task of discerning which interpreter has the Spirit. But how does one
judge the Spirit? By the majority opinion? By ecclesial rank? By the attractiveness of the
inference? Erasmus prefers to "seek refuge in Scepticism"I6 because he sees just how intractable
this problem really is. Why squabble over the opinions of men?
Luther does not argue with Erasmus' point as much as he appropriates a different way of
reading the scriptural text altogether. Luther reads the Scriptures within the context of the
apostolic mission. Luther argues that contrary to what Erasmus thinks, the scriptures are not
obscure, but in fact have a double clarity: an external and an internal clarity. The external clarity
pertains to God's use of the scriptures for his own purposes of proclaiming Christ, or as Luther
puts it, "to the ministry of the Word.' Luther writes,

15 Steven D. Paulson, "Internal Clarity of Scripture and the Modern World," in Hermeneutica Sacra: Studien
Zur Auslegung Der Heiligen Schrift im 16. Und 17. Jahr Hundert/Studies of the Interpretation of Holy scripture in
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, ed. Torbjorn Johansson, Robert Kolb, Johann Anselm Steiger (Berlin:
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I admit, of course, that there are many texts in the Scriptures that are obscure and
abstruse, not because of the majesty of their subject matter, but because of our
ignorance of their vocabulary and grammar; but these texts in no way hinder a
knowledge of all the subject matter of scripture. For what still sublime thing can
remain hidden in the Scriptures, now that the seals have been broken, the stone rolled
from the door of the sepulcher [Matt. 27:66; 28:2], and the supreme majesty brought
to light, namely, that Christ the Son of God has been made man, that God is three and
one, that Christ has suffered for us and is to reign eternally? Are not these things
known and sung even in the highwaFs and byways? Take Christ out of the Scriptures,
and what will you find left in them?
David Yeago notices that in marking out the external clarity of scripture as the ministry of
the word, Luther distinguishes between "the verba of Holy Scripture and its res or subject
matter."19 Contrary to Erasmus, who approaches the scriptures as if the subject matter was
unclear, Luther points out that while the words might be obscure in some places,
The subject matter of Scriptures, therefore, is all quite accessible, even though some
texts are still obscure owing to our ignorance of their terms. Truly it is stupid and
impious, when we know that the subject matter of scripture has all been placed in the
clearest light, to call it obscure on account of a few obscure words. If the words are
obscure in one place, yet they are plain in another; and it is one and the same theme,
published quite openly to the whole world, which in the Scriptures is sometimes
expressed in plain words and sometimes lies as yet hidden in obscure words."2°
Luther does not use the phrase "published quite openly to the whole world," by accident.
He gestures here at the economy we have already mentioned. The subject matter of scripture is
just as plain and clear as if Peter or Paul were standing before us pronouncing to us the acts of
God in Jesus. Therefore, the external clarity of Scripture is external in the same sense that the
apostle's message was external to those who heard them speaking. Elsewhere, Luther describes
the same phenomenon in terms of spoken and written words. The spoken word of the gospel is
primary and proper; it is that from which the written word derives and for which it aims. Luther
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puts it this way: "the gospel should really not be something written, but a spoken word which
brought forth the Scriptures, as Christ and the apostles have done."'
By following Luther's language of the external clarity of Scripture, I am not suggesting
that anyone can read the Scriptures without presuppositions. I am not suggesting, in other words,
that the clarity of Scripture is an attribute of the text. Rather, I am suggesting that when the
Scriptures are read within the context of the apostolic mission, they have a central feature: they
proclaim the Lordship of Christ. This position is not only theologically significant but also
historically defensible. As we have seen in our brief look at Irenaeus, the subject matter of
scripture that Luther refers to is apostolic in nature. It is proclaimed publically first by the
apostles who were commissioned by Christ, and then written down for the same purposes. In that
sense the apostolic tradition precedes the written scriptures. Irenaeus makes this argument more
fully in the first book of Against Heresies. There, he uses an analogy to describe the Gnostic
interpretations of the scriptures. The scriptures, he argues, are like the image of a king cast in
jewels. The Gnostics have taken apart the pieces and rearranged them into their own image, that
of a fox; but they nevertheless declare that this is the right image of the king. Irenaeus, writes
that "in like manner do these persons patch together old wives' fables, and then endevour, by
violently drawing away from their proper connection, words, expressions, and parables whenever
found, to adapt the oracles of God to their baseless fictions.' To counter this dilemma, Irenaeus
refers us to the apostolic rule of truth as the correct way of assembling the pieces into their
proper place. But, this rule of truth is not the application of a principle foreign to the scriptures
that subsequently has authority over them. It is the proper subject matter of the scriptures
themselves. And if the scriptures are to be read on their own terms, this subject matter must be
21
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applied. Irenaeus, can say this because the rule of truth that he refers to is none other than the
apostolic tradition concerning Christ, passed down directly from the apostles through the church
to the present time.'
Accordingly, John Behr contends that the rule of truth, which Irenaeus refers to, "is not an
arbitrary principle to be used to exclude other legitimate voices or trajectories. Rather it
expresses the hypothesis of scripture, enabling the demonstrations from Scripture to describe,
accurately, the portrait of a king, Christ; it is a mode of interpretation delivered by the apostles in
their proclamation of Christ.'"4 Thus, Behr concludes that, "the apostolic writings and tradition
are not two independent or complementary sources, but two modalities of the Gospel 'according
to the [Old Testament] Scriptures.' So, for Irenaeus, both the true apostolic tradition maintained
by the churches, and the apostolic writings themselves, derive from the same apostles, and have
one and the same content...' 25 Hence, the external clarity of the Scripture that I am describing is
not one that claims to have no presuppositions. Rather, when the apostolic testimony is the
guiding assumption applied to the Scriptures, their clarity is the apostolic proclamation
concerning Christ.
Let me pause here and elaborate on the external nature of the apostolic proclamation,
because it is a crucial point. As I have said already, the primary purpose of Scripture is to declare
the Lordship of God's Son so that those who hear the message might believe it and live by faith
in Christ. Since God wishes to speak about his Son in order to create faith, the apostolic message
about Jesus (the gospel in the broad sense) should be spoken as a word of promise (or what I
would like to call the gospel in the narrow sense).
23 Ibid.,
24
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Oswald Bayer helps clarify the significance of the spoken word with his discussion of
proinissio in Luther's thought. Borrowing from J. S. Austin, Bayer suggests that a promise is a
kind of speech act, whereby God establishes a relationship with the one to whom God speaks. A
promise does not make a declaration about a reality external to the word of promise itself. Words
of promise do not refer to a state of affairs or express emotions. Rather, the words of a promise
enact a reality as they are spoken from one person to another. "Since the sign is itself already the
thing it declares, this means, with reference to absolution [for instance], that the statement 'I
absolve you of your sins!' is not a judgment, which merely establishes that something is already
true."" It is a statement that actually enacts forgiveness in the present. For example, when Jesus
forgives the sins of the paralytic (Luke 5:17-26), Jesus' words enact the reality of forgiveness.
Of course, the validity of Jesus' speech act depends on his authority—whether or not he has the
right to speak in the stead and on behalf of God. And that is exactly why the Pharisees question
Jesus' authority. Only God alone has the authority to forgive sins. So, only God can enact such a
reality by speaking words. Otherwise Jesus really is a blasphemer. But if Jesus does have God's
authority, his words do enact the reality of forgiveness between one person and another.
The forgiveness of sins is important for Luther, but I do not want to draw too much
attention to forgiveness per se. I only point to forgiveness as an example of the kind of speech
act that Bayer describes as "promise." For Luther, the apostolic proclamation about Jesus'
lordship is this type of speech act whereby God establishes a relationship by taking a stance
over-against the one with whom God speaks. Through this proclamation, God speaks by making
a promise to us; he enacts a reality between the speaker and the hearer.

26 Oswald Bayer, Martin Luther's Theology: A Contemporary Interpretation, trans. Thomas H. Trapp (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 52-53.
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Following the contours of our discussion, I might add that a promise cannot be used by the
recipient in the same way that Erasmus uses the scripture to make an inference about God. And
this is an important point. When a promise is made, the speaker uses the words to enact a present
reality, creating a mutual bond between the speaker and hearer. So the hearer can do nothing
except trust (or reject) the word on the basis of the speaker's authority. For instance, a response
like, "that is just your opinion," does not recognize the type of speech act taking place. It tries to
gain an advantage over the speaker by questioning the meaning and truth of his words. But if a
promise is to be received as a promise, the question regarding its truth is a matter of whether the
speaker has the proper authority to give the promise and not the reality of the referent.
Therefore, when Luther refers to the external clarity of scripture, he is referring to this sort
of speech act. The promise that God makes to us by proclaiming the message about Jesus is one
of favor and election. It can be summarized by the gospel of John when its author declares that,
"For God so loved the world that he gave his only Son, so that everyone who believes in him
may not perish but have eternal life" (John 3:16). Or again, "The Father loves the Son and has
placed all things in his hands. Whoever believes in the Son has eternal life; whoever disobeys the
Son will not see life, but must endure God's wrath" (John 3:35-36). Put in terms more akin to
Paul, God has imprisoned all in disobedience in order that he might be free to have mercy on all
who have faith in Jesus. But in order to have faith, someone needs to proclaim the message to us.
Hence, John says about his gospel account: "Now Jesus did many other signs in the presence of
his disciples, which are not written in this book. But these are written so that you may come to
believe that Jesus is the Messiah, the Son of God, and that through believing you may have life
in his name" (John 20:30-31).
Therefore, the external clarity of the Scripture pertains directly to its function in God's
economy of salvation. God sends out apostles to speak on God's behalf about Jesus, so that those

208

who believe the message might live by faith in the God and Father of Jesus. When the story
about Jesus is read as a promise from God, for the hearer in the present, it functions properly as
gospel.
But God does not only use the story about Jesus to make promises. God also uses the
Scripture to make demands. Paul's letters contain countless exhortations to lead a holy life in
accordance with our faith in God. And Jesus gives numerous commands throughout the gospels
to live according to the will of God. As law, these passages express God's desire and will, and
their function is plain and simple. They express what God wants from us; they express what God
wants us to do. This is their intent and purpose. When we hear expressions of law, we will have
different kinds of responses depending on our disposition and the Spirit's intent. We might hear
these demands and welcome them as prudent instruction from God. In other words, we might
hear these demands and feel compelled to do what they say because they are God's will; and
God's will is always good. Or, we might hear these demands and realize that we are not living up
to God's will, and we will be ashamed and crushed by their accusations and indignant of their
giver. Or when we hear them we might feel compelled to keep them under the threat of
punishment. All of these are valid ways to hear the demands of the law, and the Spirit uses these
demands in different ways to conforming us to the obedience of faith.
Furthermore, the force of these demands is not mitigated by the promise of the gospel
concerning Jesus. The word of the law is simply a different kind of word than the words of
promise, and God speaks words of demand because he expects us to follow them and obey his
will. Expressions of law are not any less demands from God on account of God's promises that
we have God's favor through faith in Jesus. In fact, when we have heard the word of promise in
the gospel concerning Jesus and trust in God, we will be inclined to hear these demands as
prudent instruction and feel compelled to do what they say because we trust the God who gives
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them. In summary, then, the law and the gospel are two different ways that God speaks through
the Scriptures, and God uses them both for the purposes of bringing about the obedience of faith.
Neither one cancels out the other.
As opposed to noticing that God speaks in two different ways through the Scriptures,
Erasmus approaches the Scriptures with a different intent. When Erasmus made his argument for
the freedom of the will, he focused his attention on those portions of Scripture that are not
promises, but demands and threats. His argument went like this: Since there are many places in
the scriptures where God makes demands, it would be unjust of God to judge us if we did not
have the freedom to fulfill those demands. A key passage in Erasmus' argument was the
eighteenth chapter of Ezekiel, in which God declares that he does not will the death of a sinner,
but that the sinner turn and live. Erasmus used this passage, among others, as the basis for his
inference about God. Notice, though, that in his use of the Scriptures, Erasmus does just as
Paulson suggests. He finds a ruling principle—a harmony of the texts—that lies in the mind of
the interpreter. As Erasmus admits, this inference can only be justified by its persuasiveness as a
human conjecture about God.
But Luther recognizes that such an inference does not let God speak for himself. In light of
the clarity of Scripture's proclamation concerning Christ, Luther exposes Erasmus' inference as
just that—an inference belonging to human reason rather than God. Rather than make such an
inference, Luther recognizes that God's speaks in two different ways through the apostolic
Scriptures. Instead of trying to make the demands cohere with other content of Scripture, Luther
notices that God speaks in two different ways through the Scriptures.
Therefore, the central insight about the law/gospel distinction is this: If we do not observe
the fact that Scripture makes both demands and promises, then our reading will not be done
within the context of God's economy of salvation. To try and make demands and promises
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cohere into a unified system would only turn the message about Jesus into human speculation,
producing an idea about God that we find either convincing or not. But if we recognize that God
makes demands and promises in the Scriptures, we let the Scriptures function as direct discourse,
through which God himself speaks to us—on the one hand making promises through the
proclamation about Jesus and on the other hand making demands through the law.
If the words of promise and demand are not recognized in the Scriptures, the texts become
general statements about God that need to be harmonized by the reader. For instance, Erasmus
found it necessary to harmonize the imperatives of Scripture with its other content by making a
general statement about God. Luther on the other hand, let the demands function as demands
from God without speculating on how the same God could make both demands and promises of
us. Luther does not move from the demands to something more universal and principled. He
reads them as words from God. And rather than using these statements to make more general and
principled conclusions about God, he allows them to have their force as demands and promises
from God. The Scriptures should not be read for the purpose of making general statements about
God; they are direct discourse from the one with the proper authority to speak either promises or
demands. If the one with all authority in heaven and earth makes a promise to us, we should trust
it. Likewise, if the one with all authority in heaven and earth makes demands of us, we should
obey them. Therefore, Luther finds that both kinds of expressions (those that make demands and
those that make promises) ought to be read as having their force. Erasmus, on the other hand,
found it necessary to speculate about God because he did not approach the Scripture as direct
discourse from God. But then "God" only becomes a principled idea, and the Scriptures merely
serve as the raw material for human reason's project of making an inference about God. And if
the unity and coherence of the Scriptures—the guiding assumption—of the Christian faith is
grounded in the human mind's ability to make sense of God, we cannot avoid the impression,
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which is common in our age of normal nihilism, that when the church reads the Scriptures, we
never hear the word of God, but only human words.
On the other hand, recognizing the fact that God makes demands and promises through
Scripture, allows the Christian use of Scripture to be grounded in God's acts in Jesus and through
the Spirit. As I have been arguing throughout this dissertation, these acts of God are not
impervious to doubt. For instance, their truth depends on the eyewitness apostolic account that
the God of Israel raised Jesus from the dead. And this side of the eschaton, we will not be able to
prove Jesus' resurrection. But at the least, when Christians distinguish between law and gospel
when reading the Christian Scriptures, Christians will have defensible reasons for thinking that
God is using their work to speak his word.

Holy Scripture and Preaching
Finally, then, I would like to be a bit more specific about how the church should use its
Scriptures. If the Scriptures are to function as direct discourse, speaking words from God rather
than merely about God, the primary (but not the only) context for using the Scriptures should be
the act of preaching. Preaching takes place in many different places throughout the life of the
church. But the public worship service is one of the most significant places where preaching
takes place. The church today often reads the Scriptures out loud in public worship. But if the
Scriptures are not followed by preaching, it is not always clear why they are read aloud. And
often times the hearer is left to assemble the meaning for himself. Preaching that follows the
public reading of scripture provides an opportunity for the written Scriptures to be brought into
the context of the apostolic mission. In the church, preaching is supposed to be the place where
God's ordained servant speaks on God's behalf, just as he was sent and authorized to do. Exactly
what the preacher says will be determined by the individual text and the place it has within
God's purposes of speaking through the apostles to create a people for himself. It might be to
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make the move to elect those present on God's behalf, but it does not have to be. It might also be
an opportunity to warn them of complacency, to encourage them to perseverance and
faithfulness, or even to teach in moments of misunderstanding or conflict. In any case, when the
preacher lets the text place him within the apostolic mission, God gets the final word. Rather
than conforming to our own best ideas, God stands over-against us and speaks his own mind. If
the God of the Scriptures is to be a living God, and if the church's use is to be more than a
rhetoric of power, then preachers need to fully embrace the apostolic mission for which they are
ordained and preach from the Scriptures words of both law and gospel.
Of course, this is easy to say in the abstract. But what exactly does it look like? Let me
conclude by offering a sermonic example along with some commentary in order to put some
more substantial flesh on this chapter's thesis. The following sermon was preached at Holy Cross
Lutheran church in Saint Louis, MO. The sermon preaches from the parable of the Good
Samaritan (Luke 10: 25-37). This text of Scripture often gives people who claim to follow the
law/gospel distinction trouble because the parable is introduced by a man who comes to Jesus
and asks what he can do to inherit eternal life, and the passage ends when Jesus tells the man to
go and do just as the parable suggests.
In this sermon, I follow the law/gospel distinction by maintaining the rhetorical force of the
demand Jesus makes to go and do likewise. The difficulty in hearing this demand as prudent
instruction from God, however, is that very few people think that spontaneously helping a
stranger—even a possible enemy—is wise and good. This is especially true in a congregation
with many (but certainly not all) white, middle class members. Even more challenging, this
congregation worships in a building located in a poor area of town, where many immigrants live
and where street begging can be considered a common nuisance. In the south portion of the city
of Saint Louis, there is little segregation between wealthy and poor families. In this setting, it is
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easy to think with the culture that everyone gets what they deserve, and no one has any right to
what is mine. In order to address this challenge, the sermon asks about the way things really are.
Do we live in a world where it makes sense to take Jesus' commands seriously? Or do Jesus'
commands need to be reinterpreted and softened. The sermon tells an alternative parable that
brings to light the radical nature of Jesus' commands and also exposes the grounds for thinking
that these commands do not apply to us because they are simply not common sense. Then the
sermon proclaims the Lordship of the one who turned no one away, declares our participation in
Jesus' Lordship, and calls us to go and do just as Jesus commanded. All the elements of the
law/gospel distinction I have described above are displayed in this sermon. The gospel promise
concerning the Lordship of Jesus is proclaimed to the hearers. But that promise does not mitigate
or reinterpret the demand Jesus makes. In fact, the demand applies in all of its radical force
especially to those of us who have been called out of darkness and into light.
A Sermon on Pentecost 7, Series C, 2010
If you are anything like me, you've probably heard the parable of the Good Samaritan so
many times now that you've forgotten that this isn't the only answer to the question that is asked.
Luke tells us that a lawyer, who at this time means someone who is a professional and a
certified expert in reading the Old Testament, came up to Jesus in order to test him. "Teacher,"
he said, "what must I do to inherit the age to come?" Since he was a lawyer, Jesus asked him
what he read in the Old Testament. The lawyer replied, Love the Lord your God with all your
heart, soul, strength and mind, and love your neighbor as yourself. Jesus thought this was a good
answer and said to the lawyer, "You have given the right answer, do this and you will live."
But this isn't enough, at least not for the lawyer. After all, everyone knows the golden rule.
Everyone knows that we're supposed to love our neighbor as much as we love ourselves. This
seems like common sense. But not everyone keeps the golden rule in the same way. So for the
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lawyer, Jesus hasn't said enough yet. Yes of course I'm supposed to love my neighbor, everyone
knows that. But the real question is, "Who is my neighbor?"
If you're anything like me, you've probably heard the parable of the Good Samaritan so
many times now that you've forgotten that this isn't the only answer to the question, "Who is my
neighbor?" There are lots of different answers that we hear everyday. Yes, of course I should
love my neighbor as myself, but who is my neighbor? I can't love everyone all the time exactly
the same way. So who in particular should I love? Whether we realize it or not, Jesus' answer to
this question isn't the common answer. In fact, the world has its own answer to this question that
is quite different than what Jesus says.
If someone were to put the world's answer into a parable it would go like this. There was a
young Hispanic woman who lived in sin most of her life. She went from boyfriend to boyfriend.
And when her current boyfriend got her pregnant he started to beat her until she finally
abandoned him. So she left Chicago where she was living with her boyfriend and went down to
Saint Louis where her mother lived in poverty. And now she found herself living with her
mother who didn't have enough money to feed herself, let alone her pregnant daughter. One
night they didn't have anything to eat, and the young woman, pregnant seven months, was
starving. At least that's the story her mother told when she was begging for food outside a fast
food restaurant.
Now by chance, a middle-aged business man happened by the place where they were
begging. The mother quickly came up to him and told him her story and said, "Could you please
buy her a meal so she can have something to eat tonight?" But he quickly replied, "No," and
went on his way. And as he walked away he thought to himself, "It was her fault that she got
herself into this jam in the first place. We all have an equal opportunity in this country, and if
you blow your chance, if you make the wrong decisions in life, that's the way the world works. I
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have my own bills to pay and my own expenses, my wife, kids, and house. Who is going to feed
us if I start giving money away like it's nothing. She doesn't deserve my help, and she's
probably lying anyway."
Minutes later a young family came walking by and the Hispanic mother quickly came up to
them and told her story and asked if they could please buy her daughter a meal for the night. The
family stopped for a moment to talk it over. But then they decided that since they didn't know
the woman they shouldn't just give their money away. If it was their actual neighbor who needed
a meal, or the older woman they knew from church, then they would help. After all, they cared
about their community. But this woman was clearly just driving through their neighborhood.
You can only help so many people, so you might as well make it those who are closest to you.
That's the way the world works.
But finally, a young man came walking by and the mother came up and begged him. And
being a Christian who had some money in his pocket, he said "Yes." So he and the daughter
went into the restaurant and she started ordering her meal. As they were making it, the mother
came in too and she also started to order a meal. And then while they were making the mother's
meal, the daughter ordered more food. And this went on until the bill for a fast food meal was
over twenty dollars, and the young man had spent all the money he had on him. They took the
young man for a ride.
Who is my neighbor? According to this story, the business man and the young family were
smarter than the young man. They've been around the block a little longer and they knew just
how the world works. The business man knew that you only have one chance in life and if you
blow it, that's your own fault. So you better take care of yours in life. And the young family
knew that you just can't help someone you don't know. You can certainly help others who are

216

close to you, your community, but not some stranger that you can't trust. There's no benefit to
the community. That's the way the world works after all.
But Jesus tells a different story all-together. Who is my neighbor? Who should I love?
Jesus tells this story: A man was going down the road from Jerusalem to Jericho when a group of
robbers ambushed him, beat him, took his money and left him by the side of the road for dead. A
temple priest came down the road, and when he saw the man lying there he went to the other
side. After all, he had his own business to attend to and touching a near-dead person would make
him unfit for duty in the temple. Then a Levite, who is a person who also worked in the temple,
came down the road and when he saw the man, he too crossed over to the other side.
But then a Samaritan came down the road. Samaritans were blood enemies of the Israelite
people of that time. They were a half-breed of Israelite and gentile. When the Israelites were
kicked out of their own land, the Samaritans were the people who stayed behind and married the
conquerors. They were traitors—a disgrace to the Israelites—and they refused to respect the
Israelite's authority when they came back to the land. They refused to worship in the temple in
Jerusalem. And the Israelites wouldn't think of letting them get close to the temple anyway.
Samaritans and Israelites wouldn't even touch the same water bucket at the well; this is how
much they hated one another. But this Samaritan, when he saw the man who was beaten and
lying on the road for dead was moved with compassion. He went over to him, bandaged his
wounds, put him on his own animal, and took him to an inn to take care of him. And his care for
the man didn't stop there. He gave the innkeeper money and told him to care for him until he is
well, that he would repay the innkeeper anything it cost to bring this man back to health.
Who is my neighbor? The Samaritan had plenty of reasons to move on and keep walking
down the road. He had plenty of reasons to think that this man was not his neighbor; that the
golden rule didn't apply here and now. But when he saw this man who was beaten, robbed, and
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left for dead he was moved with compassion and he put aside all those reasons and had mercy on
the man. This is what it means to love your neighbor as yourself: to put aside all obligations, to
put aside all the rules, and all the reasons, and to have mercy on those who need it the most.
I want to ask you a question: Is this realistic? The other story has lots of evidence on its
side. That is why the world's answer is so common and often so appealing to us. Can we really
take Jesus seriously? Should we really consider putting aside all our best reasons not to and have
mercy on whomever needs it, to have mercy on those people who interrupt our lives and break
all the rules? Is this the way the world really works?
Yes! This parable is not some fairy tail, or some unpractical, over-the-top ethical standard
intended to make us feel bad about ourselves. This is the way the world works when God breaks
in and has his way.
That, after all, is why God sent Jesus. The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, Jesus said,
because he has anointed me to bring good news to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim release
to the captives and recovery of sight to the blind, to let the oppressed go free, to proclaim the
year of the Lord's favor. And that is exactly what Jesus did. He touched those people who were
considered untouchable, and he healed them. He reconciled the outcasts: those who were sinners
and unforgiveable, he forgave their sins. And he turned no one away who sought him out. He had
mercy on whoever needed it.
This is the way the world works when God breaks in through Jesus and has his way. Not
everyone liked what God was doing through Jesus. And in order to save the old standard, the old
rules, and the old reasons, they put Jesus on trial for claiming to be from God. They loved the old
world so much that they couldn't believe that God who created all things in heaven and on earth
had actually send this Jesus to do what he was doing. And they tried to do away with him by
crucifying him. If you are the Christ of God, come down now from the cross so that we might
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see and believe. But God had his way at the cross too. Father forgive them, for they do not know
what they are doing, Jesus said. But even greater, God raised Jesus from the dead to live and
reign over all things in heaven and on earth.
This is the way the world works when God breaks in and has his way here at Holy Cross.
God, the one who controls the wind and the waves, who brings the sun to rise in the morning and
set in the evening, the one who determines the way the world works—God is still working
through Jesus. For God has gathered you here this morning to have mercy on you; to forgive
your sins, to bring you into his kingdom to be a part of his people through Jesus. He hasn't done
it by the world's rules. God doesn't favor you because you great-grandparents were German, or
because you've been a good American your whole life, pulling yourself up by your boot straps
and getting what you deserve. God favors you, God has mercy on you, simply because he loves
you in Jesus Christ.
Brothers and sisters in Christ, this is the way the world works when God breaks in and has
his way. Go and do likewise. In the name of Jesus, Amen.
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CONCLUSION
AFTER NIHILISM?
The past three chapters each claimed to help Christian faith and life move beyond nihilism.
But even if the arguments are coherent and consistent, one might still wonder whether any of this
really does help us get past the problem of nihilism. The thesis I have been offering over the past
three chapters is this: the sole justification Christians have for their faith and life is found in the
divine authority of the man Jesus of Nazareth. This man claimed to be sent by the God of Israel
to bring about the consummation of all things. He was rejected for that claim by his own people,
and crucified as a blasphemer. But God raised him from the dead, vindicating his claims to be
the Son of God and the Christ of Israel. Then Jesus commissioned his disciples to go into the
whole world to preach the message about him to anyone who would hear it, so that those who
believe it might live by faith in the God and Father of the Lord Jesus Christ. That message has
been handed down from the apostles through the church, and is contained in the rule of faith.
Christians believe in the divine authority of Jesus on account of this apostolic testimony. And the
New Testament scriptures are authorized versions of the apostolic message, through which God
speaks in the present in order to gather a people for himself.
This thesis should not be a controversial explanation of the Christian faith. But one might
legitimately ask whether this account does the work I claim for it. Even if this is the only
justification Christians have for their faith and life, does it really help us move beyond our
nihilism? After all, this account does not give Christians a knock-down, unassailable reason for
the Christian faith. It does not, in other words, give Christians reasons that silence all doubts and
simultaneously prove all other belief to be false. For instance, while it gives reasons for believing
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the Scripture's message, it does not prove those reasons beyond any doubt. And so even with this
justification for their faith and life, Christians are still faced with the fact that our account is one
among a number of others available in the contemporary west. Furthermore, it might not even be
the "best" account. In other words, this thesis does not rule out the possibility that there are more
comprehensive and appealing accounts of our existence than the Christian one. That is the
primary difference between my thesis and the responses given by John Milbank and Stanley
Hauerwas. My thesis simply suggests that Christians have these reasons for their faith and life.
So does this really help us move beyond nihilism?
Let me try to answer this apparent objection by recounting the nature of the problem. We
live in a time when we are burdened by choice. The world in which we live no longer presents
itself to us as having one clear and discernable order. As I suggested in the first chapter, this
burden is both a micro and a macro phenomenon. In its most banal expression, our nihilism is
reflected in the grocery store as we stare at the dozens of options we can choose from and realize
that we have no good way to discern between the choices. At another level, though, our nihilism
comes to expression by the way technology presents the world to us as standing reserve, devoid
of meaning beyond that to which we decide to assign it for our own use and purposes. Likewise,
Christian faith and life used to frame existence for westerners. It provided the beliefs and
practices that made the world meaningful. But now Christianity is another possible option among
a number of others. Any Christian in the contemporary west can have an unbelieving neighbor,
who lives a perfectly coherent life and yet adheres to another religion, or who is a convinced
atheist, or is entirely apathetic to religion altogether. As Charles Taylor points out, we live in an
age when religious belief is just one option among a number of others.' Nietzsche expressed this

Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 1-22.
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condition by saying that God is dead. Whereas God used to frame our existence, God is now
another possibility, another way to get through life. Given this common condition, the
convictions we hold most dear appear to us as values: convictions we hold dear and nothing
more. But insofar as our convictions appear as values, they devalue themselves. After all, they
are not the way things are, but merely beliefs and practices that we hold. Given this common
condition, the sacred and profane (to use Edwards' terminology) invert and collapse. God is
dead. And Christians are faced with the real question whether or not Christianity is just another
value, just another conviction that we find important.
One way to suggest that Christianity is more than another set of values is to argue that
Christianity has the "best" account. Lacking the resources and political context to have a knockdown non-circular argument that would prove Christianity right, this strategy appeals to the
goodness of Christian faith and life in comparison to the other options. But I have been trying to
argue throughout the dissertation that aiming to give the "best" account of our existence only
panders to the normal nihilist sense that all of life has become a commodity for our consumption.
Since there is no clear, definitive, and assumed "way things are," we are burdened with the
demand to judge and choose between them. Therefore, any judgment about what counts as the
best can only be determined by our own tastes and preferences. This is finally where Milbank
and Hauerwas, in my estimation, do not help us move beyond nihilism, but only operate within
the parameters of the problem.
Instead of this strategy, my thesis does not appeal to human taste or reason but to God's
own act as it is reported by the apostolic tradition. The reasons Christians have for their faith and
life stem from God's action in the man Jesus of Nazareth. The challenge for Christian theology
(and the reason this dissertation is a work in systematic theology) is to express the Christian faith
in a way that is consistent with God's revealed will and action rather than something that is
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palatable to what we think God should be like. Since the time of Plato, I have argued, the west
has thought of God as the principled ground and cause of our existence. Therefore, under the
persuasion of this mood of thinking, Christians have been compelled to portray God's actions in
such a way that makes them subject to the discernment and judgment of human reason or taste.
Categories like God hidden and God preached, and a theologian of glory and a theologian of the
cross are helpful in maintaining the priority and authority of God when we speak about him.
So by appealing to God's own act, I have given Christians reasons for the faith (reasons
that are wholly catholic) that precede our intellectual and aesthetic sensibilities. In that sense,
these reasons are external to us. They come to us through a spoken word that has been handed
down from the man Jesus himself. They have been written down and collected in the apostolic
Scriptures, and they give us our presuppositions for reading the Scriptures in light of God's
actions. They might not be intellectually or existentially satisfying. But that is half the point.
They do not enshrine the human subject as lord and judge over God. They let God have his way
with us. They let God speak for himself. The other half of the point has to do with God's actions.
A primary occupation of my argument has been to give reasons why we say that God acts in
Jesus of Nazareth, and while those reasons are consistent and can be defended, they are never
absolute and impervious to doubt. But to have reasons that are impervious to doubt is the false
hope of Constantinian Christianity and foundationalism. Christians do not have reasons that can
transform our society back into Christendom and eliminate the context that burdens us with
choice. But within this context, Christian theology can have reasons that do not underwrite
nihilism. Simply put, in an age of normal nihilism Christians can live through faith in the
external, spoken word of God.
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